Tibetan Philosophy

For Vajrayana Buddhism, the now is an interval, a boundary, a point of tension and suspension with an atmosphere of uncertainty. It is a bifurcation point of variable length; its name is “bardo.” The bardo is immersed in the conventional, or “seeming” reality. It emerges from what is called the “unstained” ultimate or primordial emptiness or “basal clear light.” Further, the ultimate is not the sphere of cognition. Cognition, including cognition of time, belongs to conventional reality. Buddhahood, in contrast, is (...) a condition of uncompounded knowledge where basic mind blossoms without temporal or other cognitive distinctions, unmade, unfabricated, luminous and pristine. Cyclical existence involves both the ultimate and the conventional as it moves through six bardos—all of which are the effulgent of the basal clear light—until Buddhahood. The six are: the bardo of this life ; the bardo of dream; the bardo of meditation; the bardo of dying; the bardo of dharmata ; and the bardo of existence. Each realm is both ultimate and conventional, and has specific initiation-based yogas to investigate these differences. The process of transition from one to the next involves at least three bodies, one mind, and aspects of speech. In each bardo, the character of the now as embodiment and temporal knowing varies yet a complete and consistent cross-bardo yogic wisdom leads to its total cessation in the basal clear light; the now is extinguished. The author presents, from the viewpoint of a knowledgeable practitioner of over 30 years, an essay on Vajrayana Buddhist time, drawing implications for Fraser’s time typology. The essay will draw from English translations of significant older, tantric texts on dream yoga, deity yoga, the Chod, tantric time, the bardo of death, and empowerment. Useful practices that can be applied by the audience to test the tradition and author’s assertions will be suggested. (shrink)

Notions such as Sunyata, Catuskoti, and Indra's Net, which figure prominently in Buddhist philosophy, are difficult to readily accommodate within our ordinary thinking about everyday objects. Famous Buddhist scholar Nagarjuna considered two levels of reality: one called conventional reality and the other ultimate reality. Within this framework, Sunyata refers to the claim that at the ultimate level objects are devoid of essence or "intrinsic properties", but are interdependent by virtue of their relations to other objects. Catuskoti refers to the claim (...) that four truth values, along with contradiction, are admissible in reasoning. Indra's Net refers to the claim that every part of a whole is reflective of the whole. Here we present category theoretic constructions which are reminiscent of these Buddhist concepts. The universal mapping property definition of mathematical objects, wherein objects of a universe of discourse are defined not in terms of their content, but in terms of their relations to all objects of the universe is reminiscent of Sunyata. The objective logic of perception, with perception modeled as [a category of] two sequential processes (sensation followed by interpretation), and with its truth value object of four truth values, is reminiscent of the Buddhist logic of Catuskoti. The category of categories, wherein every category has a subcategory of sets with zero structure within which every category can be modeled, is reminiscent of Indra's Net. Our thorough elaboration of the parallels between Buddhist philosophy and category theory can facilitate better understanding of Buddhist philosophy, and bring out the broader philosophical import of category theory beyond mathematics. (shrink)

Zero has been axial in human development, but the origin and discovery of zero has never been satisfactorily addressed by a comprehensive, systematic and above all interdisciplinary research program. In this volume, over 40 international scholars explore zero under four broad themes: history; religion, philosophy & linguistics; arts; and mathematics & the sciences. Some propose that the invention/discovery of zero may have been facilitated by the prior evolution of a sophisticated concept of Nothingness or Emptiness (as it is understood in (...) non-European traditions); and conversely, inhibited by the absence of, or aversion to, such a concept of Nothingness in the West. But not all scholars agree. Join the debate. (shrink)

No one is surprised anymore by the dialogue between Buddhism and Western science, which develops the foundations of cognitive and contemplative sciences. But there have been requests for reflection on the results achieved, or even for a strategy for analytical research of the Buddhist East, which brings this dialogue to the philosophical level. And this level of discussion is, in fact, the dialogue between Buddhism and Western philosophy, which requires a new discourse that should be built on their common ground. (...) And the first question that arises against this background is how to focus attention on the philosophical aspect of Buddhism, which orientalists usually call “Buddhist philosophy”. Thus, realizing the beginning of the dialogue between Buddhist and Western philosophies, we are faced with the need to take the next, but already conscious step in the direction of this discussion. In order to make this step confident, we need to know where and how to start, and what key subjects we can rely on. Therefore, in an effort to find possible warnings against gross mistakes in such discussions, we sought the help of Western experts in the field of Buddhist studies by reading their works and talking to them. One of the well-known scholars is Professor Jan Westerhoff, who kindly agreed to give me an interview and answer some questions: whether there is a Buddhist philosophy; what are the approaches and stages of its research; what are the peculiarities of using the terms of Western philosophy in these studies; what can be the criterion for the best reading of traditional Buddhist texts; what can such a discussion give to contemporary Western philosophy, etc. This interview was not intended to be a conceptual deepening of either Buddhist or Western philosophy; we only tried to identify key questions that could start a dialog between them in the right direction. (shrink)

Una conoscenza adeguata del Buddismo è essenziale per l’educazione e la cultura di chiunque non voglia essere un altro membro alienato di un’eredità che cammina senza pensarci nel mezzo di una rivoluzione tecnologica. Secondo i modelli e i valori della nostra cultura occidentale, siamo più abituati a guardare verso l’esterno che verso noi stessi. Altre culture possono aiutarci ad ampliare e approfondire la nostra visione della realtà e della vita. Se qualcuno ti chiede del Buddismo, rispondi che è un'antica dottrina (...) umanistica. Il Buddismo primitivo è questo e non molte altre cose di cui sentiamo e leggiamo. Diciamo inoltre che questa dottrina non è difficile da comprendere ma veramente difficile da praticare. Per capirlo con la nostra mente occidentale, non è necessario parlare fluentemente sanscrito e pali o consultare papiri e pergamene nei sotterranei dei musei. Non è necessario radersi i capelli o indossare abiti orientali. Non devi mangiare gambi di bambù, farti tatuaggi sul corpo, creare un soprannome hindi, mettere mandala nel tuo ufficio, accendere incenso in tutta la casa e pronunciare mantra al tramonto per lo stupore del tuo cane. Questo testo non parla di esoterismo, rituali mistici immaginari, immersioni politeistiche, programmi di auto-aiuto online, religioni esotiche e miracolose, o altre fantasie attuali, oneste o meno, create per sfruttare la sofferenza che portiamo come esseri umani. Solo una dottrina umanistica chiamata Buddismo, razionalmente comprensibile. Sappiate però che per praticarlo bisognerebbe dedicare tutta la vita senza restrizioni. In questo risiede il fascino che il Buddismo offre alle nostre menti. -/- . (shrink)

Dharmakīrti’s (c. seventh century) Examination of Relations (Sambandhaparīkṣā) is unique in the Indian Buddhist canon for its being the only extant root text devoted entirely to the topic of the ontological status of relations. But the core thesis of this treatise—that relations are only nominally real—is in prima facie tension with another claim that is central to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology: that there exists some kind of “natural relation” (svabhāvapratibandha) that reliably underwrites inferences. Understanding how Dharmakīrti can consistently rely on natural relations (...) to prop up his presentation of inferential reasoning while at the same time advancing an anti-realist account of relations is critical for making sense of his system of logic and epistemology, which came to be nearly universally adopted in Tibetan Buddhism cutting across traditions. Chomden Rikpé Reldri (1227–1305), who was perhaps the most prolific commentator on logic and epistemology in the history of Tibetan philosophy, composed two texts commenting on the Examination of Relations, neither of which have received any scholarly attention to date. In this paper, I provide an introduction to Chomden Reldri’s two commentaries and consider how they may illuminate Dharmakīrti’s text and also what they reveal about the understanding of Dharmakīrti’s account of relations in early Tibetan scholasticism. I then present a translation of Dharmakīrti’s Examination of Relations together with Chomden Reldri’s commentary, Annotations and Topical Outline of the Examination of Relations (’Brel pa brtag pa’i mchan dang sa bcad gnyis). (shrink)

Review of Kuzminski, A. (2021). Pyrrhonian Buddhism: A Philosophical Reconstruction. London & New York: Routledge.

Adequate knowledge about Buddhism is essential to the education and culture of any person who does not want to be simply another alienated member of a herd that walks blindly amid a technological revolution. It is possible to understand early Buddhism through modern language and knowledge and establish its relations with contemporary thought and its references. With this, it becomes possible to deepen and broaden our perception of these millennial principles' compatibility with our modern ways of living and knowing. The (...) study required for this is quite laborious. Buddhism is the subject underlying a gigantic literary and cultural mountain. The closer we get to its original concept, the deeper and more voluminous the excavation we have to do. (shrink)

Charles Taylor criticizes many liberal theories based on a kind of atomism that assumes the individual self-sufficiency outside the polity. This not only causes soft-relativism and political fragmentation but also undermines the solidarity of the community, that is, the very condition of the formation of autonomous citizens. Taylor thus argues for communitarian politics which protects certain cultural common goods for sustaining the solidarity of the community. However, Brenda Lyshaug criticizes Taylor’s communitarianism as suppressing plurality and enhancing hostility among cultural groups. (...) In the face of such controversies, I argue for modern Confucian familism which emphasizes the family as a common good that provides a safe, stable, and nurturing environment for nurturing children and cultivating civility for future generations with a sense of community and autonomy. I also defend Confucian familism from four possible criticisms: insufficiency of familism, hierarchical relationship in the family, the danger of nepotism, and challenge from postmodern families. I argue that unlike traditional Confucianism, modern moderation of the Confucian family can greatly reduce the hierarchical problem; its emphasis on the family as one of the foundations of politics can avoid the danger of being atomistic liberalism and suppressive communitarianism. (shrink)

Review of Douglas S. Duckworth (2019). Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy of Mind and Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Longchen Rabjampa (1308–64), scholar of the Tibetan Buddhist Nyingma tradition, presents a novel doxographical taxonomy of the so-called Svātantrika branch of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, designating the Indian Mādhyamika Śrīgupta (c. 7th/8th century) as the exemplar of a Svātantrika sub-school which maintains that appearance and emptiness are metaphysically distinct. This paper compares Longchenpa’s characterization of this “distinct-appearance-and-emptiness” view with Śrīgupta’s own account of the two truths. I expose a significant disconnect between Longchenpa’s Śrīgupta and Śrīgupta himself and argue that the impetus (...) for Longchenpa’s doxographical innovation originates not in Buddhist India, but within his own Tibetan intellectual milieu, tracing back to his twelfth-century Sangpu Monastery predecessors, Gyamarwa and Chapa. (shrink)

Over the past generation, the rise of East Asia and especially China, has brought about a sea change in the economic and political world order. At the same time, global warming, environmental degradation, food and water shortages, population explosion, and income inequities have created a perfect storm that threatens the very survival of humanity. It is clear now that the Westphalian model of individual sovereign states seeking their own self-interest will not be able to respond effectively to this win-win or (...) lose-lose crisis. In this volume, a cadre of distinguished scholars comes together to reflect on Confucianism and Deweyan pragmatism as possible resources for a new geopolitics that begins from an ontology of interdependence and recognizes the irreducibly ecological nature of the human experience at every level. Both Confucian and Deweyan traditions emphasize the primacy of experience, the importance of vital relationality, and the moral roots of good governance. The potential benefits of conceptually blending the two are many. Indeed, the contemporary Chinese philosopher Tang Junyi provides us with a cosmological understanding of the "idea" of Confucianism that, in parallel to Dewey's "idea" of democracy, can enable us to anticipate the core values, if not the specific contours, of a "Confucian democracy." Just as Dewey's "idea" of democracy is his vision of the flourishing communal life made possible by the contributions of the uniquely distinguished persons that constitute it, Tang Junyi's Confucianism is a pragmatic naturalism directed at achieving the most highly integrated cultural, moral, and spiritual growth for the individual-in-community. In both, we find an affirmation of communal harmony as a process "starting here and going there" through which those involved learn together to do ordinary things in extraordinary ways. Just such a cosmological understanding of democracy is one way of describing what will be needed to address the many predicaments characterizing the environmental, cultural, socioeconomic, and political dynamics of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Agues that Confucianism and other East Asian philosophical traditions can be resources for understanding and addressing current global challenges such as climate change and hunger.

Modern dialogue between Western science and Buddhism raises an enormous range of cognitive issues that require interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research. The idea of methodological pluralism arises here as an ef fective solution for such projects. Having immersed itself in the study of the background of its opponent, Western science touched the fairly old and specific way of reality cognition, which in certain aspects actually can be identified as a Tibetan-Buddhist version of the MP. In an interview with the professor from (...) the United States, who for many decades has been engaged in research on the boundaries of various science disciplines, ethics, and religious studies, we tried to clarify the specifics of this so-called version of MP, which is set out in the Buddhist doctrine of time, Kālacakra. Texts of this doctrine are included in the corpus of Buddhist canonical literature and form the basis for two classical Buddhist sciences: the science of stars ; and the science of healing. During the interview, we went directly to the possibility of using the Buddhist version of MP at least within the dialogue “Bud dhism- Science”, to the need to understand the specifics of such an implementation, and to the mandatory combination of MP with an integrated approach. The interview was intended to raise the question that deals with transgressing the abovementioned dialogue from the “consumer” level to the philosophical one, in order to formulate a criterion for recognizing a different way of thinking, and finally, to move on toward the semantic discussion, without which the integration phase of any kind of MP is impossible. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the historical and philosophical problems of the study of the text of the "Gridaya Sutra" ("Sherab Nyingpo") within the tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. As a prolegomena, an overview of the field of translation was chosen - for a better understanding of both the logic of the formation of the Buddhist tradition of the Prajna-paramita sutras in India (which is revealed during translations from Sanskrit into Western languages), and the principles of their textual transmission to Tibet (...) (through the clarification of the principles of Tibetan translation from Sanskrit in the Lotsa tradition). The purpose of the study is to identify the mechanism that made it possible to make a transition in the Buddhist religious and philosophical space from the intellectual understanding of the ideas of emptiness (explained in the Magayana sutras) to their direct practice, the meaning of which is the detection of emptiness in one's own stream of consciousness (proposed by the tantric teachings of Vajrayana).. And since the "Gridaya-sutra" is the quintessence of the entire tradition of Prajna-paramita texts and contains a unique Buddhist mantra of "consolation in suffering", it, as a representative of the teachings of the sutras, was chosen for comparative analysis with the tradition of Mantrayana texts, i.e. Tantrayana. The representative of the tantric tradition was chosen to be the teaching text of the highest class of tantras - the Anuttarayogatantra called Kalachakra, which, due to its systematic development and strong semantic connections with classical Buddhist sciences, is considered the most consistent and structured tantra. As a result of research in Kalachakra, a specific complication of the meanings of the "Gridaya-sutra" was revealed, which opened the way for the individual from contemplating the emptiness of dharmas to collapsing the space-time continuum of the inner experience of conceptuality into a transcendent singularity for the sake of understanding true knowledge (jnana). In addition, the key mechanism of such a transition, which made it possible for the third turning of the Dharma wheel to become a continuation of the practice of the second turning, and not just another separate method, turned out to be the mechanism of the mantra, which is transformed from a concise morphological formula in the "Gridaya-sutra" into a phonetic formula in the Kalachakra. Therefore, the "Gridaya-sutra" takes the place of a trigger in the paramitayana, which makes it possible to organically connect the "higher" arsenal of Buddhist tantra to the process of enlightenment. (shrink)

How can Buddhists prove that non-existent things do not exist? With great difficulty. For the Buddhist, this is not a laughing matter as they are largely global error theorists and, thus, many things are non-existent. The difficulty gets compounded as the Buddhist and their opponent, the non-Buddhist of various kinds, both agree that one cannot prove a thesis whose subject is non-existent. In this paper, I will first present a difficulty that Buddhist philosophers have faced in proving that what they (...) take to be non-existent does not exist. I will then survey two main solutions that they have provided. Those 'solutions' may not solve the problem or solve the problem but creates other problems. I will not survey the Buddhist treatment of the problem of proving about non-existence in order to present a new solution that we have yet to see. Instead, I will articulate a problem about non-existence that is unique to Buddhist philosophers. I will do so in order to present an interesting puzzle about non-existence that has largely escaped attention in the 'Western' literature. (shrink)

The intent of this article is not to compare the philosophies of education of Confucius and Peter Kemp but to draw out what is perennial in Confucius’s philosophy of education and bring it to the contemporary context in Peter Kemp’s philosophy of education. The first part deals with Confucius’s teachings on education. The second part highlights Peter Kemp’s philosophy of education, the context of which is globalization and its dangers. The synthesis of both philosophies would mean that education is a (...) right that everyone is entitled to, that education is basically cultivation of character more than instruction, that the virtues of ren, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety can be adapted and applied to the demands of global citizenship. The method of teaching can be both dialogical (Confucius) and democratic (Kemp) when the teacher is passionate, engaged, knowledgeable of issues, caring for students, and an exemplar of what she teachers. (shrink)

This article aims to show why Sellars' critique of epistemic givenness has proven so apt in characterizing the philosophical problems that confront the project of Dignaga and Dharmakirti -- problem that result from the etent to whih these buddhists valorized "non-conceptual awareness.

This is a rebuttal to the wrong notions of Sarah H Jacoby.

This chapter suggests that Sellars' account of subjectivity as socially constructed, and hence conceptual at its illusory roots, presents a crisp and compelling perspective on cognitive life that captures Buddhist conceptions of transformative non-duality.

Sellars' critique of the myth of the given can help us understand the epistemology of consciousness in Madhyamaka and Yogacara thought.

This article argues that, rather than thinking that our ethics has to fall back on Kantian and proto-Christian claims, Sellars should have appealed to the framework of Buddhist ethics.

Калачакра-тантра в тибето-буддійській традиції – це доктрина часу, яка є основою не лише для певних релігійних практик, а й для буддійських природничих наук (астрономо-астрології та алхіміо-медецини). Стаття присвячена послідовному огляду основних досліджень вчення Калачакри як в межах самої традиції (починаючи з Х ст., коли Калачакра з’явилась в буддійському просторі Індії в якості тантричного вчення), так і на заході (починаючи з XVII ст., коли інформація про культову сторону Калачакри та про пов’язані з нею буддійські науки фрагментарно почала просочуватися в інтелектуальний простір (...) Європи), що умовно можна розподілити на дві гілки студій: апологетичних та критичних, відповідно. В апологетичних студіях було зафіксовано відображення певних періодів еволюції практики Калачакра-тантри та визначено її приналежність до групи вищих тантр ваджраяни. У критичних студіях, з метою з’ясувати культурний та філософський масштаб вчення, було виокремлено декілька головних напрямів дослідження вчення Калачакри: космологічний, астрономо-астрологічний, алхімічно-медичний, есхатологічний, релігійно-ритуальний та тибетологічний. У результаті такого підходу до історіографії Калачакра-тантри було виявлено, що наразі ці дві гілки студій, наближаючись одна до одної, досягли певної межі, за якою може відкритися новий рівень дослідження вчення, що, своєю чергою, підживить діалог буддизму з наукою, де Калачакра-тантрі, яка балансує між фізикою та метафізикою, може бути відведена ключова роль. (shrink)

The chapter offers a sustained comparison between American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and Buddhist philosopher Dignaga and argues that while their views are prima facie inconsistent with one another, there are important areas of agreement worthy of exploration.

The aim of this paper is to explore and try to give an answer to the question: what happens when the philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars meets the tradition of Japanese Buddhist philosophy.

This book explores the contributions to the philosophy of mind made by the Tibetan Buddhist thinker Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) in his seminal text, the “Dispeller of the Mind’s Darkness.” This study, which includes a critical edition and English translation of those portions of the “Dispeller” devoted to explicating the nature of mental episodes and their objects, contributes to a deeper understanding of Tibetan intellectual history, while also facilitating a wider appreciation of both Phya pa’s theory of (...) mind and its significance within the global history of philosophy. (shrink)