This paper defends the case against (sparse) disjunctive properties by means of four Armstrongian arguments. The first of these is a logical atomist argument from truthmaking, which is, broadly speaking, ‘Armstrongian’ (Armstrong 1997). This argument is strong – although it stands or falls with the relevant notion of truthmaking, as it were. However, three arguments, which are prima facie independent of truthmaking, can be found explicitly early in Armstrong’s middle period. Two of these early arguments face a serious objection put (...) forward forcefully by Louise Antony (2003) and Alan Penczek (1997), respectively. I consider these objections and argue that they fail. Thus, even if the argument from truthmaking is indecisive, disjunctive properties should be rejected. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem por objeto o retorno a Hegel proposto por Axel Honneth, em O direito da liberdade. Ante as concepções de liberdade negativa e reflexiva - segundo ele, “conceitos de liberdade individual que não levam adequadamente em conta a sua dependência em relação à mediação objetiva” -, Honneth se preocupa em oferecer uma compreensão alternativa, mais larga, de liberdade, que ele nomeia, atribuindo-a diretamente a Hegel, de liberdade social. Tal liberdade, ao contrário da liberdade meramente jurídica ou moral, (...) permitiria que se leve em conta o papel exercido pelas instituições e práticas normativas para a sua realização, reconhecendo-as como sua própria condição. Entretanto, apesar da valorização que é feita assim por Honneth às instituições, o autor é criticado por apresentar uma concepção das mesmas que seria demasiado unilateral. O mesmo ocorre com sua definição de “liberdade social”, a qual remeteria, segundo os críticos, a uma liberdade meramente individual, aquém da significação que lhe seria dada por Hegel. A análise da tese hegeliana acerca de uma eticidade imanente à esfera do mercado e às suas práticas, adotada também por Honneth, nos possibilitará avaliar não só os aspectos que os aproximam ou os separam, mas também a pertinência das críticas dirigidas a Honneth. The aim of the paper is to investigate the return to Hegel proposed by Axel Honneth in his work Freedom’s right. Honneth rejects an approach that conceives of freedom only as negative or reflexive. Hence, he seeks to provide an alternative concept, which he assigns to Hegel using the term “social freedom”. This concept of freedom, in opposite to the merely legal or moral one, should enable the recognition of the role played by the institutions as a condition in the process of its realization. However, despite the importance he gives to the institutions, Honneth is criticized for presenting an apparently too partial comprehension of them. The same happens to his definition of “social freedom”, which, according to the critics, would consist in a merely individualistic conception of freedom, falling short of Hegel’s understanding of this concept. An analysis of Hegel’s thesis about an ethicity that would be immanent to the market sphere, also adopted by Honneth, will allow us to evaluate not just the connecting points or the divergences existing between them, but also the relevance of the criticism directed at Honneth. (shrink)

This book addresses the metaphysics of Armstrongian states of affairs, i.e. instantiations of naturalist universals by particulars. The author argues that states of affairs are the best candidate for truthmakers and, in the spirit of logical atomism, that we need no molecular truthmakers for positive truths. In the book's context, this has the pleasing result that there are no molecular states of affairs. Following this account of truthmaking, the author first shows that the particulars in (first-order) states of affairs are (...) bare particulars. He then argues that the properties in states of affairs are simple, non-relational and concrete universals. Next, he argues that (material) relations in states of affairs are external relations. Lastly, he argues that a state of affairs is unified by a distinctive formal relation without giving rise to Bradley’s regress. (shrink)

A 'social trap' is a situation where individuals, groups or organisations are unable to cooperate owing to mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all. Examples include civil strife, pervasive corruption, ethnic discrimination, depletion of natural resources and misuse of social insurance systems. Much has been written attempting to explain the problem, but rather less material is available on how to escape it. In this book, Bo Rothstein explores how social capital and social trust are (...) generated and what governments can do about it. He argues that it is the existence of universal and impartial political institutions together with public policies which enhance social and economic equality that creates social capital. By introducing the theory of collective memory into the discussion, Rothstein makes an empirical and theoretical claim for how universal institutions can be established. (shrink)

Uma interpretação corrente do fenômeno social ensina que todos os bens coletivos são bens convergentes. As concepções bem-estarista e utilitarista na economia e na filosofia, respectivamente, são os seus principais expoentes. A tese consiste em aceitar que “totalidades sociais” são inexoravelmente compostas de “partes” e que, por isso, na base de cada bem público ou social se encontrariam sempre os indivíduos, os quais seriam, em última análise, responsáveis pela sua existência. Assim, os bens públicos seriam bens para os quais convergem (...) interesses e escolhas dos agentes sociais. O presente estudo mostra, em primeiro lugar, segundo a compreensão de Taylor, que nem todos os bens coletivos são bens convergentes. Alguns bens sociais podem ser considerados bens irredutivelmente sociais, cuja justificativa se encontra na reflexão sobre o significado. Em segundo lugar, aborda a contribuição que a noção hegeliana de eticidade teve sobre a formulação desse argumento. (shrink)

I väntan på den engelska Festschriften, den definitiva biografin eller de självförhärligande memoarerna kommer här för första gången en samling porträtt av den internationellt mest uppmärksammade svenska statsvetaren, den kontroversielle samhällsdebattören Bo Rothstein. Få samhällsforskare har med sådan intensitet tagit universitetens tredje uppgift till intäkt för att ifrågasätta gängse uppfattningar om sakernas tillstånd i riket. Många är de läsare, tittare eller åhörare som knappast kunnat undgå att beröras av hans synpunkter på allt från metoo till tiggeri, något färre är nog (...) de som på allvar tagit del av hans forskningsresultat om korruption och statsförvaltning. I denna bok tecknar ett tjugotal svenska forskare, författare och vänner sin bild av forskaren, debattören och livsnjutaren Bo Rothstein."--Back cover. (shrink)

O presente estudo analisa o conceito tayloriano de bens irredutivelmente sociais. Além disso, visa avaliar a possibilidade da existência de bens intrinsecamente sociais, ou se todos os bens, em última análise, devem ser compreendidos apenas como bens originariamente formulados enquanto bens individuais. Caso existam bens intrinsecamente sociais, que consequências podem ser derivadas no que tange à discussão em torno dos direitos coletivos? O tratamento destas questões é levado à cabo no artigo Bens irredutivelmente sociais, de Charles Taylor, onde o filósofo (...) canadense afirma que existem bens convergentes e bens irredutivelmente sociais. Os convergentes seriam aqueles que podem ser decompostos em bens individuais, ou seja, são aqueles que somente indivíduos podem acessar; por outro lado, bens irredutivelmente sociais são aqueles partilhados por um grupo humano ou que possuam um significado comum concedido por um pano de fundo, o que impede que sejam decompostos primariamente em bens individuais. Após essa análise, nos propomos a apresentar as consequências teóricas que podem ser derivadas da defesa de bens sociais. (shrink)

Daniel Dennett is arguably one of the most influential yet radical philosophers in America today. In this volume, Dennett is confronted by colleagues and critics, from philosophy, biology and psychology. His reply constitutes an extensive essay which clarifies, and develops further, central themes in his philosophy. The debate ranges over Dennett's whole corpus, but special attention is given to his major work on consciousness, Consciousness Explained. The volume includes a critical assessement of Dennett's views on behaviouralism and the subjectivity of (...) consciousness, the nature of perception and mental representation, intentional laws and computational psychology, the rationality of thought, culture as a virus, the architecture of mind, and the role of artifacts in thinking. Also included is an introduction to Dennett's philosophy and a full bibliography of his publications. (shrink)

Whether the justification at stake is ethical or juridical, all attempts to argue for the welfare principle in Kant’s metaphysics of morals are unsuccessful. This principle cannot be justified a priori in Kant’s context. However, it is not only possible but also necessary to argue for a certain degree of social welfare in politics as the practice of right; otherwise, Kant’s project of political practice, with enlightenment as its core concept, will inevitably fail. Enlightenment requires that the state be committed (...) to reducing the impact of an unequal social structure on individuals so as to preserve the possibility of their enlightenment. However, it also imposes limits on state-sponsored social welfare because excessive social welfare could lead to a general minority. (shrink)

What I call Mellor’s Question is the problem of whether determinables are properties of their determinates or properties of the particulars that possess these determinates. One can distinguish two basic competing theories of determinables that address the issue, implicitly if not explicitly. On the second-order theory, determinables are second-order properties of determinate properties; on the second-level theory, determinables are first-order properties of the particulars with these determinate properties. Higher-order properties are prima facie ontologically uneconomical, and in line with my general (...) view that ontological parsimony is vital to metaphysics, I consider it highly important which of the two theories is true. Firstly, I argue that the second-level theory offers the best explanation of the explananda (though the race is close), including the important but neglected phenomenon of ‘intermediate determinables’. Secondly, by paying attention to intermediate determinables and instantiation of higher-order properties, I argue that the second-level theory also is more ontologically economical. For these two reasons, this theory is preferable. (shrink)

In this paper, I relate key features of Adolf Reinach’s abundant ontology of propositional states of affairs of his to Armstrong’s—or an Armstrongian—state of affairs ontology, with special regard to finding out how sparse or abundant the latter is with respect to negative states of affairs. After introducing the issue, I clarify the notion of a propositional state of affairs, paying special attention to the notion of abstract versus concrete. I show how Reinach’s states of affairs are propositional, and how (...) they compare with Chisholm’s well-known propositional states of affairs. In the next section, I outline Reinach’s five roles for states of affairs and show that only one of them is relevant to Armstrongian state of affairs ontology. In the following section, I utilise this role to create a ranking of state of affairs ontologies according to how abundant they are. It is, however, unclear which level Armstrongian state of affairs ontology is at, since it is unclear if, like Reinach’s ontology, it includes negative states of affairs. In the final section, I argue that the answer is a qualified ‘yes’, i.e. it does not occupy the sparsest level. (shrink)

This chapter considers the ‘hosting question’ of how immanent universals, in contrast to transcendent universals, are ‘brought down to earth’ from ‘Plato’s heaven’. It explores the thesis that the hosting amounts to their being constituents of the states of affairs that result from their instantiations. These states of affairs are concrete complexes consisting of particulars and universals, and perhaps something that links them together. The traditional view that immanent universals are concrete is briefly defended against a recent prominent objection. On (...) relationalism, states of affairs are unified by a relation of some sort; on non-relationalism they are unified non-relationally. Roughly, these two conceptions of states of affairs are equivalent to Armstrong’s relational and non-relational versions of immanent realism, respectively. Armstrong mostly criticises the former and defends the latter. It is argued, however, that relationalism, at least potentially, answers the hosting question, whereas non-relationalism realism does not. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with what I call the ‘problem of unity’ . This is the puzzle of how Armstrong‐like states of affairs are unified. The general approach is ‘relational internalism’: the unifier of such a state of affairs is a relation of some sort in it. A view commonly associated with relational internalism is that if such a relation satisfies a certain ‘naive’ expectation to a relation – that it is related to its relata – then Bradley's regress results. (...) As I argue, for one very natural species of relational internalism, this is indeed the case. Influential writers on the topic have therefore maintained that this relation is not related to its relata. But, as we shall see, while this ‘classic’ relational internalism obviously avoids Bradley's regress, intuitively, it fails completely to solve the problem of unity. I argue, however, that given the rejection of a natural, but unfounded, assumption of conventional relational internalism, a unique relation can unify states of affairs without leading to Bradley's regress. I consequently propose a novel version of relational internalism on which states of affairs are unified by such an entity. (shrink)

Uma exegese filosófica da problemática do niilismo na obra de Cioran, partindo de uma análise lexicográfica dos usos discursivos deste conceito, mas sem se limitar a ele (que está longe de ter um estatuto privilegiado no discurso cioraniano). Levando em conta a reviravolta que marca uma cisão no âmago da obra de Cioran, na transição entre seus escritos romenos e franceses, e combinando à lexicografia um procedimento propriamente hermenêutico do tema do niilismo, conclui-se com uma reflexão sobre o nexo entre (...) niilismo e humor na obra francesa de Cioran, notadamente em Silogismos da amargura (1952), em contraste com o niilismo da “seriedade infinita” (sinônimo de desespero) que caracteriza a sua obra romena. (shrink)

Neste artigo propomos fazer uma breve reconstrução da concepção filosófica da história em Hegel a fim de podermos apresentar os aspectos determinantes através dos quais, para o filósofo, a história se exibiria ao pensamento, bem como expor seu entendimento da história em ato. Para além das categorias “passado”, “presente” e “futuro”, Hegel, à maneira dos Iluministas e de sua aproximação entre história e progresso ou perfectibilidade, oferece um entendimento da história como “progresso na consciência da liberdade”. Analisaremos em que consiste (...) essa definição e, ao fazê-lo, buscaremos reunir argumentos contra uma interpretação determinista da concepção hegeliana da história. Em um segundo momento, mostraremos que, se Hegel apoia uma filosofia da história e social na qual a liberdade exerce um papel fundamental, ele está, porém, interessado em combater uma noção demasiado negativa ou subjetivista da liberdade, a partir da qual o outro é visto como limitador ou mesmo oposto à mesma. (shrink)

Nos últimos anos de vida do filósofo de Berlim, ele emitiu alguns comentários sobre as dificuldades de o espirita se realizar concretamente na história. A objetivação do espirita estaria enfrentando sérias dificuldades com o engendramento geração de uma sociedade livre e autônoma. A determinação concreta da ideia da liberdade, na imediação de um povo, precisa ser projetada para o futuro da história. Estabelecemos, então, considerações sobre o futuro da história em Hegel tentando mostrar como ele não perdeu de vista a (...) correta mediação entre o discurso lógico e a explicação objetiva da história, entre a especulação e a objetivação. (shrink)

It is a common view that arguments from analogy can only be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. However, while this reflects an important insight, I propose instead a relatively simple method for their evaluation based on just (i) their general form and (ii) four core questions. One clear advantage of this proposal is that it does not depend on any substantial (and controversial) view of similarity, unlike influential current alternative methods, such as Walton’s. Following some initial clarification of the notion (...) of analogy and similarity, I demonstrate the strength of this method by analysing and evaluating three prominent arguments from analogy. (shrink)

O artigo tem como foco a participação das organizações operárias na formação educacional do trabalhador rio-grandense. Com base na análise de obras repertoriadas sobre o tema, identifica, de um lado, os aspectos em destaque na bibliografia e, de outro, as experiências operárias mais significativas para a formação do trabalhador. Centra-se na Primeira República, revisando a literatura e caracterizando as práticas pedagógicas e a influência das correntes anarquistas.

William Vallicella (2020) puts forward three arguments against self-relating internalism, my theory of the unity of states of affairs. His first objection is that there can be no constituent of a state of affairs with the required unifying power given the need for ‘ontological analysis’, or at least that such an entity is mysterious. His second objection is that self-relating internalism violates the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. His final objection is that my explanation of the unity of states (...) of affairs is viciously circular. In this note, I argue that each of challenges can be met. (shrink)

William Vallicella (2020) puts forward three arguments against self-relating internalism, my theory of the unity of states of affairs. His first objection is that there can be no constituent of a state of affairs with the required unifying power given the need for ‘ontological analysis’, or at least that such an entity is mysterious. His second objection is that self-relating internalism violates the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. His final objection is that my explanation of the unity of states (...) of affairs is viciously circular. In this note, I argue that each of challenges can be met. (shrink)

This paper asks what should be the basis of a global environmental ethics. As Gao Shan has argued, the environmental ethics of Western philosophers such as Holmes Rolston and Paul Taylor is based on extending the notion of intrinsic value to that of objects of nature, and as such it is not very compatible with Chinese ethics. This is related to Gao’s rejection of most—if not all—Western “rationalist” environmental ethics, a stance that I grant her for pragmatic reasons (though I (...) remain neutral about it theoretically). Gao argues that the Daoist notion of living in harmony with nature can instead become the basis of a Chinese environmental ethics. However, the involved Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is, in my view, based on an aesthetic property. The paper argues that despite the appeal of the Daoist view for a Chinese environmental ethics, an aesthetic property cannot provide the basis for a global environmental ethics. The paper also considers another version of Daoist environmental ethics, which does not rely on an aesthetic notion, but I argue that it too fails as such a candidate. As an alternative, the paper considers and applies contemporary Western thinkers on gratitude (such as Robert Emmons and Elizabeth Loder), proposing that gratitude to nature (environmental gratitude) can indeed provide the needed basis. (shrink)

This volume includes a critical assessment of Dennett's views on behaviorism and the subjectivity of consciousness, the nature of perception and mental representation.

I defend an ontological distinction between three kinds of relation: internal,external and grounded relations. Even though, as we shall see, this trichotomy is basic, it is not found in influential contemporary metaphysics. Specifically, the widespread tendency, exemplified notably by David Armstrong, of not recognizing grounded relations as distinct from external relations, can be shown to be mistaken. I propose a definition of each of the three kinds of relation. Of vital importance to the parsimony of metaphysics, I also argue that (...) only external relations are ontologically fundamental. (shrink)

Muitos filósofos utilizaram o jornalismo como meio para expressar suas ideias. Depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, por exemplo, Sartre, Adorno, Arendt, publicaram em jornais ou concederam entrevistas problematizando aquele evento: seus motivos, consequências e, sobretudo, as formas de evitar outras catástrofes. A partir de 1960, na França, Michel Foucault teve intensificada sua relação com jornais e jornalistas: concedeu entrevistas; participou de debates; publicou informativos e respostas a críticos; e, inclusive, atuou na criação do jornal Libération, em 1972. Quanto aos escritos (...) do autor, conforme Deleuze (1991), as entrevistas de Foucault devem ser consideradas parte da obra do filósofo, destacando a importância do jornalismo para o pensamento do autor: várias delas foram compiladas e publicadas enquanto “formas de expressão” em livros como “Microfísica do Poder” (1977) e na Coleção “Ditos e Escritos” (1994), sendo decisivas para o conjunto da obra foucaultiana. Em sua perspectiva, Filosofia e jornalismo manifestam interesses semelhantes pela “atualidade”, entrecruzando suas práticas, motivo pelo qual se tornou importante dar a necessária atenção ao tema em seus escritos. Assim, este artigo tem como objetivo analisar a relação entre Foucault e o jornalismo de modo a responder como tal relação tem importância para o desenvolvimento e compreensão da filosofia foucaultiana. Palavras-chave: Foucault; Filosofia; Jornalismo; Atualidade; The relationship between Foucaultian Philosophy and Journalism: possibilities to thinking the ‘present reality’ Abstract: Many philosophers have used journalism to expose their ideas. After the Second World War Sartre, Adorno, Arendt published in newspapers or gave interviews about that event: the reasons, the consequences and how to avoid catastrophes. In France since 1960 Michel Foucault increased his relationship with newspapers and journalists: he was interviewed, participated in debates, published newsletters, responded to comments and worked on the project to create the newspaper Libération, in 1972. Considering the texts published in newspapers, Deleuze (1991) said that Foucault’s interviews should be read as part of Foucault’s work. This decision is important to think about the contribution of journalism to Foucault and to his political interventions. Several of these interventions were published as “forms of expression” in the books: “Microfisica del Potere” (Italy, 1977) and in the Collection “Dits et Écrits” (France, 1994) and they were decisive for Foucault’s work. For the author Philosophy and Journalism have similar interests in the present reality: they intertwine their practices and this is a reason to pay attention to this relationship in Foucault’s books. Thus, the present article aims to analyze the relationship between Foucault and journalism and then discuss how this relationship helps in the understanding of Foucault’s philosophy. Keywords: Foucault; Philosophy; Journalism; Present Reality; La relation entre la Philosophie Foucaultienne et le Journalisme: Des possibilités de penser à ‘l’Actualité’ Resumé: De nombreux philosophes ont utilisé le journalisme pour exprimer leurs idées. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, par exemple, Sartre, Adorno, Arendt ont écrit des journaux ou donné des entretetiens sur cet événement: les raisons, les conséquences et surtout les moyens d’éviter d’autres conflits. En France, depuis 1960, Michel Foucault multiplie les relations avec les journaux: il donne des entretiens, participe à des débats, publie des bulletins, répond aux critiques et participe à la création du journal Libération. En ce sens, Deleuze (1991) a déclaré que ces entretiens doivent être lus dans le cadre de l’œuvre foucaldienne, soulignant l’importance du journalisme pour la pensée de l’auteur. Plusieurs de ces entretiens ont été compilés et publiés comme “formes d’expression” dans des ouvrages tels que “Microfisica del Potere” (Italie, 1977) et “Dits et Écrits” (1994) et ont été importantes pour l’œuvre foucaldienne. Pour Foucault, la philosophie et le journalisme montrent des intérêts similaires pour l’actualité, ils mêlent leurs pratiques, et c’est pourquoi il est important de prêter attention au thème. Ainsi, cet article vise à analyser la relation entre Foucault et le journalisme et tenter de montrer comment cette relation est importante dans le développement et la compréhension de la philosophie de Foucault. Mots clés: Foucault; Philosophie; Journalisme; Actualité; Data de registro: 15/06/2022 Data de aceite: 22/02/2022. (shrink)

Viver de forma autônoma, em paz e em harmonia ainda é um estorvo para os seres humanos. O documento Learning to live together in peace and harmony, publicação conjunta da UNESCO-APNIEVE, retrata essa dificuldade e expressa os desafios políticos, econômicos, sociais, étnicos e culturais que os habitantes da região Ásia-Pacífico enfrentam para aprender a viver de maneira autônoma, pacífica e harmoniosa. O documento defende que o caminho para esse processo é mudar o modelo vigente, voltado para criar uma força de (...) trabalho qualificada, para uma concepção de Educação voltada para a formação humana, para o desenvolvimento da pessoa por inteiro. A Educação é aqui concebida a partir da totalidade das dimensões humanas e deve facultar ao educando a compreensão de sua realidade interior e da realidade dos seus arredores, aguçando a sua capacidade para se autodeterminar, ser autônomo e expressar as suas potencialidades. A Educação integral deve ofertar ao aprendiz caminhos por meio dos quais ele possa pouco a pouco entrar em contato com as inúmeras facetas das suas dimensões, de modo que o processo formativo direcione o indivíduo para uma forma de viver equilibrada com ele mesmo, com os outros seres vivos e com a natureza. A Educação como processo de formação humana deve permitir o desenvolvimento de um modo de ser e de viver direcionado para a humanização do homem. A proposta advoga a ideia que os indivíduos e a sociedade devem dar prioridade ao desenvolvimento pessoal e social a partir de quatro valores fundamentais: paz, direitos humanos, democracia e desenvolvimento sustentável. O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre o documento Learning to live together in peace and harmony como o ponto de partida para o processo formativo-educacional do ser humano. Palavras-chave: Formação humana. Educação. Educação integral. Autonomia. Unesco-Apnieve. (shrink)

This paper is a philosophical study of the nature of thinking based on the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Steiner. For Heidegger, the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers exemplified genuine thinking, appreciating the meaning of Being. But this kind of philosophy was soon replaced by the onto-theological approach, in which Being was reductively objectified, and the question of the meaning of Being was forgotten. Hence, according to Heidegger, we still have to learn to think. Commentators on Heidegger point to the similarities (...) between his approach to thinking and that of various mystical teachings, such as those of Meister Eckhart or Zen Buddhism. Another less well known philosopher who devoted himself to this question was Rudolf Steiner. Like Heidegger, Steiner claims that we do not know what it means to really think. Steiner was however more outspoken in insisting that only through a kind of meditative practice can we directly experience the nature of thinking. Present day materialistic explanations of thinking as caused by the brain stand in clear opposition to his spiritual conception of thinking. Drawing upon Heidegger and Steiner I argue against the materialistic understanding of thinking as jumping to unwarranted conclusions. The paper ends with describing some of the elements of Steiner Waldorf education which are intended to promote the development of living, creative thinking. (shrink)