Este artículo expone la posición frente al concepto de utopía adoptada por una serie de pensadores de la tradición dialéctica, de Hegel a Bloch y Ellacuría. Persigue poner de manifiesto y reivindicar el modo característico en que dicha tradición afronta la cuestión de la utopía. Un lugar especial en nuestra exposición lo ocupa el pensamiento de Ellacuría, pues en él resulta significativo que lleva a cabo toda una reivindicación de la utopía entendida como ideal en el marco de una filosofía (...) muy próxima al marxismo hegeliano. Ello nos permitirá poner de manifiesto la especificidad del planteamiento de Ellacuría y, al mismo tiempo, la pluralidad de posiciones respecto a esta problemática existentes dentro de la tradición de pensamiento hegeliano-marxista. (shrink)

El presente artículo se confronta con una problemática que ha focalizado los debates teóricos en torno a los fundamentos normativos de la crítica en las últimas décadas. La cuestión es si, en un marco social escindido como el nuestro, la crítica tiene que asumir su carácter perspectivista, es decir, su estar ubicada en una de las perspectivas que se enfrentan en el escenario social. Si ello es así, el problema que se abre es el de la posibilidad o no de (...) legitimar racional, moral y políticamente una crítica que asume su estar ya siempre situada en uno de los horizontes normativos que coexisten en el marco social. Este trabajo afronta este problema poniendo en diálogo motivos de la hermenéutica y de la teoría crítica: con ello pretende realizar una aportación a lo que podríamos llamar una reflexión hermenéutica de la crítica, que logre articular carácter perspectivo y pretensión de normatividad de la misma. (shrink)

AI-based technologies are increasingly pervasive in a number of contexts. Our affective and emotional life makes no exception. In this article, we analyze one way in which AI-based technologies can affect them. In particular, our investigation will focus on affective artificial agents, namely AI-powered software or robotic agents designed to interact with us in affectively salient ways. We build upon the existing literature on affective artifacts with the aim of providing an original analysis of affective artificial agents and their distinctive (...) features. We argue that, unlike comparatively low-tech affective artifacts, affective artificial agents display a specific form of agency, which prevents them from being perceived by their users as extensions of their selves. In addition to this, we claim that their functioning crucially depends on the simulation of human-like emotion-driven behavior and requires a distinctive form of transparency—we call it emotional transparency—that might give rise to ethical and normative tensions. (shrink)

Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...) to believing Covid-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about Covid-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology. (shrink)

Most of the arguments usually appealed to in order to support the view that some abstraction principles are analytic depend on ascribing to them some sort of existential parsimony or ontological neutrality, whereas the opposite arguments, aiming to deny this view, contend this ascription. As a result, other virtues that these principles might have are often overlooked. Among them, there is an epistemic virtue which I take these principles to have, when regarded in the appropriate settings, and which I suggest (...) to call ‘epistemic economy’. My purpose is to isolate and clarify this notion by appealing to some examples concerning the definition of natural and real numbers. (shrink)

Chris Stewart’s account of his experiences after purchasing a farm in Andalusia, in an isolated farmhouse in the mountains adjacent to Granada, are far from the traditionally bucolic depictions of a pastoral landscape, in which the drawbacks of agricultural life become unquestionably compensated by the bliss of life in nature. Even though, as the title indicates, he seems to be a born romantic and optimist, undefeated by the inconveniences of a life without the everyday commodities of a First-World country in (...) the twenty-first century, his memoir narrative is soon balanced by his own testimony, which provides a realistic counterbalance to Stewart’s initial idealistic portrayal of life in rustic Alpujarras. Nonetheless, as this article intends to demonstrate, it is precisely this necessary demystification of the rural setting prevailing in certain areas in Andalusia that becomes crucial for the establishment of an essential complicity with the audience, thereby trained to appreciate—and even become enthralled by—the reality of the rural surroundings which the contemporary reader can no longer envision as merely a place of “vales and hills” softly covered by “a host of golden daffodils”. El relato que lleva a cabo Chris Stewart acerca de sus experiencias tras adquirir una finca en Andalucía, en un lugar apartado de la sierra lindante con Granada, se aleja de las descripciones bucólicas de paisajes pastorales en los que las desventajas de la vida agrícola quedaban incuestionablemente compensadas por el gozo de la vida en mitad de la naturaleza. Incluso pese a que, tal y como el título de su novela indica, Chris Stewart parece ser un romántico y un optimista de nacimiento, que no se deja vencer por los inconvenientes de una vida sin las comodidades cotidianas de un país del primer mundo en el siglo xxi, su memoria-narrativa se ve inmediatamente equilibrada por su propio testimonio, que proporciona un contrapunto realista al idealizado retrato inicial de la vida en las rústicas Alpujarras. No obstante, como el presente artículo pretende demostrar, es precisamente esta necesaria desmitificación del entorno rural de ciertas zonas de Andalucía lo que resulta crucial para poder establecer una esencial complicidad con el lector, que llega, de este modo, a valorar, e incluso, a sentirse fascinado, por la realidad del contexto agrario, el cual deja ya de percibir meramente como un lugar de «valles y colinas» delicadamente cubierto por «una cohorte de dorados narcisos». (shrink)

El pasado 4 de marzo el Ayuntamiento de Madrid reunió a 1000 personas, organizadas en 100 mesas de 10 personas cada una, para discutir sobre propuestas donde destinar los 100 millones de euros de los presupuestos participativos. Estas 1000 personas, además, fueron seleccionadas al azar para componer una muestra representativa de la ciudad. ¿A qué paradigma democrático responde esta experiencia? ¿Para qué se utiliza la selección de ciudadanos al azar? ¿Este ejemplo puede suponer una sustitución de la democracia representativa? Con (...) una aproximación teórica a la iniciativa y con una conversación con Yago Bermejo, coordinador del equipo que desarrolló el proceso, este artículo trata de resolver algunas de estas preguntas y abrir nuevas reflexiones. (shrink)

The following article has as aim identify how the analysis is carried out in Sartre’s work on the phenomenon of the language. Particularly, we will place in the problem of the intersubjective relationships and his relation with the language. We will do this interpreting the postulates on this subject matter, specifically from The nausea, The being and nothing and the Critique of the dialectical Reason. This will allow us to place the thought of our author in the context of the (...) contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

v. 1. Formación y liberación del pensamiento cubano (1515-1860). t. 1. Orígenes y formación del pensamiento cubano -- t. 2. Del liberalismo esclavista al liberalismo abolicionista.

According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we (...) will proceed as follows. First (Sect. 1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including “intrabodily” cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord (Sect. 2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks (Sect. 3) and cases of animal cognitive offloading (Sect. 4). We’ll then allay some worries our claim might raise (Sect. 5) to then conclude the paper (Sect. 6). (shrink)

This volume collects 17 case studies that characterize the various kinds of translations of the European culture of the last two and a half millennia from ancient Greece to Rome, from the medieval world to the Renaissance up to the ...

A view that emancipates free will by means of quantum indeterminism is frequently rejected based on arguments pointing out its incompatibility with what we know about quantum physics. However, if one carefully examines what classical physical causal determinism and quantum indeterminism are according to physics, it becomes clear what they really imply–and, especially, what they do not imply–for agent-causation theories. Here, we will make necessary conceptual clarifications on some aspects of physical determinism and indeterminism, review some of the major objections (...) against libertarian conjectures, and show that there is no conceptual incompatibility preventing us from taking a ‘quantum-libertarian’ approach to the problem of free will. In particular, we will illustrate the possible role of self-causation (causa sui) as a potential solution to otherwise apparently incompatible or even paradoxical statements concerning free will and quantum indeterminism. (shrink)

The abrupt beginning of the Philebus refers to the abrupt interruption of the dialogue with Callicles in the Gorgias. The reuse of the phrase αὐτὸς γνώσῃ (Phlb. 12a9 = Gorg. 505c9), unique in Plato, is an evident sign of the will to connect the two texts and contexts. Both of them deal with the problem of the interruption of the philosophical dialogue. The absolute lack of contextualization and the ‘open’ conclusion in the Philebus are consistent with this framework. The continuity (...) with the Gorgias is also a fundamental reason why Socrates returns as protagonist in a late dialogue. It also allows us to put forward a hypothesis on the identity of Philebus, an emblematic character like Callicles. (shrink)

Gorgias, the teacher of Isocrates, is rarely mentioned in Isocrates’ works and never in a flattering way. He is also presented, among other masters and poets, on Isocrates’ grave in a way that appears to be consistent with his pupil’s thought. Thus, the author of the iconographic plan of the grave may have been either Isocrates himself or someone who suffi­ciently knew his works and properly understood his tempestuous rela­tionship with his master.

In this article, I address a controversial aspect of Rawls’s treatment of the question of justice between generations: how the parties in the original position could be motivated to select Rawls’s preferred principle of intergenerational savings, which he dubs the just savings principle. I focus on the explanation found in his later work, where he proposes that the correct savings principle is the principle that any generation would have wanted preceding generations to have followed. By expanding upon this explanation, I (...) respond to the objection that this explanation disregards the perspective of the first generation. I demonstrate that this objection ceases to be a concern when a proper account of the parties’ reasoning is developed. What is notable about the explanation I defend is that it relies on the parties adopting maximax – not maximin – as a rule for rational decision making. Having established this intermediary conclusion, I depart with Rawls and consider what savings principle the parties would choose if given more options. Ultimately, I argue that the parties would select a principle that Rawls would have undoubtedly rejected if presented to him at face value. This is because the principle of savings I argue would be selected requires continual economic growth over generations to increase upwards indefinitely – a conclusion Rawls is explicitly trying to avoid in his theory of justice. (shrink)

In his 1920 monograph Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori the young Reichenbach distinguished between two meanings of the a priori: ‚apodictically valid, true for all time‘ and ‚constituting the concept of object‘. At the end of the 1990s Michael Friedman drew again the attention of philosophers of science to this forgotten distinction. In the spirit of Reichenbach’s early Kantianism Friedman attempted to construct a relativized or temporally variable a priori, which is nevertheless constitutive of the object of knowledge. Friedman rejects an (...) alternative historicized version of the a priori elaborated by the Marburg school and in particular by Cassirer. According to Friedman, Cassirer defended a regulative, but absolute version of the a priori, the existence of a yet-to-be-found set of final principles that are conditions of all scientific experience. This paper suggests that using the constitutive/regulative distinction as a basis for comparison is misleading. In order to understand the Marburg school’s conception of the a priori one should get back to Hermann Cohen’s interpretation of Kant and in particular to his own distinction between two meanings of the a priori. A more suitable comparison is that between Cohen’s opposition metaphysical-vs.-transcendental a priori and Reichenbach’s distinction apodictic-vs.-constitutive a priori. If the comparison is conducted along these lines—as already suggested in the mid-1920 s by the Dutch neo-Kantian Alfred C. Elsbach—it turns out that Cohen and the Marburg school and not Reichenbach provided a good example of a relativized a priori. (shrink)