The paper is Part III of the large research, dedicated to both the revision of the system of basic logical categories and the generalization of modern predicate logic to functional logic. We determinate and contrapose modern Fregean logistics and proposed by the author ultra-Fregean logistics, next we describe values and arguments of functions, arguments of relations, relations themselves, sets (classes), and subsets (subclasses) as derivative categories (concepts) of ultrafregean logistics. Logistics is a part of metalogic, independent of semantics. Fregean logictics (...) is a metalogical theory, based on the quadruple <particular (individual), predicate, equality, sequence>; it generates predicate logic. Ultrafregean logictics is based on the quadruple <particular, function, representation, sequence>, where the notion of a function is a generalization of the notion of a predicate and the notion of representation is a generalization of the notion of equality; this logictics generates functional logic. For the completely correct denotation of the functional values, we need the Churchian symbolics with parenthesis. Predicates are usually identified with relations. A relation is the derived and even definable category of ultra-Fregean logictics. Namely, relations are representations by functions (of one of their arguments). We show that Frege could really establish this definition and the notion (category) of representation but, unfortunately, rejected this course of thought. Next, we show that every n-ary relation can be resolved for some of its arguments via some (n-1)-ary function. A set, or class, is a derived and not definable category of ultra-Fregean logistics. The universal way to introduce the sets is Frege’s abstraction principle. We formulate this principle for functional logic and show that the notion of a set is quantified, so there is the dual existential notion of a nonempty subset, involved by the same abstraction principle. (shrink)

There are two implicit semantic postulates underlying modern predicate logic. Hence predicate logic is not semantically neutral. The author proposes to take semantically neutral languages, which have no predicate categorial structure but replace the notion of predicate with general notion of function. Some function calculi for different semantics are demonstrated.

The paper is the Part IV of the large research, dedicated to both revision of the system of basic logical categories and generalization of modern predicate logic to functional logic. The topic of the paper is consideration of graphs of functions and relations as a derivative and definable category of ultra-Fregean logistics. There are two types of function specification: an operational specification, in which a function is first applied to arguments and then the value of the function is entered as (...) the result of such application, and a grammar specification, in which an object is first entered and then represented as a value of the function on the given arguments. Since function specifications are relations themselves (which was shown in the previous article of the series), this means that each function forms two relations: the obverse (for an operational specification) and the reverse one (for a grammatical specification). Hence, the definitions introduce two types of graphs: the obverse graph of a function, or a graph of the obverse relation formed by this function, is a set of sequences of such objects, the last of which is a value of this function on the sequence of other of these objects as arguments of the same function. Similarly, the reverse graph of a function, or the graph of the reverse relation formed by this function, is called a set of sequences of such objects, the first of which is the value of this function on the sequence of other of these objects as arguments of the same function. In the limiting case of 0-ary functions, both graphs of any such function coincide. Gottlob Frege discovered obverse graphs of functions and called them function value-ranges. He fundamentally emphasized the non-identity of functions and their graphs. Unfortunately, in set theory under the influence of Giuseppe Peano, an alternative approach was adopted, according to which functions and relations are identical to their graphs and, ultimately, to each other. We show that this approach leads to two unacceptable and, at the same time, mutually contradictory conclusions, and must therefore be rejected. (shrink)