We propose a unified theory of intentions as neural processes that integrate representations of states of affairs, actions, and emotional evaluation. We show how this theory provides answers to philosophical questions about the concept of intention, psychological questions about human behavior, computational questions about the relations between belief and action, and neuroscientific questions about how the brain produces actions. Our theory of intention ties together biologically plausible mechanisms for belief, planning, and motor control. The computational feasibility of these mechanisms is (...) shown by a model that simulates psychologically important cases of intention. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars have come to understand emotions as dynamic and socially constructed—the product of interdependent cultural, relational, situational, and biological influences. While researchers have called for a multilevel theory of emotion construction, any progress toward such a theory must overcome the fragmentation of relevant research across various disciplines and theoretical frameworks. We present affect control theory as a launching point for cross-disciplinary collaboration because of its empirically grounded conceptualization of social mechanisms operating at the interaction, relationship, and cultural (...) levels, and its specification of processes linking social and individual aspects of emotion. After introducing the theory, we illustrate its correspondence with major theories of emotion construction framed at each of four analytical levels: cultural, interactional, individual, and neural. (shrink)

We are pleased that all the commentators seem to agree that a theory-driven integration across disciplines is a worthwhile endeavor to better understand the social constitution of emotion. In our reply, we first take up the idea of relating affect control theory to cultural priming and suggest links to an ACT-inspired constraint satisfaction explanation of priming. Second, we address reservations concerning ACT’s capability to account for emotions with nonconceptual content and to explain stability and change in affective meanings. Third, we (...) clarify the relation of affect control theory to psychological constructionism, in particular with regard to conceptualizations of culture and society. Finally, we suggest that computational models are an adequate tool to address multilevel issues in the study of emotion. (shrink)