Our words are vague, yet the world is precise. This dissertation consists of three essays that jointly attempt to articulate, explore, and defend this claim. In the first essay, I present my positive proposal for a non-metaphysical treatment of vagueness. Inspired by research on the Problem of the Many, I claim that we are speaking many perfectly precise languages simultaneously and that each speech act involves uttering many perfectly precise sentences. This position, which I call supersententialism, is the most plausible (...) alternative to metaphysical vagueness: it provides a fully reductive account of vagueness that preserves the T-schema. The second essay aims to address a rampant, albeit unnoticed, argument schema that purports to show that non-metaphysical accounts of vagueness cannot explain vagueness in fundamental, or perfectly natural, properties. In response, I propose a position that I call ersatz metaphysical vagueness according to which the term ‘perfectly natural’ is vague. Ersatz metaphysical vagueness retains the idea that the world is precise, but replicates the advantages of genuine metaphysical vagueness. I show how, by adopting this hypothesis, there can be vagueness in attributions of perfectly natural properties arising from the vagueness in our notion of perfect naturalness rather than from ‘the world itself’. Ersatz metaphysical vagueness thus provides us with a highly general alternative to genuine metaphysical vagueness. The final essay explores the relationship between metaphysical vagueness and ontological deflationism. Ontological deflationist positions treat the quantifier as having a highly plastic meaning. This plasticity naturally leads to vagueness in the quantifier. Thus, ontological deflationists are committed to vague existence. Is this vague existence ‘metaphysical vagueness’ or ‘vagueness in the world’? The rest of the essay clarifies this question and answers it under various clarifications. (shrink)

Ces dernières années, plusieurs travaux sur l’histoire des femmes s’intéressent à leur présence et à leurs rôles dans les domaines artistiques laissés de côté par les ouvrages généraux plus anciens. Pour autant, des thèmes sont encore à explorer en ce qui concerne le rôle de certaines dans ces secteurs pour la période moderne. C’est le cas de la musique, pour laquelle des éléments sur la présence féminine sont décelables à travers des ouvrages sur l’art musical de cette période. Ainsi, l’ouvr...

According to Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a "semantic rule"? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic rules.

According to the plurivaluationist, our vague discourse doesn’t have a single meaning. Instead, it has many meanings, each of which is precise—and it is this plurality of meanings that is the source of vagueness. I believe plurivaluationist positions are underdeveloped and for this reason unpopular. This paper attempts to correct this situation by offering a particular development of plurivaluationism that I call supersententialism. The supersententialist leverages lessons from another area of research—the Problem of the Many—in service of the plurivaluationist position. (...) The Problem reveals theoretical reasons to accept that there are many cats where we thought there was one; the supersententialist claims that we are in a similar situation with respect to languages, propositions and sentences. I argue that the parallel suggested by the supersententialist reveals unappreciated advantages and lines of defense for plurivaluationism. (shrink)

Does moral vagueness require ontic vagueness? A central challenge for nonontic treatments of moral vagueness arises from the referential stability of moral terms across small changes in how they are applied: if moral vagueness is not ontic vagueness, it’s hard to explain this referential stability. Pointing to this challenge, Miriam Schoenfield has argued that moral vagueness is ontic vagueness, at least for a moral realist. I disagree. I argue that a moral realist can use a conceptual role semantics for moral (...) terms to give a purely semantic treatment of moral vagueness. (shrink)

A relatively small segment of business, known as social entrepreneurship (SE), is increasingly being acknowledged as an effective source of solutions for a variety of social problems. Because society tends to view "new" solutions as "the" solution, we are concerned that SE will soon be expected to provide answers to our most pressing social ills. In this paper we call into question the ability of SE, by itself, to provide solutions on a scope necessary to address large-scale social issues. SE (...) cannot reasonably be expected to solve social problems on a large scale for a variety of reasons. The first we label the orga nizational legitimacy argument. This argument leads to our second argument, the isomorphism argument. We also advance three other claims, the moral y political and structural arguments. After making our arguments, we explore ways in which SE, in concert with other social institutions, can effectively address social ills. We also present two examples of successful ventures in which SEs partnered with governments and other institutions. (shrink)

Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others -- they do better or worse at ``carving nature at its joints''. Call this claim predicate naturalism. Disagreement remains over whether the notion of naturalness extends ``beyond the predicate'' (à la Sider, 2011). Are the candidate meanings of logical vocabulary also more or less natural? Call this claim logical naturalism. -/- One motivation for predicate naturalism comes from its supposed ability (...) to help rebut various radical indeterminacy arguments associated with Hilary Putnam (1977, 1980, 1981). It does so in combination with a popular meta-semantic theory called reference magnetism. I argue that the same threats of Putnam-style radical indeterminacy rearise for proponents of predicate naturalism -- threats which logical naturalism helps rebuts. So, if we accept predicate naturalism because it helps fend off threats of indeterminacy, we should also accept logical naturalism. (shrink)

Adam Elga (Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(5), 1–11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga’s argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle (...) that is more difficult for imprecise Bayesians to avoid. (shrink)

We provide an overview of the meta-ontological position known as "Quantifier Variance".

This paper asks: Is the quantifier variantist committed to metaphysical vagueness? My investigation of this question goes via a study of vague existence. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist is committed to vague existence and that the vague existence posited by the variantist requires a puzzling sort of metaphysical vagueness. Specifically, I distinguish between (what I call) positive and negative metaphysical vagueness. Positive metaphysical vagueness is (roughly) the claim that there is vagueness in the world; negative metaphysical vagueness is (roughly) (...) the claim that there is vagueness that is not in our language or thought. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist’s commitment to vague existence comes with positive metaphysical vagueness -- even if it doesn't require negative metaphysical vagueness. (shrink)

Qu'elle soit entendue comme état de désordre social ou qu'elle soit pensée comme ordre social sans Etat, l'anarchie reste difficilement appréhendée par les juristes autrement que par l'exclusion. Droit et anarchie seraient incompatibles, car le droit impliquerait nécessairement l'autorité (dont l'Etat moderne constitue la forme ultime, par la monopolisation du pouvoir de contrainte) que l'anarchie supprime. Aussi, l'étude de l'anarchie n'aurait plus grand chose à révéler au juriste, et sa marginalisation intellectuelle ne devrait pas surprendre. Pourtant, est-il vraiment satisfaisant de (...) cantonner la question de l'anarchie à l'histoire des idées politiques, alors que l'enjeu du débat touche les fondements mêmes de l'ordre juridique? C'est cette question complexe des rapports entre le droit et l'anarchie que cet ouvrage - qui regroupe les actes d'une journée d'étude organisée par l'Institut d'études de droit public de la faculté jean Monnet de l'Université Paris Sud - se propose d'investir à nouveau. (shrink)

The authors argue that a free market paradigm facilitates wealth creation but does little to distribute that wealth in a just manner. In order to achieve the social goal of distributive justice, the concept of a fair market is introduced and explored. The authors then examine three drivers that can help improve the lives of all people, especially the poor: civil society, its institutions, and business. After exploring the roles these drivers might play in developing fair markets, we describe three (...) enablers that serve as catalysts for change: the effects of globalization, the impact of technology, and the emergence of entrepreneurial activity. We conclude by making recommendations for establishing fair markets and provide exemplars of two firms that embody the arguments made in the article. (shrink)

I propose a view that I call "Ersatz Metaphysical Vagueness" according to which the term "perfectly natural" can be semantically vague. As its name suggests, the view mimics traditional metaphysical vagueness without the radical metaphysical underpinnings. In particular, the ersatzer avoids a widely accepted argument schema (advanced by JRG Williams, Ted Sider, Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne and others) according to which, if there is no metaphysical vagueness, F-ness cannot be both perfectly natural and vague.

This paper investigates a structural void that, especially in the context of poor or developing nations, prevents economic growth from being more inclusive and benefiting wider sections of society. The authors initially examine the imperative for inclusive growth, one encompassing a focus on poverty and development. Utilizing social choice theory, and a capability deprivation perspective, we observe that the poor experience deprivations due to a deficiency in their personal autonomy. This in turn is deeply interwoven with the concept of identity. (...) Legally recognizing the poor as individuals, and providing them with proof of their identity, will empower them and facilitate inclusive growth and poverty alleviation. These conceptual arguments are illustrated with the description of a biometric-linked developmental initiative that is providing proof of identity to 1.2 billion residents of India. By establishing a robust identity management system, the project aims to ensure more inclusive growth and efficiently target welfare programs. The authors further investigate how the establishment of identity rights facilitates financial inclusion, property ownership, and necessity-driven entrepreneurial action. Biometric identification on this scale is, however, fraught with dangers to civil liberties and has other serious ethical consequences. In the last section, issues around privacy and security are debated while highlighting the need for external review and independent monitoring to define the project’s boundaries and usages. (shrink)

One desideratum for a theory of fundamentality is to give us the conceptual tools to articulate fruitful metaphysical distinctions between the assortment of ‘realist’ and ‘anti-realist’ positions in a given domain such as meta-ethics. The ability to articulate such distinctions gives us a way to assess rival theories of fundamentality, such as Fine’s grounding theory and Sider’s metaphysical semantic theory. Indeed, Sider has argued that metaphysical semantic theories have an edge with respect to this desideratum and takes this as an (...) important reason to prefer those theories over rival grounding theories. This paper takes a closer look at how the rival theories compare with respect to questions of realism and defends the grounding theorist’s ability to meet the desideratum. (shrink)

As capitalist economies have shifted their primary focus from providing goods and services for all, to concentrating wealth at the top echelons of societies, social entrepreneurs have been one source of re-capturing the original intent of capitalism. Social entrepreneurs have combined the efficiency and effectiveness of business organizations with the social concerns of many non-profit and governmental agencies. As a result, social entrepreneurship is viewed as having significant potential for alleviating many of the social ills we now face. To accomplish (...) this mission, however, will require expansion of social enterprises beyond their current footprints. We explore alternate methods of expansion, scaling and replication, and then examine potential catalysts, which can enable social entrepreneurs to attain their goals of social improvement. The catalysts we identify are effectual logic, enhanced legitimacy through appropriate reporting metrics, and information technology. We conclude with two brief case studies that exemplify how these catalysts are currently working to enhance the effectiveness of social start-ups. (shrink)

We propose that firms that engage in morally imaginative sensemaking will manage society's changing ethical expectations more effectively than those engaging in habituated sensemaking. Specifically, we argue that managers engaging in habituated sensemaking will tend to view changes in expectations as threats and respond to them defensively. In contrast, morally imaginative managers will tend to see these same changes as opportunities and address them by proactively or interactively engaging stakeholders in learning processes. We contribute to the literature on moral imagination (...) by highlighting the value of moral imagination relative to conventional sensemaking, and by positioning moral imagination as an ongoing mode of sensemaking. While we recognize that managers' capacity to continuously address changing ethical expectations using moral imagination is constrained by cognitive limitations, we posit that morally imaginative sensemaking may economize on cognitive resources over time by enabling managers to avoid managing ethical issues unproductively based on habit. We also contribute to the issues management literature by calling attention to two underlying factors, managerial sensemaking mode and firm enterprise strategy, that drive companies' approaches to issues management. (shrink)

Difficile à lire, connu de réputation pour ses objections aux Méditations de Descartes, sa réhabilitation d'Épicure et des atomes, voire le caractère ambigu de ses relations avec les "libertins", Pierre Gassendi est un personnage un peu flou dans notre galerie de portraits imaginaire. Il fut cependant un auteur important, lu, connu, approuvé ou critiqué dans toute l'Europe, surtout par les savants qui voulaient fonder efficacement leur physique moderne sans renier pour autant les acquis des anciens. Les études réunies ici ont (...) cherché comme la trace et le reflet de l'œuvre de Gassendi dans les écrits d'autres auteurs qui ont vécu de son temps et jusqu'à la fin des Lumières - non seulement en France -, mais aussi en Angleterre (comme Walter Charleton, John Locke, David Hume ou Robert Boyle), en Hollande (professeurs d'Université), en Allemagne (Leibniz), en Pologne (Sociniens et "libertins"), en Italie du Nord (comme le jésuite milanais Thommaso Ceva), en Italie du Sud (comme le fondateur de l'Accademia degli Investiganti Tommaso Cornelio ou Giambattista Vico), en Espagne enfin (comme le médecin Martínez). Aujourd'hui encore Gassendi fait des adeptes parmi ceux que séduisent les chemins non battus de l'effort gratuit et de l'érudition austère, ceux que ravit absolument une certaine esthétique baroque de l'esprit pur. (shrink)

While investigating the role of business and accepting that profitable partnerships are the primary solution for poverty alleviation, we voice certain concerns that we hope will extend the authors’ discourse in Alleviating Poverty through Profitable Partnerships . We present a model that we believe can serve as an effective framework for addressing these issues. We then establish the imperative of inclusive growth. Here, we engage with the necessity of formulating strategies that focus on the pace and, importantly, the pattern of (...) economic growth, including its social and cultural dimensions. We also deliberate on the parameters of inclusive growth with the overriding objective of ensuring that multiple strata of society share the benefits of globalization. Turning to the critical role of institutions in promoting social welfare, we explore the impact of government policy vis-à-vis the leverage enjoyed by other social institutions. Despite the reality that state and private interests often operate at cross purposes, we argue that government must still be an integral part of the solution matrix. With direction from other social institutions, entrepreneurial forces can be unleashed to tackle endemic poverty prevalent in the base of the pyramid. We then provide an in-depth case study in which the availability of telecommunications in rural areas was utilized as a means to foster development and ensure inclusive growth. The conclusion examines lessons learned while operationalizing the model, and spells out the impact of our enablers at ground level. (shrink)

An ongoing argument often made by business ethicists is that a singular preoccupation on profitability, will lead, in the long run, to disvalue for all the stakeholders and the communities it affects, and often, economic challenges for the company. On the other hand, we argue, a preoccupation with ethics and CSR as the primary aims of a for-profit company, it is, on its own, like a preoccupation with profitability, unsustainable. Indeed, without economic viability, a company will fail. Both of these (...) contentions point to our conclusion that one must take care in changing habits and rethinking business models. We illustrate through case examples, that merely being ethical and socially responsible is insufficient for the long-term well-being of business just as a preoccupation with profits for their own sake also is insufficient. What is realistic, practical, pragmatic, sustainable and profitable for corporations, and what also serves the interests of multiple stakeholders including those in the communities they serve, is a true balance of ethics, CSR, and economic value-added. Expanding on the recent work of Husted and Allen, we call this a strategic global strategy approach. (shrink)

« J'allai à la fenêtre et regardai dans la rue, où restait un groupe de trois personnes qui battaient la semelle dans le froid. Une quatrième était à la porte, une fille sans âge en fourrure mouillée avachie, qui s'efforçait de regagner le royaume de la contingence à coups de clignements d'yeux. » [Don Delillo, Great Jones Street (1973), Arles, Actes Sud, 2011, p. 22] ThéoRèmes n'entend pas suivre les modes mais se veut une revue résolument contemporaine. Si le (...) réalisme spéculatif est parfois... (shrink)

"First published in French as Images d'Algerie by Camera Austria/Actes Sud.".

State prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) use proprietary, predictive software platforms that deploy algorithms to determine whether a patient is at risk for drug misuse, drug diversion, doctor shopping, or substance use disorder (SUD). Clinical overreliance on PDMP algorithm‐generated information and risk scores motivates clinicians to refuse to treat—or to inappropriately treat—vulnerable people based on actual, perceived, or past SUDs, chronic pain conditions, or other disabilities. This essay provides a framework for challenging PDMP algorithmic discrimination as disability discrimination under federal (...) antidiscrimination laws, including a new proposed rule interpreting section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. (shrink)

L'ouvrage que nous propose M Tryphon Bonga présente un double intérêt. Il nous offre en effet une belle introduction à une tradition philosophique contemporaine majeure la Théorie critique de l'Ecole de Francfort tout en ouvrant de stimulantes perspectives, appliquées à un contexte social précis. La discussion théorique se double de réflexions mettant en évidence l'intérêt du travail du philosophe. La majeure partie de l'ouvrage consiste en une lecture détaillée de l'évolution de la Théorie critique au fil des trois générations de (...) l'Ecole de Francfort. Partant du marxisme d'Horkheimer et d'Adorno, l'auteur retrace la refondation de la Théorie critique qu'a proposée Jürgen Habermas sur base de l'activité de la communication. Cette discussion des thèses d'Habermas amène M Bonga à considérer, dans un troisième temps, le tournant pris par Axel Honneth chef de file de la troisième génération de l'Ecole de Francfort et l'importance donnée par ce dernier à la thématique de la lutte pour la reconnaissance. Les problèmes philosophiques abordés sont nombreux. La recherche est ample et donne lieu à une riche présentation de l'évolution des recherches majeures menées au sein de l'Ecole de Francfort. Mais l'importance de ce travail n'est pas seulement relative au spectre philosophique abordé ; elle l'est aussi au sens où les thématiques de l'émancipation humaine et de la démocratie "en acte" sont d'une actualité brûlante et ce, plus spécifiquement, dans de nombreux pays du Sud engagés dans des processus de démocratisation. Or une des grandes qualités de la recherche de M Bonga est de situer, tout au long de son développement, la discussion proprement philosophique en perspective du contexte socio-politique africain et plus précisément de celui de la R D du Congo. (shrink)

Two sources of possible disagreement in bioethics may be associated with pessimism about what bioethics can achieve. First, pluralism implies that bioethics engages with interlocutors who hold divergent moral beliefs. Pessimists might believe that these disagreements significantly limit the extent to which bioethics can provide normatively robust guidance in relevant areas. Second, the interdisciplinary nature of bioethics suggests that interlocutors may hold divergent views on the nature of bioethics itself—particularly its practicality. Pessimists may suppose that interdisciplinary disagreements could frustrate the (...) goals of bioethics. In this article, I explore how wonder may alleviate the concerns of the first group of pessimists regarding problems associated with pluralism, provided that we are willing to accept some interdisciplinary frustrations. Then, I invite readers of this issue of The Journal of Medicine & Philosophy to test these intuitions by considering the role of wonder in these articles. (shrink)