Estonia has successfully created a digital society within the past 2 decades. It is best known for its eGovernment achievements, but it is also home for four unicorn star-ups. While the state is aiming to attract tech investments with e-Residency program and has recently started to invest into protecting national IP and safeguarding data from cybercrime by applying blockchain technology and creating its “digital embassy” in Luxembourg, emerging technologies such as and applications of artificial intelligence but also internet of things (...) have posed the question on legal regulation and standardization. The dilemma, however, seems to be that since the new technologies, such artificial intelligence is much more overwhelming phenomenon than e-governance and presumably, before deciding the legal standards, the political and economic strategies that go beyond the e-governance should be set. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is developing rapidly. There are technologies available that fulfil several tasks better than humans can and even behave like humans to some extent. Thus, the situation prompts the question whether AI should be granted legal person- and/or agenthood? There have been similar situations in history where the legal status of slaves or indigenous peoples was discussed. Still, in those historical questions, the subjects under study were always natural persons, i.e., they were living beings belonging to the species Homo (...) sapiens. We analyse the situation from moral-ethical and practical perspectives. The final conclusion is that the currently existing AIs are still so far removed from humans that there is simply no need to think seriously about legal person- or agenthood. Doing so would mean imposing obligations on the AI to follow. This, in turn, would mean that certain rights in relation to those obligations would have to be granted as well. By all evidence, this is something that humans are not ready to do yet and might never get that far. (shrink)

The article responds to the recent evolution in AI judiciary, especially as presented in China. The authors compare the basic methodological background of Western and Eastern legal systems, concluding that the West is rather inclined to post-positivist methodology in law, which seems incompatible with the full use of AI in legal decision-making. In China, with its more pragmatic approach, the actual process of decision-making might be closer to a new form of technological legal positivism, distinct from Western trends in jurisprudence. (...) Finally, various forms of applicability of AI in law and judiciary are pondered upon, so as to use at least some positive aspects of AI in this sector—albeit with reservations regarding the decision-making proper. (shrink)