Is there a human right to subsistence? A satisfactory answer to this question will explain what makes human rights distinctive, what is meant by subsistence, and why subsistence is an appropriate content of a human right. This article situates the human right to subsistence within the context of recent philosophical discussions of human rights. The argument for human subsistence rights provides an instructive example of how to understand what human rights are, why we must affirm them, and how they fit (...) together as a coherent group. I begin the article by outlining the meaning, content, and justification of human rights in general. I then identify the strongest arguments for affirming a human right to subsistence and the most powerful objections to such a right. Finally, I address the worry about human rights inflation and question any minimalist understanding of human rights that would either exclude subsistence rights altogether or limit their scope in certain ways. (shrink)

What does it mean to defend moral cosmopolitanism in terms of human rights? I outline ‘human rights cosmopolitanism’, explain the role of equality in giving content to this conception, and defend the liberal view of human rights against the restricted view by considering – and responding to – several arguments for remaining neutral between a range of cultural and ideological perspectives on the demands of social justice and political legitimacy. I defend the liberal view that a conception of human rights (...) should not remain neutral on controversial questions of justice and legitimacy. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to the central claims presented in Samuel Moyn’s influential book, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World. Moyn argues that human rights have the following features: they are powerless to combat growing material inequality; they share key characteristics with neoliberalism; they make only minimalist or sufficientarian demands and therefore are not enough to achieve the equality demanded by justice. He suggests, in particular, that Henry Shue’s Basic Rights exemplifies these features. My response argues that (...) Moyn does not accurately present the core conceptual and normative characteristics of human rights, nor does he succeed in implicating Shue’s conception in his critique. I suggest that Moyn’s own ideas about global justice are incompletely developed, including his views about the scope, content, and distributive principles that should guide an account of global justice. Finally, I argue that, even though human rights are only part of an account of global justice, nonetheless they do provide reasons to limit socioeconomic inequality. This point is exemplified by the claim that a human right to democracy requires limits on material inequality in order to prevent power hierarchy. In short, I agree with Moyn that human rights are not enough by themselves to achieve global justice, but I reject his multi-pronged critique of human rights, specifically his claim that they imply no constraints on socioeconomic inequality. (shrink)

-- James Der Derian, University of Massachusetts.

ABSTRACT David Miller has written extensively on the ethical value of the nation. A satisfactory response to Miller's ideas on nationalism requires an assessment of the whole range of his writings on the subject. After stating the outlines of Miller's conception of ‘nationality’, I evaluate the most important arguments for and against any attribution of ethical importance to the nation. Finally, I assess Miller's commitment to conational ethical priority in the context of duties of justributive justice. My main conclusions are (...) as follows. (i) Miller's conservative strategy of justification is unacceptable, and a critical strategy suggests several plausible arguments for valuing national attachments. These arguments are not conclusive, however, (ii) In so far as Miller's position depends on real historical connections between persons, it is susceptible to the objection from historical myth. (iii) Miller offers an unexpected and ultimately unsuccessful response to the claim that national sentiments are partial and hence biased, (iv) Miller provides no good reason to believe that the duties of distributive justice are owed in the first instance to conationals. (shrink)

The political theory of Richard Vernon has been a guiding light for students of politics for over five decades. From the situated ethics of shared citizenship to the normative character of individuals' connections to members of other societies and generations, Vernon has cleared a distinctive course in his contributions to the many complex dimensions of political morality. Justice, Rights, and Toleration centres on the core ideas that animate Vernon's engagement with the problems of political theory. Contributors to this volume - (...) all former students and colleagues of Vernon - offer critical engagement with the fundamental themes threaded throughout the thinker's work on the perennial political challenges in liberal democratic societies, including the understanding of citizenship and political membership, justice within and between nations and generations, the rights of children and parents, and the idea of toleration. Vernon articulated a clear vision of the nature of these problems as well as a nuanced approach to addressing them, one rooted in the ideas of democratic dialogue and justice. The essays in this volume are a testament to the breadth of the pressing issues on which Vernon's work continues to advance critical insights. Justice, Rights, and Toleration provides a worthy tribute to the wide range of Richard Vernon's interests and the inspiration to be found in his deep yet subtle body of work in political theory. (shrink)

In Giulio Aleni’s The True Source of the Myriad Things chapter 4 contains the following question and answer:One might say that it is like seeds: from only one seed the subsequent branches, trunk, and blossoms are produced in a truly spontaneous manner. There need not be an external creator. All things have their own inherent natures, and they come forth on the basis of their inherent natures spontaneously; why must they have some external maker?1I [i.e., Aleni] say: The sprouting of (...) a seed cannot be separated from the efficient cause. Suppose that the seed had no prior tree to produce it. Then the present tree would not have come to be. Therefore the prior tree is considered the... (shrink)

This article identifies some core features of the argument in Richard Vernon's Cosmopolitan Regard: Political Membership and Global Justice (2010) and suggests some directions to pursue in defending its conclusions against reasonable objections. I outline the book's key ideas and draw attention to two areas in which Vernon's argument might be open to question. The first issue is that Vernon seems too quick with the problem of motivation, and the second is that his commitment to multiple jurisdictions must be careful (...) not to beg the question. In the end, I claim these objections can be answered. (shrink)

This essay attempts to investigate the prospects for a certain model of rational argumentation, what we call a dialectical model. More specifically, we assess the utility of this model for the purposes of inquiry. Dialectical inquiry consists in a rule-governed discussion between two or more interlocutors in which the acceptability of a claim is determined by laying out and criticizing the support available for it. Models of dialectical argumentative discussion have been proposed before, and part of this work consists in (...) a critical outline of three relatively recent models, those of Rescher, Toulmin, and van Eemeren and Grootendorst. The remainder of the essay evaluates and defends a set of standards of dialectical adequacy. We defend cogency standards of acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency and pragmatic standards embodied in a set of rules of discussion. The impetus of the work is a desire to have a model through which we may rationally assess the acceptability of claims.Dept. of Philosophy. Paper copy at Leddy Library: Theses & Major Papers - Basement, West Bldg. / Call Number: Thesis1990.J674. Source: Masterss International, Volume: 30-03, page: 0419. Thesis --University of Windsor, 1990. (shrink)

E. H. Carr was one of the most influential theorists of international relations, and his works, notably The Twenty Year's Crisis (1939), are widely read by students of the subject. He is generally regarded as a hard-nosed, right-wing political realist, but Charles Jones' study reveals him as a much more radical figure. By examining the political context in which he wrote, and the ruthless ways in which he sought to persuade his contemporaries in a period of national crisis, this book (...) offers a radical reinterpretation of a major theorist of international relations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 24.1 (2004) 117-133 [Access article in PDF] Emptiness, Kenōsis, History, and Dialogue: The Christian Response to Masao Abe's Notion of "Dynamic Śūnyatā " in the Early Years of the Abe-Cobb Buddhist-Christian Dialogue Charles B. Jones The Catholic University of America Introduction Between 1980 and 1993, the Japanese Zen scholar Masao Abe resided in the United States, teaching in various places.1 This brought him into contact with many (...) American scholars and theologians, among whom was John Cobb, a Protestant theologian then working in the area of process theology. Many of the ideas that Abe brought from Japanese Buddhism and particularly from the "Kyōtō School" of Japanese philosophy appeared to Cobb intriguingly congruent with his theological work, and the two began a series of dialogues that came to include a larger and larger circle of Christian theologians2 and (mostly Western) Buddhist scholar-practitioners. The end result was a series of informal encounters as well as a series of three formal "International Buddhist-Christian Conferences" (1980, 1984, 1987; a second series of dialogues were held without Abe's attendance starting in 1998 after a hiatus under the name "International Buddhist-Christian Theological Encounter"3 ). From these encounters came an impressive number of publications from Abe and from a variety of other participants in what is sometimes known as the "Abe-Cobb Encounter."The agenda, following Cobb's suggestion and vocabulary, was to allow each side to "cross over" into the other; in other words, to study and internalize the worldview of the other in as much depth as possible without converting or losing one's connection with one's home tradition, abiding in the other side as a guest. Later, one was to "cross back," come home to one's own tradition and reflect on the benefits gained in wearing the other's shoes for a time.4 This agenda, which emphasized understanding the other's worldview and concepts of ultimate reality, suited the highly intellectual style of the dialogues, focused as they were on philosophical and theological concerns. [End Page 117]Nevertheless, even given the concern to study and understand the other's philosophical standpoint, a curious disconnect emerges when one studies the literature produced in this dialogue. During the early phase of these encounters in the 1980s, each side, Buddhist and Christian, appears to have taken one text as normative for the entirety of the other's tradition. For Abe, following his predecessors in the KyōtōSchool, the emblematic textfor Christianity was avery short one: the hymn toChrist recorded by Paul in Philippians 2:6-11. He was particularly drawn to the concept of kenōsis, "emptying," which he thought might serve as a cognate for the Buddhist idea of "emptiness" (Skt: śūnyatā ). While the Christians participating in the dialogueaccepted this as a point of contact, albeit with some reservations, others have objected strenuously to this approach, saying that Abe's method of interpreting this text did not hold to responsible methods of exegesis, and at any rate the passage was much too minute to support an entire theology of God and creation.5The Christian side by and large adopted much the same strategy in coming to grips with Buddhist thought, choosing a brief text as the paradigmatic statement of the Buddhist view of ultimate reality: the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (Root Stanzas on the Middle Way; hereafter the MMK) of the second-century Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna. In this instance, objections from the Buddhist side were not forthcoming, because Abe himself took the MMK as a normative statement of Buddhist thought. Nevertheless, his own presentation of Buddhism, especially his key notion of "dynamic śūnyatā, " went considerably beyond Nāgārjuna's presentation and thus elicited some objections from the Christian side for not hewing to their own understanding of Nāgārjuna. Because Abe never responded to these objections directly, the misunderstanding was left unresolved... (shrink)

This paper attempts to evaluate two arguments dealing with the nature and form of global political institutions. In each case I assume the general plausibility of moral cosmopolitanism, the view that every person in the world is entitled to equal moral consideration regardless of their various memberships in states, classes, nations, religious groups, and the like. The first argument is designed to show that moral cosmopolitans should be committed to the idea that core justice-promoting social, political, and economic institutions must (...) have global scope. It purports to show this by appealing to both the universality constitutive of moral cosmopolitanism and theprima facieplausibility of uniform protections for the basic rights of persons everywhere. These premises are subjected to critical scrutiny, and a qualified version of institutional cosmopolitanism is defended. The second argument considers the case for requiring institutions with global scope to be democratic. (shrink)