This article focuses on a psychological phenomenon discussed by the early Confucian: yuan 怨, which is often translated as “resentment”, “grievance”, “lament”, or “complaint”. I attempt to use the early Confucian discussions of yuan to shed light on an aspect of human psychology, namely, when one laments about certain conditions that obtain in such a way that she sees as beyond her control and negatively affects her. This is an unusual reactive attitude because one who has yuan takes the “passive (...) stance.” This paper has four main sections: the first section makes textual observations of “yuan” in the early Confucian texts; the second section proposes a Confucian-inspired account of yuan and highlights the psychological state in which one who has yuan sees oneself as object; the third section discusses the problematic dimensions of yuan; the final section discusses the negative implications of the passive stance with respect to contemporary concerns: vulnerability, moral repair, and self-respect. (shrink)

This essay analyses the Confucian conception of xin, an attribute that broadly resembles what we would ordinarily call trustworthiness. More specifically, it provides an analysis of the psychology of someone who is xin and highlights a feature of the Confucian conception of trustworthiness: the trustworthy person has to ensure that there is a match between her self-presentation and the way she is. My goal is not to argue against any of the existing accounts of trustworthiness but to draw on Confucian (...) insights so as to shed light on features of trustworthiness that are overlooked in current discussions. I hope to show that the Confucian conception of trustworthiness puts more emphasis on the way a trustworthy person actively tries to make sure another’s dependency on her is not unwarranted than on how the trustworthy person responds to the one who gives trust. (shrink)

This paper argues that yu 欲 (desire), in Xunzi’s view, cannot by itself motivate action. Such a clarification will also bear on our understanding of the relation between xin 心 (the heart/mind) and yu in the Xunzi. This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section seeks to explicate the common assumption that yu can be an independent source of motivation. In the second section, I will conduct textual analysis that challenges such an assumption and argues that only (...) xin can by itself motivate action. In the third section, I explain that the issue of whether yu can conflict with xin is not applicable in Xunzi’s thought and extrapolate the implications that xin is always activated and that xin has natural inclination to pursue the objects of yu. For these reasons, the source of moral failure lies in xin being active in certain problematic ways. (shrink)

This article introduces and analyses the debate between Mencius and Xunzi on xing 性. While Mencius claims that xing is good, Xunzi claims that xing is bad. A common way of interpreting these two different claims is to determine the scope of xing. It is generally agreed that, for Mencius, it is the heart/mind that falls within the scope of xing, for Xunzi, the sensory desires. This article also explores a different way of approaching Mencius's and Xunzi's different claims about (...) xing. It is suggested that Mencius's and Xunzi's different views on xing can be understood in terms of their different views on the heart/mind. While Mencius thinks that the heart/mind has a morally good natural tendency, Xunzi thinks that the heart/mind has a morally problematic tendency. (shrink)

This article seeks to advance discussion of Xunzi’s view of ritual by examining the problem ritual treats and the way in which it targets the problem. I argue that the root of the problem is the natural inclination of the heart/mind to be concerned only with self-interest. The reason ritual works is that, on the one hand, it requires one to disregard concern for self-interest and observe ethical standards and, on the other, it allows one to express feelings in an (...) ethically appropriate way. The ideal character shaped by ritual is one of respect in dealing with affairs and people; the ideal effect of ritual on the person is a sense of ease and security. Based on these conclusions, I will flesh out an implicit assumption Xunzi might have adopted about a pattern in human psychological constitution so as to further our understanding of Xunzi’s moral psychology. (shrink)

The term bu ren 不忍, which may be loosely translated as "cannot bear to harm others," does not occur frequently in the Mencius. However, the passages where the term does occur are ones that are crucial to our understanding of Mencius' thought. In one of the key passages, 1A:7, Mencius uses the example of King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 having the heart/mind of bu ren for an ox to show that he has the kind of heart/mind that enables him to (...) be a true king. The context of the story is this: King Xuan asks Mencius whether he is capable of protecting his people and being a true king. Mencius reminds the king of an incident where the king spared an ox that is about to be killed for consecrating a bell because the king bu ren to see... (shrink)

This article seeks to interpret Mencius’ criticism of the village worthies and shed light on the distinctive psychological phenomenon that Mencius has captured but not quite articulated. An attempt at filling out the Mencian view of the village worthies will help us better understand the content of the moral charges made against them and also deepen our analysis of the kind of psychology that early Confucians regard as crucial to moral agency. Following an introduction that overviews Mencius’ criticisms of the (...) village worthies, the main discussion of this article is divided into three sections. Section 2 offers an interpretation of the psychology of the village worthy and articulates the way in which the village worthy can be regarded as a special kind of hypocrite, which I label as “appearance-only” hypocrite. Section 3 draws on the proposed interpretation to make sense of Mencius’ criticisms of the village worthy. I argue that while the village worthy can elude some common charges against hypocrisy, it is still problematic in the sense that it weakens an unstable system of morality from the inside and inflicts harm on the genuinely virtuous person. Section 4 delves deeper into analyzing the ethical implications for the self and for others. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse the nature of a particular form of theoretical reasoning—ratiocination. Ratiocination is purposeful, self-conscious, deliberatively controlled reasoning. I will argue that ratiocination concludes when the ratiocinator believes that she ought to believe p. In Section 1, I suggest that the way a reasoner’s mind moves in ratiocination is different from the way her mind moves in non-ratiocinative reasoning. Such a difference should motivate an analysis that focuses just on ratiocination. In Section 2, I provide a general (...) characterisation of ratiocination and distinguish it from non-ratiocinative reasoning. I draw a distinction between non-deliberative rational control and deliberative rational control. I then argue that the ratiocinator always exercises the latter. Since theoretical reasoning is a norm-governed activity and since ratiocination involves deliberatively controlled reasoning, the ratiocinator necessarily tries to control her mental movements in a way that is in line with the normative requirements of this activity. In Section 3, I argue that ratiocination ends when the ratiocinator believes that she ought to believe p. I further explain the nature of the ‘ought’ in the ratiocinator’s belief that she ought to believe p. In Section 4, I address possible objections to the account on offer and explain why my account does not undermine our general understanding of the nature of theoretical reasoning. I explain that my claim is compatible with the claim that reasons to be rational are transparent to reasons to believe p. I also discuss why the ratiocinator’s belief that she ought to believe p is not an intermediate stage in ratiocination. Finally, I argue that ratiocination, as described, is compatible with the claim that belief is truth-governed. (shrink)

This paper analyses the connection between knowing Dao and ethical transformation in Xunzi’s thought. While there have been many discussions concerning what Dao is and how one may come to Dao, there has not been sufficient attention on how knowing Dao leads to ethical transformation. In Section 2, I explicate Xunzi’s concept of bi 蔽 and suggests that one’s not knowing Dao has to do with a certain problematic state of the heart/mind. In Section 3, I analyse xu虛, yi 一, (...) and jing 靜, which are remedial practices for knowing Dao, and bring out the importance of discerning li 理 for Xunzi. In Sections 4 and 5, I propose an interpretation of the relation between li 理 and qing 情 in the process of ethical transformation. In Section 6, I highlight some remaining ambiguities that can be further investigated to deepen our understanding of Xunzi’s thought. (shrink)

Sun, Wei 孫偉, Reconstruction of Confucianism: A Re-Examination of Xunzi’s Thought 重塑儒家之道—荀子思想再考察 Beijing 北京: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 2010, 250 pages.

Sun, Wei 孫偉, Reconstruction of Confucianism: A Re-Examination of Xunzi’s Thought 重塑儒家之道—荀子思想再考察 Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11712-011-9260-z Authors Winnie Sung, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, 14 Nanyang Drive #06-01, 637332 Singapore, Singapore Journal Dao Online ISSN 1569-7274 Print ISSN 1540-3009.