One short passage on what is called the Receptacle in Plato’s Timaeus has been the subject of much controversy since Cherniss presented an alternative reading of it in 1954. In this paper, I criticize an influential argument presented by Zeyl for a traditional reading, and propose a new interpretation which adopts the alternative reading on important sentences of the passage, but is not accompanied by the defects of Cherniss’ interpretation.

In Plato’s Timaeus, two different theories – the Receptacle theory and the geometrical particle theory – are presented to explain change in the natural world. In this paper, I argue that there is tension between the two theories. After examining several possible solutions for this tension, I conclude that Plato does not present it as something ready to be solved within the dialogue but, rather, as something to be understood in a way that maintains both theories. Finally, I also argue (...) that the contrast between the two theories in the Timaeus derives from a similar contrast in the Phaedo. (shrink)

1. Katachi no odissei -- 2. Rinshō no chi -- 3. Aku no tetsugaku nōto 4. Zōho 21-seiki mondaigun ; Jutsugoshū II -- 5. Shūkyō to kagaku; Jinruichi shō -- 6. Shinpen Nihon bunka ni okeru aku to tsumi ; Shōnenba -- 7. Jutsugoteki sekai to seido -- 8. Seishin no fūga -- 9. Shinpen Pasukaru to sono jidai -- 10. Shinpen kindai Nihon ni okeru seido to shisō.

One most common problem in reinforcement learning systems (e.g. Q-learning) is to reduce the number of trials to converge to an optimal policy. As one of the solution to the problem, k-certainty exploration method was proposed. Miyazaki reported that this method could determine an optimal policy faster than Q-learning in Markov decision processes (MDPs). This method is very efficient learning method. But, we propose an improvement plan that makes this method more efficient. In k-certainty exploration method, in case there is (...) no k-uncertainty rule (rules which aren’t selected more than k times) in current state, an agent sometimes walks randomly until it finds a state where it can select a k-uncertainty rule. We think that this behavior is not efficient. To reduce this useless behavior, we propose combining k-certainty exploration method with Dynamic programming (DP). Miyazaki’s system uses DP after all rules are executed at least k times. But, our method uses k-certainty exploration method along with DP during learning. Our method, takes two pattern actions. In case an agent can select k-uncertainty rules, one of these rules is selected at random as k-certainty exploration method. In another case there is no k-uncertainty rule, behavior of agent is different from the behavior of k-certainty exploration method. In that case, our method uses DP to compute an optimal policy for moving from a current state to a state in which some k-uncertainty rules remain. The model for DP is constructed by using only known states. The outline will be described below. First, an agent makes a map constructed by using only known states. In the map, goals are states in which there are k-uncertainty rules and arbitrary state values are set in these states. Point to which attention should be paid is that the map is not given from outside. It is made from only experience. Next, each state values of states in which there are only k-certainty rules in the map are computed by DP (we used Policy Iteration). Finally, an agent continues to select greedy action until it arrives at a state in which it can select a k-uncertainty rule. By this improvement, we expect it can determine an optimal policy faster than k-certainty exploration method. And we have verified that our exploration method can determine an optimal policy faster than k-certainty exploration method by computer simulation. (shrink)

1. Kodai shisō -- 3. Chūsei shisō -- 4. Kindai shisō -- 5. Tōzai bunka no kōryū -- 6. Shōtoku Taishi -- 7. Kinsei Nihon no hihanteki seishin -- 8. Nihon shūkyō no kindaisei.

This book brings together the work of two significant figures in contemporary philosophy. By considering the work of Tanabe Hajime, the Japanese philosopher of the Kyoto School, and William Desmond, the contemporary Irish philosopher, Takeshi Morisato offers a clear presentation of contemporary comparative solutions to the problems of the philosophy of religion. Importantly, this is the first book-length English-language study of Tanabe Hajime's philosophy of religion that consults the original Japanese texts. Considering the examples of Christianity and Buddhism, Faith (...) and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy focuses on finding the solution to the problem of philosophy of religion through comparative examinations of Tanabe's metanoetics and Desmond's metaxology. It aims to conclude that these contemporary thinkers -- while they draw their inspiration from the different religious traditions of Christianity and Mahayana Buddhism -- successfully reconfigure the relation of faith and reason. Faith and Reason in Continental and Japanese Philosophy marks an important intervention into comparative philosophy by bringing into dialogue these thinkers, both major figures within their respective traditions yet rarely discussed in tandem. (shrink)

A number of philosophers today endorse the view that material substances (e.g., cats, stones, atoms) can be analyzed as bundles of “particular properties” or “tropes”. Among several developments, the theory that Peter Simons proposed is seen as the most successful one. Simons’ theory seems to owe its high reputation to mainly two advantages which he claims for his theory: the capacity for avoiding infinite regress, and the explanatory adequacy for the phenomenon of change. In this paper, however, I try to (...) object to this high appraisal, by showing that the two alleged advantages in fact cannot be simultaneously secured by Simons’ position. To this aim, I proceed as follows: First, I present Simons’ theory and explain its alleged two advantages. Next, I take up Arda Denkel’s criticism and show that the explanatory adequacy will be lost unless Simons accepts a certain revision of his theory. Finally, I show that as a result of the revision needed, Simons’ position comes to lose the capacity for avoiding infinite regress in turn. (shrink)

There is a familiar tension between the two main components of non-reductive physicalism, which are physicalism, on the one hand, and the non-reducibility or autonomy of so-called special sciences (i.e., sciences other than physics), on the other. While it is often claimed that this tension can be satisfactorily resolved by adopting the subset account of realization (defended by e.g., Shoemaker (2001) and Wilson (2011)), this paper challenges that popular view, by elaborating some critical comments by Funkhouser (2014). Then, after examining (...) Funkhouser’s own position, this paper proposes a new way of resolving the aforementioned tension, which consists in refining the subset account’s analysis of realization on the basis of various dependence relations between causal powers. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between a firm’s strategy and consumers’ decisions in the presence of the paradox of choice and sharing personal information. The paradox of choice implies that having too many choices does not necessarily ensure happiness and sometimes having less is more. A new model is constructed introducing a factor of information sharing into the model of a previous study that embedded the paradox of choice only (Kinjo and Ebina in AI Soc (...) 30(2):291–297, 2015). A key feature of the model is its disutility function. It is demonstrated that if the sign of the cross derivative of the function is positive (negative) at the optimum, there is a positive (negative) correlation between the degree of sharing personal information chosen by the consumers and the number of products offered by the firm in its recommendation systems. It is also numerically indicated that the profit function of the firm becomes convex or concave depending on the shape of the disutility function. These results suggest that firms should carefully investigate the shape of the disutility function, under the paradox of choice and sharing personal information. (shrink)

The purpose of our study is to investigate the effects of the number of products, product attributes, and prices on consumer confusion, conduct a numerical analysis to check the robustness of the results, and present an example of the cell phone market in Japan. Following an ideal point model and embedding the number of products and product attributes, we clarify how these factors affect consumer confusion and purchase probability. We show that as the number of product attributes increases, the choice (...) probability of each product becomes equal, implying that consumer confusion occurs. This result is robust to the introduction of prices as strategic variables. (shrink)

This is a lucid and rewarding book which sets a new standard for dealing with a history of thought across many cultures.

Reading “The Tale of Genji”: Sources from the First Millennium. Edited by Thomas Harper and Haruo Shirane. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Pp. xx + 610. $65.

Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it is (...) obviously false if read as saying that everything that has existed, exits or will exist is present. If eternalism is taken as the negation of presentism, it is also either trivially false or obviously true. In this paper, I try to respond to the triviality objection on behalf of presentism. In second section, I will examine how the argument proceeds. In third section, I will reflect on three possible ways to respond but will argue that none of them succeeds in giving a satisfactory solution. I will then try to clarify the core idea of presentism and to suggest that if we characterise presentism accurately, the problem will disappear. In fourth section, I will offer a plausible definition of presentism and will show how it can avoid the triviality objection and demonstrate why it is advantageous to accept the version of presentism I offer. (shrink)

合理主義、自我の自覚、宗教的伝統や人間性に対する評価の変化など、近代的思惟の特徴を解明。刊行開始から11年、決定版中村元選集全巻完結。.

The essay is a written version of a talk Nakamura Yūjirō gave at the College international de philosophie in Paris in 1983. In the talk Nakamura connects the issue of common sense in his own work to that of place in Nishida Kitarō and the creative imagination in Miki Kiyoshi. He presents this connection between the notions of common sense, imagination, and place as constituting one important thread in contemporary Japanese philosophy. He begins by discussing the significance of (...) place (basho) that is being rediscovered today in response to the shortcomings of the modern Western paradigm, and discusses it in its various senses, such as ontological ground or substratum, the body, symbolic space, and linguistic or discursive topos in ancient rhetoric. He then relates this issue to the philosophy of place Nishida developed in the late 1920s, and after providing an explication of Nishida’s theory, discusses it further in light of some linguistic and psychological theories. Nakamura goes on to discuss his own interest in the notion of common sense traceable to Aristotle and its connection to the rhetorical concept of topos, and Miki’s development of the notion of the imagination in the 1930s in response to Nishida’s theory. And in doing so he ties all three—common sense, place, and imagination—together as suggestive of an alternative to the modern Cartesian standpoint of the rational subject that has constituted the traditional paradigm of the modern West. (shrink)

According to alethic pluralism, sentences belonging to different domains of discourse can be true by having different alethic (i.e., truth-constituting) properties. Against this pluralistic view, Jamin Asay has recently argued that pluralists' appeal to multiple alethic properties is ill-motivated because the main advantages of pluralism can already be obtained within the framework of standard truthmaker theory. In response to this objection, this paper argues that Asay's claim does not hold with respect to one of the central advantages of pluralism, namely, (...) the ability to offer a proper understanding of the realism/anti-realism debate. This is because, first, when simply construed, truthmaker theory can only provide an inadequate understanding of the debate, and second, when construed in certain ways that allow it to avoid inadequacy, it becomes committed to multiple alethic properties. (shrink)

According to the “truthmaker maximalism”, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its truthmaker. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new (...) reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense. (shrink)

According to the subset view of realization, a property realizes another if the causal powers of the latter are a subset of those of the former. Against this view, some authors (in particular, Kevin Morris and Paul Audi) have argued that it has an untenable consequence that realizing properties are less fundamental than the properties they realize, because the subset view characterizes realized properties as parts (subsets) of their realizers whereas it is generally true that a part is prior to (...) its whole. This paper defends the subset view from this “part-whole” objection, by arguing that if we compare individual powers of realizer and realizee with particular attention to their manifestation conditions, it turns out that each power of a realizee is grounded in some power of its realizer. This grounding relation between powers, I shall argue, allows subset theorists to explain why a realizer is more fundamental than its realizee, even while having the latter as a part. (shrink)

本書は、2013年4月1日から2015年3月31日までの2年間、『みすず』誌に連載された「日記」を一書にしたものである。大学人としての仕事や作家として執筆に追われながら、政治学者として世の動向を分析し 、皇室の動きを観察し、鉄道旅行をする。日常から時代を解読する試み。.