Marcus William Hunt argues that prepositional gratitude to God is metaphysically impossible. This is because a fitting target of prepositional gratitude should be able to be benefited in return. Having the maximum well-being, God cannot be benefited in return and fails to be a fitting target. This view is debatable as some argue that God’s well-being can be increased in some peculiar sense. This paper proposes that Zhu Xi (1130-1200), a Confucian philosopher in China, can offer some plausible perspective. The (...) ultimate reality in Zhu, while perfectly good itself, can be in a better state of being when it has more manifestations (namely, when humans fulfill their moral nature.) This can serve as a parallel to suggest alternative conceptualizations of God and of his well-being, which always guarantee his maximum well-being in an intensive sense, while allow for an increase in his well-being in an extensive sense. In other words, we can uphold God as perfectly good per se while admit his having varying degrees of external well-being, which can account for his relationship with things, especially human beings, in the world. (shrink)

This article focuses on the two types of conception of time, namely, the time of history and the time of ethics. The former is a conception of time that one views or situates one’s lifetime in or with history, whereas the latter a time of our personal lifetime interrupted by the intervention of the other and the accompanied ethical significance. This article argues that Classical Confucianism has interesting specifications of these two conceptions of time. In particular, it shows a correspondence (...) and interaction between the two. Then, it is not difficult to catch up with what our tradition has been aiming at through ethical practices, and the tradition in turn prompts us to be ethical. (shrink)

An accessible introduction to Confucian moral philosophy.

Yat-hung Leung debates Chenyang Li’s view of harmony and benevolence in Confucian teachings: Which is the more fundamental and important value, and ultimate ideal? In The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony, Li delineates a distinctively Confucian conception of “deep harmony” as the basic ideal of Chinese culture and especially Confucianism. Leung questions that depiction of things, arguing that benevolence does and should hold that place of honor. Leung focuses his arguments against two claims: firstly, that harmony should be understood as the (...) supreme value in Confucian thought, and secondly, that the ideal of harmony is of greater value to us today than that of benevolence. Leung points out that in the influential texts and traditions of Confucian philosophy, benevolence is of higher value than harmony. He disputes both the representative nature of the texts Li relies on as well as Li’s portrayals of some of those texts. We more properly understand Confucian harmony and benevolence in the inverse relation, with harmony as the product of benevolence, and thereby come to see that the substantive action-guiding content of benevolence in fact has the greater value to contemporary life. (shrink)

Empathy is generally regarded as an emotional contagion between what one person feels and what another, the empathic person, comes to feel. This essay focuses on one aspect of the altruism/egoism debate involving empathy, that is, whether the empathy-induced motivation to help is egoistic, altruistic, or neither, and demonstrates that the philosophy of the Neo-Confucian Cheng Hao 程顥 can provide unique insights. By referring to Cheng's conceptions of empathy and oneness involved in his famous notions of benevolence and "ten thousand (...) things in one body", the present essay claims that the notions of egoism and altruism are inapplicable. It will introduce the notion of empathy in... (shrink)

In this article, I argue that we can have a plausible account of the experience of practical necessity, namely, the experience that some action is necessitated for someone, by referring to the philosophy of Wang Yangming, a Neo-Confucian philosopher in Ming Dynasty China. The experience of practical necessity, according to Wang, can be of two kinds: general and particular, both having their bases on human nature and related to the fulfillment of the self. I argue that this account fares better (...) than the non-reductionist account and other reductionist accounts, including Christine Korsgaard’s, which explains the experience in terms of the constitution of the self. (shrink)

This article discusses the phenomenon of emotional ambivalence, especially in the moral context. After a nuanced classification of the phenomenon that facilitates accurate evaluation and treatment, it argues that Zhu Xi 朱熹 acknowledges the phenomenon and can provide insights particularly into cases that involve conflicting moral emotions. In light of Zhu, the criterion of motivational harmony rather than motivational unity can more pertinently account for the motivational state of the virtuous persons facing moral emotional ambivalences. This can avoid a certain (...) mystery concerning the status of the nonoptimal emotion and its motivation to action in some of those cases. (shrink)