Suppose that some contradictions are true – for example, that as I walk through the door, I’m inside and I’m not inside. Then we argue 'if I'm walking through the door, I'm inside; I'm not inside; therefore, I'm not walking through the door' is an invalid instance of modus tollens.

In this article we address the question of how many impossible images Escher produced. To answer requires us first to clarify a range of concepts, including content, ambiguity, illusion, and impossibility. We then consider, and reject, several candidates for impossibility before settling on an answer.

With the help of renowned logician Taylor Swift, Theresa Helke introduces four fundamental paradoxes: the Liar, Epimenides’, the Truth-Teller, and the No-No.

In this article, I present a philosophy-of-language assignment which emerges as the hero in a fable with the following trio of villains:ness, Parroting, and Boredom. Building on Penny Weiss’s “Making History of Ideas Classes Relevant”, and serving students taking an introductory course which covers Western theories of meaning, the “You are there” essay conquers Abstractness by requiring students to make a connection between the material and their lives, rendering theories relevant. It conquers Parroting by requiring them to apply theories to (...) new examples. And it conquers Boredom by producing papers whose originality can not only surprise but also remind the instructor reading them how meaningful the original theories are. In addition, I present a way to adapt the Weiss framework such that it’s inclusive, and discuss my experience piloting and negotiating the assignment. As appendices, I include materials which an instructor can use to scaffold the assignment. Note that beyond dispatching Abstractness, Parroting, and Boredom, the assignment invites collaborative/cooperative learning, fosters learner autonomy, and lends itself to online course delivery. (shrink)

This thesis is about indicative conditionals and apparent counterexamples to classically valid argument forms. Specifically, it applies the following four theories: - material (inspired by Grice (1961, 1975 and 1989)); - possible-worlds (inspired by Stalnaker (1981); Lewis (1976); and Kratzer (2012)), - suppositional (inspired by Adams (1975) and Edgington (1995 and 2014)); and - hybrid (inspired by Jackson (1987)) to try and solve the following two counterexamples: - Vann McGee’s to modus ponens (1985); and - Lewis Carroll’s to modus tollens (...) (1894). I argue that none of the theories I consider can explain – without facing any problems – the three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent theses that give rise to the apparent counterexamples. The three theses of the trilemma are the following: (1) the argument is invalid; (2) the argument is an instance of modus ponens or modus tollens; and (3) modus ponens or modus tollens is valid. (shrink)