China, which has made a major economic breakthrough, has become one of the most important actors in international politics by increasing its military power in recent years. China's increasing power and influence in the international arena arouses increasing curiosity about the country's foreign policy. With Xi Jinping becoming president, China began to display a more assertive attitude or behavior on many issues. This study basically seeks an answer to the question of what differences Xi Jinping brought to Chinese foreign policy. (...) What kind of changes do these differences lead to in Chinese foreign policy? In this study, the general tendencies and directions of Chinese foreign policy during the Xi Jinping period are discussed. The assertive foreign policy approach that Xi Jinping is trying to implement is analyzed. In this context, the visions of "Chinese dream", "new type of great power relations", "new type of international relations", “Belt and Road Initiative" and "a community with a common future for humanity", which reflect Xi's assertive foreign policy approach, are examined. At the same time, challenges to the assertive foreign policy implemented under Xi Jinping are discussed. The study mainly questions the extent to which Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy approach is successful. The study concludes that Xi Jinping's active foreign policy approach has not increased China's sphere of influence in the international arena to the extent expected. As China becomes more visible in the international arena, the country's foreign policy challenges seem to be increasing. (shrink)

Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God. Because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, (...) another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are a kind of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. For me in this subject, there are some similarities between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides. In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge. Summary: Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel’s and Stroumsa’s arguments, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge.In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are kinds of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. Based on God’s immutability, some thinkers argued that God does not knows particulars. Particulars occurs due to the matter. Matter and its functions are continually changing. Therefore, to know the particulars requires changing in God’s essence. If God is the most perfect being, it is impossible that He is subject to affection. Thus, God does not know the particulars. Other thinkers, like Avicenna, argued that God knows the particulars as a universal way. For example, God knows only humanity and He cannot know Zayd as a particular person. al-Ghazālī criticizes Avicenna’s idea in Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and argues that God is a perfect being and He should know particulars as a particulars. For al-Ghazālī, God should know everything, and His knowledge is different from our knowledge. In order to explain this matter, he says in Ninety-Nine Names of God;“But this can be understood only through an example. Perhaps you have seen the clock which informs one of the hour of worship. If you have not seen it, then, generally speaking, (it is constructed in this manner). There must be a mechanism in the form of a cylinder which contains a known amount of water. There must also be another hollow mechanism which is placed within the cylinder (but) above the water, and a string which has one of its ends tied to this hollow mechanism. The other end is tied to the part of a small container which is placed above the hollow cylinder. In (this container) there is a ball. Under the ball there is another bowl (placed) in such a manner that if the ball drops will fall into the bowl, and its jingle will be heard. Then the bottom of the cylindrical mechanism must be pierced to a determined extent so that the water can escape through it little by little…. All of this can be determined by a determination of the extent of cause which neither increases nor decreases. It is possible to make the falling of the ball into the bowl a cause of another action and this other action a cause of a third action, and to continue this process indefinitely so that from it are generated remarkable and predetermined movements (actions) of circumscribed extent. The first cause was the falling of the water in a determined quantity…. All of that happens in a determined quantity and to a determined extent which causes the determination of all of it by (adding at this point) the determination of the first movement which is the movement of the water. When you understand that these mechanisms are the principles from which movements must result, and that the movement must be determined if the result is to be regulated, then certainly that which has been determined must proceed from them….Even as the movement of the mechanism, the string, and the ball are not external to the will of the inventor of the mechanism -on the contrary, that is what He willed when He invented the mechanism- so also all the events which occur in the world, both the evil and the good and the beneficial and harmful, are not external to the will of God Most High. Rather (all of) that is the intention of God Most High for the sake of which He has planned its causes.” For Maimonides, as in al-Ghazālī, God is a perfect being and He must have the perfect attributes. Because of knowing is a perfect attribute, He should know everything, and His knowledge is different from human knowledge. In order to explain the difference between God’s knowledge and human knowledge Maimonides gives a parable in The Guide of the Perplexed. “Suppose a thing is produced in accordance with the knowledge of the producer, the producer was then guided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other people, however, who examine this work and acquire a knowledge of the whole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. An artisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of the water, and thus indicate how many hours have passed of the day and of the night. The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the different ways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every little ball that descends -all this is fully perceived by him who makes the clock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing the movements as they are actually going on; but, on the contrary, the movements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. But another person who looks at that instrument will receive fresh knowledge at every movement he perceives; the longer he looks on, the more knowledge does he acquire; he will gradually increase his knowledge till he fully understands the machinery…Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is not derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there would be change and plurality in His knowledge…” As can be seen from above, when Maimonides is explaining the difference of God’s and human knowledge, he uses the same example what al-Ghazālī used. Even though Maimonides does not mention al-Ghazālī’s name in his works, it could be seen that there are a lot of similarities between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, in this paper, I tried to show that there is a similarity between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas on God’s knowledge. In my opinion, therefore, in the formation of Maimonides’s thought, as he thanks to Muslim philosophers like al-Farābī, Avicenna and Averroes, he also thanks to al-Ghazālī. (shrink)

The main purpose of this study is to examine whether God can be free in His actions according to al-Ghazâlî and Thomas Aquinas, whether their assessment on divine actions has legitimacy and internal consistency. For this purpose, in the Introduction, it was given some general explanations on the problem and some works were done about this matter are taken into consideration and evaluated. In the first part of the dissertation, I tried to analyze the concept of ‘freedom’ and its relation (...) to determinism. I also tried to give some explanations in terms of ontological and semantical aspects of the divine freedom. After these explanations, I pictured historical panorama of the problem of divine freedom and how to be understood divine actions in the historical period. In the second part of the dissertation, I tried to demonstrate how interaction took place between al-Ghazâlî and Thomas Aquinas. After this step, I took into consideration the concept of God in al-Ghazâlî and Thomas Aquinas, and I tried to give their resemblances and differences about this matter. In the third part of the dissertation, I considered their ideas about God-World relationship. In this context, I took in to consideration the issue of indicators of God’s freedom, like creation, miracles, relation between moral truths and God’s commands. (shrink)

During the Middle Ages, most of theological and philosophical works, like Avicenna’s eş-Şifā: Ilahiyat (The Healing: Metaphysics), al-Ghazālī’s Maqāsıd al-Falāsifa (The Aims of Philosophers), and Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle’s books were translated into Latin language. Through these translations, many controversial issues in the Islamic thought, like “whether God knows partials in their essence”, “whether God acts necessarily because of His nature”, and “whether reason and revelation can be reconciled or not” were conveyed into Latin West. In addition to these issues, (...) the problem of scope of God’s absolute power has been known by Latin thinkers as well. In this paper, I tried to show the idea of “God can do logically possible affairs and this does not limit God’s absolute power” conveyed in to Latin West through translations of Avicenna’s al-Şifā and al-Ghazâlî’s Makāsıd. As far as I can see, there is a drastic textual similarity between the ideas of al-Ghazâlî and Thomas Aquinas about this matter. Based on the similarities between al-Ghazâlî and Thomas Aquinas, it should be assumed that it is highly probable that Thomas Aquinas’ idea about God’s power goes back to Islamic tradition. (shrink)

Computer and communication technologies created new modes of creating and sharing arts. In this paper, we apply ‘diffusion of innovation’ theory to investigate how artistic content travels in an online social network site called deviantArt, a site designed for sharing user-generated artworks. We first define what innovation corresponds to in such a context, and then discuss how it can be measured with the help of network, image and text analysis methods. We propose to use user-shared resources as relatively easy targets (...) of tracking innovation. (shrink)

Orta Çağ’da, İslam düşüncesi içerisinde yazılmış olan İbn Sînâ’nın eş-Şifâ: İlahiyat’ı, Gazzâlî’nin Makâsıdu’l-Felâsife’si ve İbn Rüşd’ün, Aristoteles’in eserlerine yazmış olduğu şerhler gibi pek çok felsefî ve teolojik eser Latinceye çevrilmiştir. Söz konusu çeviri eserler vasıtasıyla, İslam düşüncesinde carî olan, Tanrı’nın tikelleri kendi zatlarında bilip bilmediği, Tanrı’nın zatı gereği fiilde bulunup bulunmadığı, din ve felsefenin uzlaşıp uzlaşmayacağı gibi tartışmalı pek çok mesele Batı’ya intikal etmiştir. Bunlara ilaveten Tanrı’nın mutlak kudretinin alanının ne olduğu sorunu da Batı düşüncesinde bilinir hale gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada, (...) “Tanrı mantıksal olarak mümkün olanı yapabilir ve bu durum Tanrı’nın mutlak kudretine halel getirmez” anlayışının Latin Batı dünyasına İbn Sînâ’nın eş-Şifâ’sı ve Gazzâlî’nin Makâsıdu’l-Felâsife’sinin çevrileri vasıtasıyla intikal ettiği ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Tespit edebildiğimiz kadarıyla, Gazzâlî’nin Makâsıdu’l-Felâsife’de bu konuya ilişkin serdettiği fikirler ile Hristiyan teolog/düşünür Thomas Aquinas’ın fikirleri arasında önemli ölçüde benzerlik söz konusudur. Söz konusu benzerlik temele alınarak, Thomas Aquinas’ın bu hususta İslam düşüncesinden beslendiğini söylemek kuvvetle muhtemeldir. (shrink)

Towards the end of the Tābi‘ūn generation (the generation of Muslims who followed the Sahaba [companions of the prophet Muhammad]), there was a search for a name through history, for people who were members of Ahl as-Sunnah (people of the tradition and the community of Muhammad [peace be upon him]), and were distinguished from other people with their understanding of zuhd (asceticism) and faqr (indigence), and their sensitivity to worship and to abide by righteous deeds. In this process, any name (...) other than Tasawwuf (Islamic mysticism, commonly known as Sufism) was not generally accepted because it was considered incomplete and inadequate in expressing the knowledge, state, behavior, and approaches of Sufi. The debate about the origin of the word Tasawwuf has continued from the first time to the present day. Some authors have argued that the original word was not in Arabic and hence it was not known during the time of Sahaba, while other authors have argued that it was in Arabic and that it was known in the time of Sahaba. Also, there were differences of opinion about the origin of the root word for Tasawwuf among the authors who argued that the origin of the word Tasawwuf was Arabic. When Sufi works are examined, it can be seen that each Sufi made many descriptions of Tasawwuf in accordance with the subjects they cared about and the state in which they lived. However, this study does not aim to examine the terminological descriptions of the notions of Tasawwuf expressed in the historical process, but to bring up some discussions about the origin of the word and to examine some issues related to the subject.Summary: There has been an ongoing search for a name for the group who was a part of Ahl as-sunnah and were distinguished from others with their outside appearances and zuhd (asceticism), and made intensive efforts for the elimination of the heart (sense of selfishness and ego). Some authors declared that this group was essentially famous and known, but that a name was needed to distinguish them from other people and to show their privileges. In the early days, some distinguishing names such as abid, nasik, vari‘, zahid (following are some of the descriptions/meanings of these names; one who prays a lot, servant of God, extremely religious, someone who gave up earthly possessions for God, etc.) were given to the pioneer Sufis. However, these names were not seen as a distinguishing feature because they were also given to other non-Sufi individuals, and the use of these names did not become widespread in later times. In addition, since these names indicated only one characteristic of the Sufi in terms of their meaning, they were considered incomplete and inadequate, and there was a need for a more comprehensive name. In addition to these names, there was also a search for new ones in some regions. Among these names, some names such as fuqaraa (the poor), ghuraba (eccentric and noncomformist), sayyaheen (pilgrims), shiqaftiyyah (cave people), dju’iyyah (who eats just enough to survive), malamatiyya (someone who believes in the value of self-blame), nouriyyah (someone who is trying to reach the God's light [nour in Arabic]) and moqarraboon (blessed). Khorasan, Basra, Damascus, and Baghdad are the locations where new names were searched for extensively. These names used in these regions have not gained prevalence in the historical process either. As a more comprehensive name in the historical process, the word Tasawwuf/Sufiyyah (sufism) was preferred. The word Sufism, which means "one who wears wool", signifies an external meaning. However, the main distinguishing feature of Sufi is not the external aspect, but the internal state and scholarship/wisdom. In this context, the relationship between name and person has always been the subject of discussion. Depending on the spiritual education of Sufi, there will be constant changes in their spiritual state and wisdom. There has been a lack of an encompassing name to express this change. Because of this insufficiency, the word Tasawwuf, which includes external meaning, has been accepted as an umbrella term, which also included the internal meaning. In addition, because wearing wool garments was the custom of elite servants of God such as prophets and saints, Sufis considered it appropriate to be known by this name. Tasawwuf has been accepted as a word that encompasses the meanings of words such as zuhd, faqr, vera’ (being afraid to sin), morality, adherence, nusq (praying for and worshipping God). In this sense, Tasawwuf does not mean only morality, zuhd, or worshipping. It refers to a feature that encompasses all of these and also includes other meanings.There are two different views on whether the word Sufism was known and used during the times of Muhammad (PBUH), Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn. According to one view, the term Tasawwuf was not known during this period. For this reason, the advocates of this view accept Tasawwuf as a way of thinking and approach which is formed by some non-Islamic influences such as Indian, Iranian, Christian, Jewish, and Greek Philosophy. Contrary to this view, according to some advocates, Tasawwuf was known and used not only during the time of Muhammad (PBUH), Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn, but also during Jahiliyyah period (ignorance period in Arabia before the advent of Islam. Wool (Suf) symbolized devotion during the Jahiliyyah period. When someone tied wool around his neck and head, this movement meant devotion. There are apparent connections between wool and sacrifice in some customs during the Jahiliyyah period.The fact that the word Sufism does not appear in Qur'an verses and hadith (the record of the words, actions, and approval of Muhammad [PBUH]) and that no one from the two prominent generations of Islam, Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn, was called Sufi does not make it necessary to search for the origin of Tasawwuf in non-Islamic sources. Because although Tasawwuf is not mentioned in verses and hadith, there are some words such as Moqarraboon and Abrar (good samaritan) which correspond to Sufi. The names Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn were the most honorable names for these two generations, this should explain why no one in the Sahaba, and Tābi‘ūn generations used the name Sufi or needed any other name. Although the name Sufi was not used as a word in the time of Sahaba, it is known that the life of Sahaba is the main premise of the Sufi lifestyle. For this reason, the Sufis took Sahaba as an example, especially the Ashab al-Suffa (young, unmarried, and poor Sahaba, who dwelled in the Suffas [shades] Muhammad [PBUH] built near the Al-Masjid al-Nabawi [a mosque the prophet built while in Medina]).With the preference of this word, discussions about the origin of the word have come up. Among these discussions, the most effective ones were whether the origin of the word was Arabic and if so, what was the root word. Authors such as Al-Qushayri and Ali Hujwiri did not accept the word Sufism as an Arabic word. According to them, there was no comparison showing that the word originally was Arabic. Whatever meaning is given, it is not correct to derive the name Sufi from a root word in Arabic according to the language rules. In this context, it is more appropriate that it is a moniker, not a word derivative. Contrary to Al-Qushayri and Ali Hujwiri, authors such as Abu Nasr as-Sarraj, Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi, Sohrevardi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Khaldun accept the origin of the word as Arabic, but they disagree about the word origin. Abu Nasr as-Sarraj, who is among the first sources of Tasawwuf, stated that the word origin was Safa (enjoyment), while authors such as Abu Bakr al-Kalabadhi, Sohrevardi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Khaldun stated it was the word Suf (wool). According to them, if the origin of the word is accepted as Suf, in terms of vocabulary, the word becomes authentic and the wording correct. According to al-Kalabadhi, the words put forward about the origin were allied in terms of meaning, even if they appeared different on the outside, and the meanings of all these names were collected in the word Suf. (shrink)

Gerek felsefede gerekse teolojide Tanrı’nın ilim sahibi bir varlık olup olmadığı tartışma konusu olmuştur. Eğer Tanrı ilim sahibi bir varlık ise, bu durumda O’nun tikelleri bilmesi mümkün müdür? Tanrı’nın tikellerini bildiğini iddia etiğimizde bu durum O’nun zatında bir değişimi gerektirir mi? Tesitik düşüncede Tanrı kâmil bir varlıktır ve O, mutlak manada âlimdir, kâdirdir ve iyilik sahibidir. Dolayısıyla O’nun zatına bir değişim söz konusu olamaz. Tanrı’nın ilmi konusunda tartışılan mesellerden birisi de bu ilmin tikelleri kapsayıp kapsamadığıdır. Pek çok teist düşünür Tanrı’nın (...) mutlak manada kâmil olduğunu iddia etmekte ve bu kemali temele alarak O’nun kemal niteliklere sahip olması gerektiğini belirtmektedir. Bilmek ve iyilik gibi nitelikler kemal niteliklerdir. Cehalet ve kötülük ise nakıs hallerdir. Şayet Tanrı kâmil bir varlık ise bu tür kemal niteliklere de sahip olmalı, nakıs niteliklerden de hâli olmalıdır. Tanrı’nın ilmine dair Gazzālī ve İbn Meymûn’un görüşleri arasında birtakım paralellikler olduğu kanaatindeyiz. Bu çalışmada, Gazzālī ve İbn Meymun’un konuya yaklaşımını ele aldık ve Griffel ve Stroumsa’nın iddiasını temele alarak Tanrı’nın ilmi konusunda Gazzālī ve İbn Meymun’un görüşleri arasında benzerlikler olduğunu göstermeye çalıştık. (shrink)

Computer and communication technologies created new modes of creating and sharing arts. In this paper, we apply ‘diffusion of innovation’ theory to investigate how artistic content travels in an online social network site called deviantArt, a site designed for sharing user-generated artworks. We first define what innovation corresponds to in such a context, and then discuss how it can be measured with the help of network, image and text analysis methods. We propose to use user-shared resources as relatively easy targets (...) of tracking innovation. (shrink)