This paper argues that, despite the widespread assumption that everyone has an absolute right to hold any religious belief whatever, no matter how bizarre or irrational, there are limits to responsible belief. Epistemic responsibility means that we are not entitled to hold beliefs that, by recognized epistemic methods, have been discredited. The paper distinguishes epistemic responsibility from legal and from moral responsibility. Because our beliefs tend to affect our behavior, epistemically irresponsible beliefs become morally irresponsible when they conduce to discrimination (...) or harm. To insist that scripture and religious doctrine must be believed literally and in every detail is epistemically irresponsible, because they have been shown to be, at many points, inconsistent with well-established scientific and historical knowledge. Such beliefs are morally irresponsible when they encourage racism or discrimination against women, gays and lesbians, ethnic groups, the poor, or any other individual or group. (shrink)

This paper argues that, despite the widespread assumption that everyone has an absolute right to hold any religious belief whatever, no matter how bizarre or irrational, there are limits to responsible belief. Epistemic responsibility means that we are not entitled to hold beliefs that, by recognized epistemic methods, have been discredited. The paper distinguishes epistemic responsibility from legal and from moral responsibility. Because our beliefs tend to affect our behavior, epistemically irresponsible beliefs become morally irresponsible when they conduce to discrimination (...) or harm. To insist that scripture and religious doctrine must be believed literally and in every detail is epistemically irresponsible, because they have been shown to be, at many points, inconsistent with well-established scientific and historical knowledge. Such beliefs are morally irresponsible when they encourage racism or discrimination against women, gays and lesbians, ethnic groups, the poor, or any other individual or group. (shrink)

Sayers announces that his objective in this book is to develop and defend a realist account of knowledge. It is an epistemology in the Marxist tradition which extends the theories of Lenin and Engels and attempts to correct what is admittedly unsatisfactory in their position. By a realist epistemology Sayers means one that affirms an objective, material world, existing independently of consciousness, but knowable by consciousness. It is a materialist theory in the sense that it denies the existence of consciousness (...) independent of matter and affirms that all reality is ultimately material. It affirms a reflection theory of knowledge—that the objective world can be known by consciousness only because consciousness is a reflection of reality. Without such a reflective connection between consciousness and objective reality, an unbridgeable gap is created and knowledge is impossible. This is the trouble with traditional empiricist, rationalist, and Kantian positions which make knowledge merely a matter of contemplating our own ideas which may or may not resemble objective reality. (shrink)

Sayers announces that his objective in this book is to develop and defend a realist account of knowledge. It is an epistemology in the Marxist tradition which extends the theories of Lenin and Engels and attempts to correct what is admittedly unsatisfactory in their position. By a realist epistemology Sayers means one that affirms an objective, material world, existing independently of consciousness, but knowable by consciousness. It is a materialist theory in the sense that it denies the existence of consciousness (...) independent of matter and affirms that all reality is ultimately material. It affirms a reflection theory of knowledge—that the objective world can be known by consciousness only because consciousness is a reflection of reality. Without such a reflective connection between consciousness and objective reality, an unbridgeable gap is created and knowledge is impossible. This is the trouble with traditional empiricist, rationalist, and Kantian positions which make knowledge merely a matter of contemplating our own ideas which may or may not resemble objective reality. (shrink)