Critics of conspiracy theories often charge that such theories are implausible because conspiracies of the kind they allege tend to fail. Thus, according to these critics, conspiracy theories that have been around for a while would have been, in all likelihood, already exposed if they had been real. So, they reason, they probably are not. In this article, I maintain that the arguments in support of this view are unconvincing. I do so by examining a list of four sources recently (...) cited in support of the claim that conspiracies tend to fail. I pay special attention to two of these sources, an article by Brian Keeley, and, especially, an article by David Grimes, which is perhaps the single “best” article in support of the idea that conspiracies tend to fail. That is, it offers the most explicit and elaborate attempt to establish this view. Further, that article has garnered significant (uncritical) attention in the mainstream press. I argue that Grimes's argument does not succeed, that the common assertion that conspiracies tend to fail remains poorly supported, and that there are good reasons to think that at least some types of conspiracies do not tend to fail. (shrink)

The philosopher Quassim Cassam has described a concept called ‘Conspiracy Theories’ (capitalized) that includes several ‘special features’ that distinguish such theories from other theories positing conspiracies. Conspiracy Theories, he argues, are unlikely to be true. Indeed, he implies that they are, as a class of ideas, so unlikely to be true that we are justified in responding to them by criticizing the ideology they are (presumed to be) associated with, rather than engaging them solely on their individual epistemic merits. This (...) article argues that Cassam’s ‘special features’ are ambiguous. Under some interpretations, they are not epistemically problematic. Under other interpretations, they do not fairly describe many of the theories Cassam treats as examples of Conspiracy Theories. In the end, there seems to be no interpretation of these features that would justify the inference that theories Cassam treats as Conspiracy Theories, including JFK Conspiracy Theories, can be reasonably dismissed on account of having these features. (shrink)

In an article based on a recent address to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Keith Harris has argued that there is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorizing. Although he finds “standard criticisms” of conspiracy theories wanting, he argues that there are three subtle but significant problems with conspiracy theorizing: It relies on an invalid probabilistic version of modus tollens. It involves a problematic combination of both epistemic virtues and vices. And it lacks an adequate basis for trust in its information (...) sources. In response to Harris, this article argues that, like previous criticisms, these criticisms do little to undermine conspiracy theorizing as such. And they do not give us good reasons to dismiss any particular conspiracy theory without consideration of the relevant evidence. (shrink)

In the social science literature, conspiracy theories are commonly characterized as theories positing a vast network of evil and preternaturally effective conspirators, and they are often treated, either explicitly or implicitly, as dubious on this basis. This characterization is based on Richard Hofstadter’s famous account of ‘the paranoid style’. However, many significant conspiracy theories do not have any of the relevant qualities. Thus, the social science literature provides a distorted account of the general category ‘conspiracy theory’, conflating it with a (...) subset of that category that encourages unfairly negative evaluations of conspiracy theories. Generally, when evaluating theories, one should focus on the most plausible versions; the merit of a theory is independent of the existence of less plausible versions of it. By ignoring this and glossing over important distinctions, many academics, especially in the social sciences, have misclassified many conspiracy theories and in doing so have contributed to an epistemically unfair depiction of them. Further, even theories that genuinely fit the description of ‘the paranoid style’ cannot be completely dismissed on that basis. All conspiracy theories ought to be judged on the totality of their individual merits. (shrink)

This article addresses the question, ‘Should scholars debunk conspiracy theories or stay neutral?’ It describes ‘conspiracy theories’ and two senses of ‘neutrality,’ arguing that scholars should be...

Kurtis Hagen argues that early Confucians seek to discourage war by prescribing conditions for just war that are exceedingly difficult to meet. They encourage, instead, a long-term strategy of ameliorating unjust circumstances by leveraging the credibility and influence that stems from consistently practicing genuinely benevolent governance.

Many intellectuals scoff at what they call “conspiracy theories.” But two Harvard law professors, Cass Sunstein (now working for the Obama administration) and Adrian Vermeule, go further. They argue in the Journal of Political Philosophy that groups that espouse such theories ought to be infiltrated and undermined by government agents and allies. While some may find this proposal appalling (as indeed we all should), others may find the argument plausible, especially if they have been swayed by the notion that conspiracy (...) theories (or a definable subset thereof), by their nature, somehow or another, do not warrant belief. I will argue that Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposal not only conflicts with the values of an open society, but is also epistemically indefensible. In making my case, I will adopt their favored example, counter-narratives about 9/11. (shrink)

Presumably authoritative sources, such as social scientists who study conspiracy theorists, are generally expected to be logically rigorous, intellectually honest, and unbiased. This chapter suggests that this expectation may not always be justified. Specifically, it exposes a number of significant problems in an attempt by a group of social scientists to defend the (ostensibly) scientific study of conspiracy theorists. First, they misrepresent their own previously stated intentions. Second, they misrepresent a critique of those intentions. Third, they fail completely in their (...) attempt to show that, regarding the inappropriate pathologizing of conspiracy theorists, their critics are guilty as they are. Fourth, they cite seriously flawed studies as though they offered robust findings. And fifth, their criticism of a central distinction, between “generalist” and “particularist” approaches, is based on a misunderstanding. This raises troubling questions: How can we to have confidence in a program of study undertaken, in part, by scientists who get so much wrong? And, to what degree is this an isolated problem? (shrink)

In the philosophy of Confucius, the concept _li_ is both central and elusive. While it is often translated 'ritual' or 'the rites,' I argue that there are numerous significant ways in which _li_ is as much an internal property of individuals as it is an external set of rules or norms. I discuss _li_ as deference, as developed dispositions, as embodied intelligence, and as personalized exemplary conduct. Finally, reflecting on the work of Fingarette, and Hall and Ames, as well as (...) Wilson's analysis of their work, I argue that the external _aspect_ of _li_, although reasonably understood under the rubric of 'traditional norms,' may nonetheless legitimately evolve, and that this coheres well with the notion that an internal sense-of-ritual is integral to the meaning of _li_. (shrink)

An anthology of new translations of essential readings from the classical texts of early Chinese philosophy. It includes the Analects of Confucius, Meng Zi (Mencius), Xun Zi, Mo Zi, Lao Zi (Dao De Jing), Zhuang Zi, and Han Fei Zi, as well as short chapters on the Da Xue and the Zhong Yong. Pedagogically organized, it offers philosophically sophisticated annotations and commentaries as well as an extensive glossary explaining key philosophical concepts in detail.

In an article published in the Journal of Political Philosophy, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the government and its allies ought to activelyundermine groups that espouse conspiracy theories deemed “demonstrably false.” They propose infiltrating such groups in order to “cure” conspiracy theorists by treating their “crippled epistemology” with “cognitive diversity.” They base their proposal on an analysis of the “causes” of such conspiracy theories, which emphasizes informational and reputational cascades. Some may regard their proposal as outrageous and anti-democratic. (...) I agree. However, in this article I merely argue that their argument is flawed in at least the following ways: their account of the popularity of conspiracy theories is implausible, and their proposal relies on misleading “stylized facts,” including a caricature of those who doubt official narratives and a deceptive depiction of the relevant history. (shrink)

This paper challenges the view of several interpreters of Xunzi regarding the status of names, ming. I will maintain that Xunzi's view is consistent with the activity we see not only in his own efforts to influence language, but those of Confucius as well. Based on a reconsideration of translations and interpretations of key passages, I will argue that names are regarded neither as mere labels nor as indicating a privileged taxonomy of the myriad phenomena. Rather, Xunzi conceives them as (...) constructs designed to facilitate social goals. Finally, I will suggest an alternative to overly simplistic understandings of how appropriate names are fashioned and of who is responsible for their form. (shrink)

While Sorai's intellectual debt to Xunzi is often mentioned, the similarities between their views have not often been explored at length in English2.2 Further, while Maruyama Masao does compare the two thinkers in his influential monograph Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, he stresses (apparent) differences between Xunzi and Sorai, in order to hail Sorai's uniqueness. Without meaning to take anything away from Sorai as an independent thinker, I maintain that with regard to precisely those views for which (...) Sorai is lauded as unique - that dao is a product of real people that evolved over time and continues to evolve - his position was also held by Xunzi. In addition, there is a related yet rarely highlighted aspect of Xunzi's thought that is also acknowledged by Sorai. That is, virtues acquired by participating in the way in turn qualify one to contribute to its continuous open-ended development. (shrink)

Xunzi is often interpreted as offering a method for transforming our desires. This essay argues that, strictly speaking, he does not. Rather, Xunzi offers a method of developing an auxiliary motivational structure capable of overpowering our original desires, when there is a conflict. When one succeeds in transforming one’s overall character, original desires nevertheless remain and are largely satisfied. This explains why one may be motivated to follow the way even before one has developed noble intentions. On Xunzi’s view, following (...) dao provides the best chance of satisfying one’s original desires, as well as fulfilling the more noble aspirations that arise from the process. (shrink)

Xunzi was chronologically the third of the three great Confucian thinkers of China’s classical period, after Confucius and Mencius. Having produced the most comprehensive philosophical system of that period, he occupies a place in the development of Chinese philosophy comparable to that of Aristotle in the Western philosophical tradition. This essay reveals how Xunzi’s understanding of virtue and moral development dovetailed with his positions on ritual propriety, the attunement of names, the relation betweenli (patterns) andlei (categories), and his view ofdao (...) (the way) in general. I have argued for a constructivist understanding of each of these aspects of Xunzi’s philosophy in some detail elsewhere (see Hagen 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), and so here I will just briefly review a few key points before addressing their relation to moral development. (shrink)

This article explores contrasting interpretations of early Confucian philosophy as they apply to education, focusing primarily on the Analects of Confucius, the Mencius, and the Xunzi 荀子. I first describe a common interpretation of the Confucian worldview, according to which an already perfected way is thought to have been established. This view tends to encourage thinking of education as a process of conveying the True Way and ensuring conformity to the norms that constitute it. I then describe and defend a (...) contrasting Confucian worldview, in which the learner’s initiative, critical engagement, creativity, and personal qualities play a significant role. According to this interpretation, the way is, to some degree, indeterminate and evolving, and thus more open to participatory inquiry as well as influence. Illustrious virtue, which Confucian learning aims at developing, is likewise to some degree indeterminate and legitimately personalized. Although some degree of conformity to established norms is involved, especially in early stages, Confucian education culminates in the cultivation of personal distinction, developing one’s own uniqueness. (shrink)

I will argue that there are two pervasive and enduring Western attitudes towards warfare: one involves the romanticism of violent conflict, the other concerns moral justification for it. These stand in sharp contrast to the traditional Chinese attitude as put forward in the Chinese classic treatises on warfare, the Sun‐tzu and Sun Pin. I will reference similar concerns articulated in the Taoist and, to a lesser extent, Confucian classics both to confirm and clarify this position. Using the combination of some (...) of the most important and influential texts with the most relevant to our topic, I will attempt to identify and explicate what I will call “the traditional Chinese attitude toward warfare” as a critique of the two widespread Western attitudes. Finally, I will explore the implications of the West abandoning its romantic and moralistic attitudes. (shrink)

This essay offers a critical evaluation of competing interpretations of the early Confucian thinkers Xunzi and Mencius regarding their view of the legitimacy of war. First, I briefly describe and critique Daniel Bell's “just war” interpretation of Mencius, which is relatively permissive regarding the legitimation of war. I then consider and critique the position of Sumner Twiss and Jonathan Chan regarding Mencius' and Xunzi's ostensible support for what we call “humanitarian intervention,” which is also made from a just war perspective. (...) Next, I describe Xinzhong Yao's pacifistic interpretation, offering a slightly qualified defense of it. I then consider reframing this view as “just war pacifism,” defending a phrase used in the Confucian context by Julia Ching. Finally, I address the question of whether the pacifistic account is too naïve to attribute to these great Confucian thinkers. I maintain that, on the contrary, it is not naïve. Indeed, it is a position we would do well to give due consideration. (shrink)

This essay offers a critical evaluation of competing interpretations of the early Confucian thinkers Xunzi and Mencius regarding their view of the legitimacy of war. First, I briefly describe and critique Daniel Bell’s “just war” interpretation of Mencius, which is relatively permissive regarding the legitimation of war. I then consider and critique the position of Sumner Twiss and Jonathan Chan regarding Mencius’ and Xunzi’s ostensible support for what we call “humanitarian intervention,” which is also made from a just war perspective. (...) Next, I describe Xinzhong Yao’s pacifistic interpretation, offering a slightly qualified defense of it. I then consider reframing this view as “just war pacifism,” defending a phrase used in the Confucian context by Julia Ching. Finally, I address the question of whether the pacifistic account is too naïve to attribute to these great Confucian thinkers. I maintain that, on the contrary, it is not naïve. Indeed, it is a position we would do well to give due consideration. (shrink)

As the title Ritual and Religion in the Xunzi accurately suggests, this collection of essays edited by T. C. Kline III and Justin Tiwald addresses Xunzi’s perspective on ritual and religion. Some of the essays are new, others are have been published previously. As a whole, the book strives to portray Xunzi as a religious philosopher, and to elucidate his potential contribution to the understanding of religion and ritual. Although there are a variety of views presented, Xunzi is generally characterized (...) as renovating and reinterpreting religion, rather than denouncing it, as he has sometimes been interpreted.After an introduction, the first chapter is Edward J. Machle’s seminal 1976 essay “Xunzi as a Religious.. (shrink)

Many scholars view Confucianism as relatively open to war, as a legitimate tool for maintaining order and rescuing oppressed peoples. Indeed, it is not uncommon for statements such as the following to be presented as though they were straightforward matters of fact: “Confucians would approve the use of force by one state against another state for the protection against abusive rule in the latter if properly carried out”.1 Such claims find support in the work of Daniel A. Bell, Tongdong Bai, (...) and Yan Xuetong. Both Bell and Bai are explicit in their view that Confucians ought to support some humanitarian interventions. Bai writes, “When it is humane and strong, a state... (shrink)

My purpose has been more negative than positive. That is, I have challenged the view that Sorai understoodtian as an intentional agent. At minimum, Sorai’s philosophical views do not depend upon such a conception oftian, and he refrains from characterizingtian in such terms when he discusses the concept oftian directly. However, I do not claim to have proven that Sorai’s view oftian was completely naturalistic, or even that Sorai did not—at some level—believe thattian had intentions. I have, I hope, shown (...) thatthe case that Sorai viewedtian as intentional has not been convincingly made. Further, something closer to a dynamic and indeterminate naturalistic view is a reasonable alternative. On my reading, Sorai steers a course between the Song Confucian view oftian as static and knowable (a view that he explicitly rejects) and a view oftian as intentional (a view he never unequivocally expresses)—indeed, he rejects the idea of personifyingtian. When Sorai speaks of thexin or mind of tian, he is best understood as employing a metaphor that implies complexity, mystery, activity, and perhaps moral structure, but not intentionality in the normal sense. The complexity, indeterminacy, and dynamism oftian, as these are expressed in Sorai’s writings, do not necessarily imply willful intent on the part oftian, for they are all consistent with the Xunzian interpretation oftian as a natural process, even iftian’s regularities have a moral character. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the XunziKurtis HagenVirtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Edited, with introduction, by T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000. Pp. xvii + 268.Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, edited by T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe, is an anthology that has much to recommend it. It brings together several seminal (...) papers on Xunzi by established and distinguished scholars of Chinese philosophy, such as Antonio S. Cua, D. C. Lau, David S. Nivison, and Henry Rosemont, Jr. It also includes contributions from relative newcomers, who focused their dissertations on Xunzi's philosophy, namely T. C. Kline III and Eric Hutton. While most of these essays have been previously published, some appear in print for the first time in this volume. There is also a succinct introduction, name and subject indexes, and a targeted bibliography, which may serve as a reading list for those interested in supplementing their study of Xunzi. Another nicety is that references to passages in the Xunzi in older articles have been updated to include John Knoblock's translation1 as well as A Concordance to the Xunzi,2 and romanizations have been standardized to pinyin. [End Page 434]For the most part, the title Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi accurately represents the most prominent subject matter of the book. However, by "nature" what is meant is apparently "human nature," if that is an adequate translation for the concept Xunzi designates with the character xing. Xunzi's view of tian (the propensities of nature, the heavens) is not prominently discussed.3 Most of the essays, chapters 4 through 11 (the final chapter), deal extensively if not primarily with understanding Xunzi's conception of human nature. Chapters 5 through 7 are tied even closer together under the theme of moral agency (more on their connection below). Virtue is the topic of chapter 3 and plays a role in chapters 4 and 7.Although the first two chapters seem not to fall neatly within these categories, Henry Rosemont, Jr.'s contribution, "State and Society in the Xunzi: A Philosophical Commentary," seems an appropriate choice for the lead chapter of this collection. A sweeping polemic in defense of Xunzi's political philosophy, this seminal essay demonstrates the philosophical strength and potential relevance of Xunzi's thought. Specifically, Rosemont argues that Xunzi's political system is no less "reasonable" than democracy, and that while Xunzi advocates what Karl Popper would call a "closed society," Xunzi's system is defensible against Popper's critique of such societies.4The second chapter, "Ethical Uses of the Past in Early Confucianism: The Case of Xunzi," is authored by Antonio S. Cua, who has been a consistent contributor to the understanding of Xunzi's philosophy for more than twenty years. A collection of essays on Xunzi would be incomplete without Cua's work being represented. However, given the themes of the book, it is not entirely clear why this particular piece was selected. While Cua has written on both human nature and virtue in the Xunzi, this essay only tangentially addresses the theme of virtue. Nevertheless, it exemplifies the kind of careful scholarship characteristic of Cua's work, and there is something to be said for an anthology like this to exhibit breadth as well as focus. In his contribution, Cua analyzes Xunzi's appeal to history in terms of its "pedagogical function," "rhetorical function," "elucidative function," and "evaluative function."In chapter 3, "Virtues in Xunzi's Thought," Jonathan W. Schofer offers a lucid depiction of Xunzi's moral theory as a kind of virtue theory, despite the lack of any systematic analysis on Xunzi's part of a specific set of virtues. He then suggests that, given Xunzi's theory and goals, the omission of any analysis of specific virtues may have been deliberate.The last eight chapters deal extensively with the issue of human nature. Chapter 4, "Xunzi: Morality as Psychological Constraint," by Joel J. Kupperman, compares Xunzi's and Mencius' conceptions of human nature. Kupperman argues that, unlike Mencius, Xunzi does not really have a "view of human... (shrink)