In the first part of this paper, I argue that philosophers of sport have mistakenly privileged a specific psychology and purpose in their definitions of competition. The result of this mistake has been that philosophers of sport make generalisations about competition as such which in fact only hold for some competitions. In the second and third parts of the paper, I articulate an alternative approach: rather than search for a single psychology and purpose that underlies all competition, I argue that (...) we should begin by acknowledging four distinctly different competitive formats, and only then enquire as to which psychologies and purposes are more or less appropriate to each format. This method allows us to capture the richness and diversity of competition, and helps to ensure that we do not confuse part and whole when defining it. (shrink)

By examining his account of individual virtues, making inferences from his analyses of flawed cities, and teasing out the tacit assumptions behind claims about the nature of political activity, I argue that Aristotle thinks of competition as being a political ideal rather than as an inevitable corruption of civic life. Virtuous citizens compete for civic honor through traditional "competitive outlays" and contend against one another for prestigious offices in the city. Moreover, I argue that the very structure of political deliberation (...) is competitive. It is through a "vis-à-vis" competition among proposals that a winning policy is adopted, and the speakers who offer these proposals are themselves involved in a competition for political influence. (shrink)

In this article, I respond to the criticisms that Richard Royce has made of my theory of competition in Sport, Ethics and Philosophy. While I find some of his attacks misplaced, a number of his criticisms address key difficulties to which I offer clarification and defense.

By examining his account of individual virtues, making inferences from his analyses of flawed cities, and teasing out the tacit assumptions behind claims about the nature of political activity, I argue that Aristotle thinks of competition as being a political ideal rather than as an inevitable corruption of civic life. Virtuous citizens compete for civic honor through traditional “competitive outlays” and contend against one another for prestigious offices in the city. Moreover, I argue that the very structure of political deliberation (...) is competitive. It is through a “vis-à-vis” competition among proposals that a winning policy is adopted, and the speakers who offer these proposals are themselves involved in a competition for political influence. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean is often interpreted as a map of how character virtues are constituted. Taken in this way, critics argue that the Doctrine fails to describe accurately the specific virtues analyzed in books 3 to 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics. I argue that Aristotle does not offer the Doctrine as a map, but rather as a legend in terms of which any explication of a character virtue should be given. This interpretation resolves a number of interpretative problems (...) in the Ethics and sheds light on the way the Doctrine does, and does not, guide action. (shrink)

Aristotle's Politics is widely recognized as one of the classics of the history of political philosophy, and like every other such masterpiece, it is a work about which there is deep division.

This paper develops and defends a new interpretation of Aristotle's conception of democratic and oligarchic identity. Rejecting interpretations that ground partisan identities in class, greed, or conceptions of justice, this interpretation posits that Aristotle thought of democrats and oligarchs as being defined by the confluence of four distinct traits: having an incorrect conception of happiness, having an incorrect conception of political desert, suffering from an emotional defect, and habitually inferring equality/inequality in all respects from one respect. The argument for this (...) interpretation is that it best explains why Aristotle attributes a despotic attitude to partisans and it explains why democrats and oligarchs are depicted as being unstintingly hostile towards one another. The paper concludes by arguing that Aristotle chose these four traits in order to show that partisans are citizens who devote themselves to a life of discriminatory elitism. (shrink)

Offers a careful analysis of how Aristotle understands civil war, partisanship, distrust in government, disagreement, and competition, and explores ways in which these views are relevant to contemporary political theory. Do only modern thinkers like Machiavelli and Hobbes accept that conflict plays a significant role in the origin and maintenance of political community? In this book, Steven Skultety argues that Aristotle not only took conflict to be an inevitable aspect of political life, but further recognized ways in which conflict promotes (...) the common good. While many scholars treat Aristotelian conflict as an absence of substantive communal ideals, Skultety argues that Aristotle articulated a view of politics that theorizes profoundly different kinds of conflict. Aristotle comprehended the subtle factors that can lead otherwise peaceful citizens to contemplate outright civil war, grasped the unique conditions that create hopelessly implacable partisans, and systematized tactics rulers could use to control regrettable, but still manageable, levels of civic distrust. Moreover, Aristotle conceived of debate, enduring disagreement, social rivalries, and competitions for leadership as an indispensable part of how human beings live well together in successful political life. By exploring the ways in which citizens can be at odds with one another, Conflict in Aristotle’s Political Philosophy presents a dimension of ancient Greek thought that is startlingly relevant to contemporary concerns about social divisions, constitutional crises, and the range of acceptable conflict in healthy democracies. “Through debate with other scholars, this book clarifies the meaning of stasis, a central term in Aristotle’s Politics; speculates about the limits of Aristotle’s notion of practical wisdom; and puts in dialogue Aristotle’s historical thought with contemporary debates about the nature of political conflict.” — Thornton Lockwood, Quinnipiac University. (shrink)

This article examines the grounds for Plato's negative attitude towards trade, commerce and currency in the Laws. The author shows that commerce and trade are condemned because they are fundamentally private, and demonstrates that Plato rejects gold and silver currency because its use encourages a kind of cosmopolitanism. Rather than condemning the competitiveness or licentiousness of the economic sphere, Plato critiques it for turning the citizens' attention away from civic life.

Some scholars have claimed that Aristotle uses the word " stasis " to refer to any sort of conflict in the political realm, covering everything from civil-war to social rivalry. After developing an interpretation of Politics V.1-4, where Aristotle discusses the topic at length, I argue that he is in fact carefully delimiting the concept of stasis so that it applies only to civil-war and open sedition, showing how his analysis excludes partisan antipathy, legal disputes, and political competition. I conclude (...) with some reflections on the significance of this position: by defining stasis narrowly, Aristotle not only offers a profound critique of Plato's theory of regime change, but adopts a position that allows his political philosophy to be relevant for modern theories requiring acceptance rather than rejection of conflict in the political realm. (shrink)