This article reports on a case-based, longitudinal study of the micro-foundations of business sustainability development in the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in the turbulent years between 2002 and 2012. The study proposes an emerging 3-i process model, mapping the role of bounded, shared, and embedded intentionality; operational, functional, and strategic integration; and constraining, accelerating, and stabilizing institutionality as they relate to the micro-foundations underpinning the development of corporate sustainability from an operational capability to as a dynamic capability as it (...) evolved across multiple levels of context and over time. The research extends extant literature exploring transformations toward sustainability as part of the strategic change process, the micro-foundations of capabilities as well as discussions on sustainability and temporality. (shrink)

AI enters more and more spheres of personal and public life, the topic becomes the object of much discussion. The expanding possibilities of these technologies give rise to the need to introduce ethical and legal regulation in order to control them. Hence the question arises as to how far a system can be considered an autonomous entity, similar to the individual possessing this capability. This article examines the question of whether a system with artificial intelligence can be considered a subject (...) in ethical and legal aspect. The aim is to demonstrate the difference between human thinking and behaviour and the activities performed by AI systems in order to outline a framework with ethical and legal norms governing the creation and use of AI. By applying a multidisciplinary approach combining the analysis of philosophical and legal notions of the subject, concepts such as intellect, autonomy, moral and legal responsibility are explored. The conclusion is that no matter how developed these systems are, they cannot be defined as subjects because they cannot perform fully conscious acts and cannot be held morally or legally responsible. (shrink)

Language is the original technological prosthesis mediating all transfer of human cognition. The relationships between language, communication and cognition have long been the subject of scientific, philosophic and linguistic inquiry. However, it is through contemporary advancements in neuroscience that we now have unprecedented access to the inner workings of the human brain. Particularly, consumer grade neural scanning technologies like the Muse headset allow non-scientists to view, manipulate and draw conclusions from data generated by their own neural processes. Hence, artists Minka (...) Stoyanova and Lisa Park SoYoung have created an artistic experimental system that utilizes these technologies to address the possibility of communication beyond the confines of linguistic signification. Performing Hypo-Linguistics uses Muse brain sensors to create an abstract audio-visual communication system and feedback loop. Through the visualization and sonification of their respective brain data, these artists perform communication that is both outside of conscious control and beyond sign-based systems of linguistic representation. In this article, we discuss the philosophic and scientific groundwork that supports the creation of this system; our processes of sonification and visualization of the Muse-generated brain data (including the modes by which we actively avoided signification and expected technological aesthetics of data representation); and the outcomes of the performances or the realized interaction between the performers. As deep-learning algorithms become increasingly able to teach computers to mimic human language, it becomes ever more apparent that language is not, in fact, the purview of the human, but only one technological mode invented to facilitate the transfer of information. As with all systems of communication, noise is introduced in this process of transfer. This artistic research seeks to highlight that reality while considering the potentials for alternative forms of technologically mediated communication beyond linguistic signification and below the level of consciousness. (shrink)

Thе aim of the paper is to present the problem of boredom in Bogomil Raynov’s fourth book Travelling in Everyday Life. The interpretation of boredom in the novel is seen as based on the idea of a mismatch between expectation and experience. The expectation of the individual turns out to be modeled by the mass commercialization of the 20th century. The "cultural industry" replaces the sublime ideas of the romantic poetics with superfluous clichés, which deny the world its unpredictability, its (...) unexpectedness. It is these kinds of clichés that are subject of irony in Bogomil Raynov's novel – false expectations create a false feeling of boredom. Boredom as a problem has been rarely discussed either by Bulgarian authors, or by Bulgarian literary historians, therefore this paper tries not only to focus scholars’ attention on it, but also to interprete it. (shrink)

Although clinical ethics consultation has existed for more than 40 years in the USA and Europe, it was not available in Bulgaria until recently. In introducing clinical ethics consultation into our country, the Modular, Ethical, Treatment, Allocation of resources, Process methodology has been preferred because of its potential to be used in resource-poor settings and its strong educational function. This paper presents the results of a METAP evaluation in a hospital palliative care ward in the town of Vratsa. The evaluation (...) was based on Beauchamp and Childress’ four principles of biomedical ethics and involves implementation of specific instruments for clinical ethics decision-making. Research tasks emphasised analyses of ethics meetings in the ward. Data were processed by SPSS v.24 using descriptive statistical analysis. Altogether, 32 ethics meetings of an average duration 20.63 min were conducted on cases involving critically ill patients. Most of the participants expressed satisfaction with the ethics process. The principlist approach supported resolution of conflicts between autonomous patients and their relatives, clarified definitions of “medical benefit” and “social good,” and enabled assessments of the risk of unequal treatment. Even as the specific research tasks were achieved, further participant follow-up is necessary to identify any improvement in healthcare personnel’s ethical competence. METAP worked well in end-of-life care settings. Participants experienced several benefits, including improved team communication, better understanding of patient preferences, and confidence in the correctness of decisions. Despite the significant educational potential of METAP, the need for additional and ongoing ethics training of health professionals should not be underestimated. (shrink)

One of John Dewey's major contributions to the reconstruction of the educational process was in his understanding that education needed to develop a working relationship between the refined end-products of inquiry that are codified and sedimented in textbooks, and the raw subject matter inquiry that is natural to the young. Such inquiry, he was convinced, should be shaped and fashioned to the well-known model of scientific inquiry which he set forth in How We Think (Dewey, 1933). In that same book, (...) he describes "reflective thinking" as a special kind of ratiocination that is aware of its means and consequences, and thus is a major instrument in discipline-based inquiry. Dewey's "scientific method" became a .. (shrink)

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended (...) to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the social philosopher Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, and use it to locate and examine dispositions in a larger constellation of related concepts, exploring their dynamic relationship within the social context, and their construction, manifestation, and function in relation to classroom mathematics practices. I describe the main characteristics of habitus that account for its invisible effects: its embodiment, its deep and pre-reflective internalization as schemata, orientation, and taste that are learned and yet unthought, and are (...) subsumed by our practices, which we understand as something that “goes without saying.” I also propose that, similarly to Bourdieu’s concept of linguistic habitus, a math habitus is made up of a complex intertwining of collective and individual histories that turn into “nature,” which structure all individual and collective action and inform mathematical classroom practice. I suggest that individual math dispositions may be liable to reconstruction through the reconstruction of the collective math habitus, which follows from opening spaces for dialogue, problematization and reconstruction of the unthought categories of the doxa. This requires that students acquire new concrete and symbolic means with which to challenge their current sense of mathematics as a discipline, and mathematical practice tout court. Finally, I argue that community of inquiry, employed as a pedagogical model, provides an avenue for both: for opening those spaces for reflective dialogical inquiry into concepts and questions whose meanings and references have so far been taken for granted, and for acquiring critical thinking and dialogical skills and dispositions that are a necessary means for participating in such reflective inquiry that offers significant promise for reconstructing individual and collective habitus in school settings. (shrink)

Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...) take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)