In this book, Vasubandhu's classic work Refutation of the Theory of a Self is translated and provided with an introduction and commentary. The translation, the first into a modern Western language from the Sanskrit text, is intended for use by those who wish to begin a careful philosophical study of Indian Buddhist theories of persons. Special features of the introduction and commentary are their extensive explanations of the arguments for the theories of persons of Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavâdines, the Buddhist (...) philosophers whose theory is the central target of Vasubandhu's refutation of the theory of a self. (shrink)

Plato's ethics, contrary to the impression recent literature on the topic creates, is basically a system of religious ethics, and I sketch here its main outlines. Since the goal of Plato's philosophy is the achievement of the divine life, his ethics in its most comprehensive sense is the knowledge that this life is our good, along with the knowledge of how our good can be achieved. With the help of passages in Plato's dialogues and other ancient sources I explain briefly (...) Plato's view of the divine life and of two of the three principal paths followed to achieve that life, namely, the path of moral training, which relies on practical wisdom, and the path of contemplation, which relies both on theoretical wisdom, which is developed on the path of dialectic, and on the love of God. (shrink)

Since the Buddha did not fully explain the theory of persons that underlies his teaching, in later centuries a number of different interpretations were developed. This book presents the interpretation by the celebrated Indian Buddhist philosopher, Candrakirti. Candrakirti's fullest statement of the theory is included in his Autocommentary on the Introduction to the Middle Way, which is, along with his Introduction to the Middle Way, among the central treatises that present the Prasavgika account of the Madhyamaka philosophy. In this book, (...) Candrakirti's most complete statement of his theory of persons is translated and provided with an introduction and commentary that present a careful philosophical analysis of Candrakirti's account of the selflessness of persons. This analysis is both philologically precise and analytically sophisticated. The book is of interest to scholars of Buddhism generally and especially to scholars of Indian Buddhist philosophy. (shrink)

Here it is argued, with the help of Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Candrakīrti's theory of persons, and on the basis of the character of Vasubandhu's encounter with the Pudgalavādins in the "Refutation of the Theory of Self," that in his Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya . Candrakīrti most likely identifies the theory of persons he attributes to the Sāṃmitīyas with the theory of persons Vasubandhu presents in the "Refutation," and the theory of persons he attributes to the Āryasāṃmitīyas with the Pudgalavādins' theory of persons, to (...) which Vasubandhu objects in that same work. He interprets Vasubandhu's thesis, that persons exist as their aggregates, as the thesis of the Sāṃmitīyas, that persons possess the essence of the aggregates, and interprets the Pudgalavādins' thesis, that persons exist apart from their aggregates as their identity-free substratum, as the thesis of the Āryasāṃmitīyas, that persons possess an essence of something that is neither other than nor the same as the aggregates. It is explained that Candrakīrti's interpretations both rest on the assumption that existence is the possession of an essence and mirror the assumptions upon which Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavādins object to one another's thesis. (shrink)

Aristotle characterizes a syllogism as “discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.” This characterization of the syllogism does not require us to include as one of its constituent propositions the conclusion of a syllogism. When what are now called the premisses of a syllogism are stated, “something other than what is stated follows of necessity,” but what necessarily follows need not be a proposition in a syllogism on (...) a par with its premisses. The view that an Aristotelian syllogism contains only its premisses as its constituent propositions I call the premiss account of the Aristotelian syllogism. The more customary accounts of the Aristotelian syllogism are the inference account, according to which the syllogism is an inference whose premisses make necessary its conclusion, and the statement account, according to which it is a conditional statement whose conjunctive antecedent makes necessary its consequent. In this paper I shall not explain my reasons for adopting the premiss account and rejecting the inference and statement accounts of the Aristotelian syllogism, since these reasons are enumerated in another place. Instead, I shall discuss a complication which is involved in the premiss account but not involved in the inference and statement accounts. My explanation of this complication must await a more careful statement of the premiss account. (shrink)

In this paper, I will explain how ancient Greek philosophy can be made relevant to our lives. I do this by explaining how an instructor of a course in ancient Greek philosophy can teach Greek philosophy in a way that makes its study relevant to how the students in the course live their lives. Since this is the most likely way in which its relevance to contemporary life might be realized in practice, I explain its relevance from this perspective. I (...) contrast the different ways in which ancient Greek philosophy is taught, and give examples of how it can be taught that calls attention to the ways in which what the Greeks said are relevant to how students live their lives. (shrink)

This book addresses prominent views on the nature of the self in Indian philosophical traditions and presents Buddhist critiques of those conceptions through the translation and commentary on Śāntarakṣita's chapter in the Tattvasaṃgraha on theories of a self and Kamala-śīla's commentary on it in his Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā. The book is comprised of an introduction presenting the theories of a self in the Indian Buddhist Middle Way philosophies and in the different philosophical schools Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla study and offers a background for (...) the translation. The detailed translation that follows reveals the theories of a self that are explained in the philosophical schools in India called the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Jain, Advaita Vedanta, and Vātsīputrīya. It is complemented by a thorough commentary by the author which brings the text to light for a modern audience. A useful contribution to Indian philosophy and global philosophy, this book will be of interest to researchers in the fields of Philosophy, Religious Studies and Buddhist Studies. (shrink)

Śāntarakṣita was an important 8th century CE Indian Buddhist philosopher who introduced Indian Buddhism to Tibet and is believed to have created what the Tibetans call the Yogācāra-Svātantrika School of Madhyamaka Indian Buddhism. He composed the "Compendium of Reality" (Tattva¬saṃgraha), which is a comprehensive critical examination of the major Indian philosophical theories of his time. Kamalaśīla was Śāntarakṣita’s eminent disciple who wrote a commentary on the "Compendium of Reality", entitled "Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Compendium of Reality" (Tattva¬saṃgraha¬pañjikā), (...) which we shall call the Commentary. Here we translate and briefly comment upon the Commentary discussion of Śāntarakṣita’s examination in verses 285–310 of the classical Sāṃkhyas’ theory of a self (ātman). Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and the Sāṃkhyas all believed that a self is consciousness, but according to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, consciousness is a causal continuum of momentary consciousnesses of objects and exists merely by convention; according to the Sāṃkhyas, it is a permanent and partless witness of objects that has independent existence. We give a brief explanation of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, and a brief explanation of the Buddhism of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Then we translate one or more of Śāntarakṣita’s verses on the Sāṃkhya theory of a self, along with Kamalaśīla’s commentary, follow the translation with our own comments upon what is translated, and repeat this sequence until the examination of the Sāṃkhya theory is completed. We expand our comments when dealing with a few basic philosophical issues that arise from the arguments presented in the Commentary. We briefly evaluate the effectiveness of the arguments by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and the Sāṃkhya replies as they are represented. The basic philosophical questions upon which we shall comment concern the Sāṃkhya theories that a self is one (eka) in the sense that it has no parts, permanent (nityam) in the sense that it continues to exist without changing in any way, a witness of objects presented to it, and the experiencer of the objects presented to it without being an agent that produces them. (shrink)