Entrevista a Miguel Valderrama por Raúl Rodríguez Freire.

El artículo indaga en la pregunta que subyace al cine político de Helvio Soto. Pregunta compleja, apenas entreabierta, y que resume una época que se planteó seriamente la relación entre cine y revolución. Esta pregunta, que es el anverso de aquella otra que Gilles Deleuze y Jun Fujita Hirose se plantearon a propósito del cine-capital, es una indagación no solo por el devenir revolucionario de las imágenes cinematográficas, sino por la temporalidad de un mundo en construcción. De raíz materialista, esta (...) indagatoria es la de la duración de las imágenes, de las imágenes revolucionarias. (shrink)

When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can result only from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behaviour but its stable (...) fixed points (those in the vicinity of which it spends most of the time, after comparatively short transitory periods), and stable fixed points can change abruptly as a result of infinitesimal changes of the low-level phenomenon. We illustrate this potential gradualist trap by showing that Chalmers’ fading qualia argument falls into it. (shrink)

v. 1. Propedêutica filosófia. v. 2. Ontognoseologia juridica.

A presente obra trata, de forma inigualável, das preliminares ao estudo da teoria tridimensional do direito, examinando a Filosofia e a Ciência do Direito, as dimensões da experiência jurídica, a posição do tridimensionalismo jurídico concreto, a dialética de complementaridade, o personalismo e o historicismo axiológico, as estruturas e os modelos do Direito no processo cultural e a visão integral do mundo jurídico.

This comic, serious inquiry into the nature of art takes its technical vocabulary from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. It is ridiculous to think of poems, paintings, or films as distinct from other things in the world, including people. Talking about art should be contiguous with talking about other relevant matters.

pt. 1. The form of the state : on beginnings -- pt. 2. Machiavelli's theory of history : modes of encounter between action and time -- pt. 3. The event of the republic : the return to beginnings.

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

La filosofía moral kantiana ha sido criticada por su compromiso con el rigorismo moral. Esta crítica está basada en la posición kantiana respecto a la mentira; específicamente, se deriva de la afirmación de Kant de que es un deber ser veraces incluso con el asesino que llega a casa preguntando por el paradero del amigo refugiado. Este artículo tiene un carácter enteramente expositivo y tiene el objetivo de reconstruir y examinar la posición de Kant frente a la mentira para determinar (...) si la acusación rigorista está bien fundamentada. Examino tres fuentes: Lecciones de ética (§1.1), “Sobre un supuesto derecho a mentir por filantropía” (§1.2) y Metafísica de las costumbres (§1.3). De este examen comparativo, concluyo que no existe evidencia textual que demuestre que Kant defienda categóricamente el deber de ser veraces en el caso del asesino en la puerta, de manera que la acusación de rigorismo que pesa en contra de la filosofía moral kantiana, al menos en lo que respecta a este caso en particular, no parece estar bien fundamentada. (shrink)

Para defender la tolerancia religiosa, se muestra que no hay razones para considerar que unas religiones son más verdaderas que otras, del mismo modo que no es posible establecer que una religión es verdadera, ya que la creencia religiosa no tiene un valor objetivo absoluto. Se sostiene además que, al no ser posible el establecimiento de la objetividad de la creencia religiosa, solo si esta se funda en la libertad de conciencia es posible defender la tolerancia religiosa.

Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation. In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that combines ecological psychology with (...) recent trends in enactive cognitive science. According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency. (shrink)

A strikingly original work, Friends of Interpretable Objects re-anchors aesthetics in the object of attention even as it redefines the practice, processes, ...

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

En Los Cuatro Acuerdos, un éxito de ventas en todo el mundo, don Miguel Ruiz revelaba cómo el proceso de educación, o «domesticación», nos hace olvidar nuestra sabiduría innata. A lo largo de la vida establecemos muchos acuerdos que van en nuestra contra y nos causan un sufrimiento innecesario. Los Cuatro Acuerdos nos ayudan a romper estos acuerdos limitadores y a substituirlos por otros que nos aportan libertad, felicidad y amor. Ahora don Miguel Ruiz, junto con su hijo (...) don Jose Ruiz, nos ofrece una nueva perspectiva de Los Cuatro Acuerdos y un acuerdo nuevo y poderoso para transformar nuestra vida en nuestro cielo personal: el quinto acuerdo. El Quinto Acuerdo nos permite adquirir una conciencia más profunda del poder del yo verdadero y recuperar la autenticidad con la que nacimos. En esta absorbente continuación del libro que ha cambiado la vida de millones de personas de todo el mundo, se nos recuerda el mejor regalo que podemos hacernos: la libertad de ser quienes realmente somos. Más sobre el libro Imagínate llevando una vida totalmente nueva: una vida en la que eres libre de ser quien realmente eres. Ya no te riges por lo que los demás piensan de ti. Imagínate viviendo sin juzgarte a ti mismo ni juzgar a los demás, sin temer ser juzgado. Te aceptas tal como eres y aceptas a los demás tal como son. Imagínate viviendo sin estar en conflicto contigo ni con la gente. Te respetas a ti mismo y a los demás, y a cambio ellos te respetan a ti. Imagínate viviendo sin miedo a expresarte ni a explorar la vida. Vives sin temor, sin culparte, sin avergonzarte, sin arrepentirte. Imagínate que te encanta ser como eres. Te gusta tu cuerpo tal como es, te gustan tus emociones tal como son. Imagínate siendo tú mismo. Eres feliz y disfrutas verdaderamente de tu vida. ¡Imagínate viviendo con esta clase de libertad personal! Esta manera de vivir es completamente posible. Otros lo han conseguido y tú también lo harás. Sólo necesitas hacer de los Cinco Acuerdos tu estilo de vida y pronto vivirás tu sueño personal del cielo. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

Presents advice on how to gain personal freedom by following the wisdom of the Toltecs.

What is the “conventional sense” of disability, and how do the questions addressed in this special issue of Science, Technology, & Human Values differ from those inspired by Donna Haraway and the cyborg? In industrialized societies, the medical profession has authority over the determination of who should count as disabled while “assistive technologies” enable specific kinds of subject positions. In this special issue of STHV, the focus of the essays as a whole is on the different enactments of disability, as (...) complexity that simultaneously implicates bodies, gender, sexuality, technology, and politics. The study of disability offers scope for refinement and further articulation of many issues of long-standing concern to science, technology, and society. In addition, we hope they will encourage further reflection on our field’s normative engagement. (shrink)

This article develops a constructive criticism of methodological conventionalism. Methodological conventionalism asserts that standards of inductive risk ought to be justified in virtue of their ability to facilitate coordination in a research community. On that view, industry bias occurs when conventional methodological standards are violated to foster industry preferences. The underlying account of scientific conventionality, however, is problematically incomplete. Conventions may be justified in virtue of their coordinative functions, but often qualify for posterior empirical criticism as research advances. Accordingly, industry (...) bias does not only threaten existing conventions but may impede their empirically warranted improvement if they align with industry preferences. My empiricist account of standards of inductive risk avoids such a problem by asserting that conventional justification can be pragmatically warranted but has, in principle, only a provisional status. Methodological conventions, therefore, should not only be defended from preference-based infringements on their coordinative function but ought to be subjected to empirical criticism. (shrink)

Despite the emergence of computer games as a dominant cultural industry, we know little or nothing about the ethics of computer games. Considerations of the morality of computer games seldom go beyond intermittent portrayals of them in the mass media as training devices for teenage serial killers. In this first scholarly exploration of the subject, Miguel Sicart addresses broader issues about the ethics of games, the ethics of playing the games, and the ethical responsibilities of game designers. He argues (...) that computer games are ethical objects, that computer game players are ethical agents, and that the ethics of computer games should be seen as a complex network of responsibilities and moral duties. Players should not be considered passive amoral creatures; they reflect, relate, and create with ethical minds. The games they play are ethical systems, with rules that create gameworlds with values at play. Drawing on concepts from philosophy and game studies, Sicart proposes a framework for analyzing the ethics of computer games as both designed objects and player experiences. After presenting his core theoretical arguments and offering a general theory for understanding computer game ethics, Sicart offers case studies examining single-player games, multiplayer games, and online gameworlds from an ethical perspective. He explores issues raised by unethical content in computer games and its possible effect on players and offers a synthesis of design theory and ethics that could be used as both analytical tool and inspiration in the creation of ethical gameplay. (shrink)

En el artículo se examina la controversia entre extramisionismo e intramisionismo a propósito de la percepción visual. Se defiende que la evaluación del cierre de la controversia depende del explanandum que rastrea el filósofo/historiador en la reconstrucción que persigue. Si enfatizamos en los mecanismos causales, la controversia se cerró en favor del intramisionismo. Si enfatizamos en aspectos asociados con la intencionalidad o con la forma como ciertas afecciones mentales refieren a objetos externos, la controversia conduce a una conciliación entre intramisionismo (...) causal y extramisionismo mental. Finalmente, si ponemos en duda la necesidad de una distinción entre interno/externo, la controversia se disuelve por carecer de sentido. (shrink)

La resistencia comunitaria noviolenta es una estrategia para transformar conflictos. Este estudio contiene el análisis de la Asamblea Municipal Constituyente (AMC) como proceso de resistencia en Mogotes, Santander, Colombia. En el desarrollo del artículo se retoma la experiencia de investigación llevada adelante en el municipio para indagar acerca de la contribución de las redes sociales en el desarrollo y mantenimiento de las políticas de identidad en el proceso de resistencia Para esto se emplearon métodos etnográficos tales como entrevistas a profundidad (...) a miembros de la asamblea, y el contenido de programas radiales de la emisora del municipio. Como conclusión se plantea que el fortalecimiento de las políticas de identidad se ve influenciado por las redes sociales que intervienen en el proceso. (shrink)

Why computer games can be ethical, how players use their ethical values in gameplay, and the implications for game design.

The non-transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non-transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter-intuitive. However, such an intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished from each other; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

This article states that research in skill acquisitionand executionhas underestimated the relevance of some features of attention. We present and theoretically discuss two essential features of attention that have been systematically overlooked in the research of skill acquisitionandexecution. First, attention alters the appearance of the perceived stimuli in an essential way; and second, attention plays a fundamental role in action, being crucial for solving the so called ’many-many problem’, that is to say, the problem of generating a coherent behavior byselecting (...) between many inputs and many potential outputs. We discuss the importance of these features for skill acquisition in sport. We also suggest empirical ways to assess the precise impact of taking them into consideration and at the same time we propose important implications for training derived from the ideas discussed in the paper. (shrink)

Many philosophers and scientists have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order Representationalist theories, attempt to explain such a self-awareness by means of a higher-order representation. Consciousness relies on our capacity to represent our own mental states, consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind. Such an ability can, at least conceptually, be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. In this paper I will argue (...) that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories. (shrink)

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is (...) misguided—at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require—and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem. (shrink)

The paper engages Christopher Boorse’s Bio-Statistical Theory. In its current form, BST runs into a significant challenge. For BST to account for its central tenet—that lower-level part-dysfunction is sufficient for higher-level pathology—it must provide criteria for how to decide which lower-level parts are the ones to be analyzed for health or pathology. As BST is a naturalistic theory, such choices must be based solely on naturalistic considerations. An argument is provided to show that, if BST is to be preserved, such (...) parthood choices are based on non-naturalistic considerations. We demonstrate that even when parthood choices are based on the best way to preserve BST, there are counterintuitive results which bring the central tenet of BST into question. (shrink)