In the writings of Husserl one can uncover what could be labeled a "critical" philosophy of history, as well as what some scholars have deemed a "speculative" philosophy of history. Concerning the former, Husserl offers three criticisms of historicism: the incapability of historicism to establish that any particular theory is false, the impossibility of demonstrating inductively that there are no absolute truths, and the paradox of the claim that there are no absolute truths, for it rests on an assumption of (...) apodicticity. However, Husserl's own notion of the historical character of the life-world seems vulnerable to the assertion that it falls into an historicist position. His defense relies on the third of the above criticisms: that historicism should recognize its own fundamental assumption of apodicticity. Regarding a "speculative" philosophy of history, if Husserl demonstrates one, it is of a very limited sort, and it relies on his reading of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The topic of art forgery draws attention in many quarters: major art fraud schemes make big news, books are written that bring forgers fame, the buyers and sellers of art look for assurance they are getting the genuine article, authentication specialists strain to spot phony items, museums present special exhibitions of forgeries, and theorists tackle the topic on occasion ranging from a postmodern perspective extolling the virtues of forgery to more traditional concerns about its ontological status. The dark side of (...) the art world is often brought into the light. Forgery is a commonly, if uncomfortably, recognized force. It might be assumed, then, that the meaning of the term “forgery” is uniformly established:... (shrink)

Michael Polanyi is best known for his work in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Less frequently discussed, but still a significant aspect of his work, is his political theory. He is an advocate of a free society which is based on “spontaneous order.” This concept is apparent in an early collection of essays entitled The Logic of Liberty, and is emphasized again in his last book, Meaning. In the latter work, Polanyi's method of argumentation involves citing three objections to (...) the endorsement of spontaneous order, and then offering a rebuttal to each. His discussion in this regard, while brief, provides an excellent opportunity for insight into a pivotal topic in his politics. In what follows here I will offer first a brief summary of Polanyi's position on spontaneous order and certain related concepts. Then I will examine his responses to the three objections he poses, and point out their deficiencies. Involved are a commonplace logical fallacy, the tendency to underestimate the power of economic interests and egoistic motivations, and, ultimately, an overstated and untenable epistemological position which does not adequately support, but instead undermines, his political position. (shrink)