In this paper I put forward a new interpretation of the “Exordium” and “Eulogy for Abraham” sections in Fear and Trembling. It reads them in tension, as mutually incompatible approaches to the biblical narrative of Abraham. I argue this tension is productive insofar as it reveals and critiques the failure of each section to respond to Abraham as a religious exemplar of faith. Drawing on the work of Paul Ricœur, I argue that this failure consists in the absence of the (...) hermeneutical moment of refiguration, which takes up what is understood in the narrative in the lived experience of the reader. By enacting this irreconcilable contrast within his text, Silentio poses a hermeneutical critique of faith by highlighting the importance of narrative refiguration in the life of faith, that is, the lived experience of those who understand Abraham to be a religious exemplar. (shrink)

Forgiveness is often understood as a primarily interpersonal experience, a type of moral response to a wrongdoing that has particular effects on the personal relationship between the one wronged and the wrongdoer. However, some have also attempted to defend another kind of forgiveness, one that takes place in public and applies to a wider range of practices in a specifically political context. That such a concept of forgiveness is possible is not particularly controversial. But the way that this political forgiveness (...) is unified—if it is unified—with personal forgiveness has not been clarified. By approaching the question phenomenologically, it becomes possible to root forgiveness, both personal and political, in the more fundamental context of the shared human world. Hannah Arendt's analysis of forgiveness does just this. In so doing, Arendt accounts for both the role of forgiveness in private human relationships and the way in which this role is fundamentally political. (shrink)

By prioritizing the ethical encounter with the Other over politics, Levinas appears to relegate political concerns to a secondary status. Not only does politics appear to be less important than the face-to-face, it even appears to be morally compromised. Nevertheless, Levinas insists that politics are necessary for a moral society. This paper attempts to navigate this tension between morality and politics by exploring Levinas’s account of original peace as opposed to competing accounts of original violence in Hobbes and Derrida. This (...) original peace not only serves as a foundation of the political order, but also provides the context in which to understand Levinas’s famous account of the third. The introduction of the third party appears to problematize the self-other account and opens an aporia in the ethical relation. Far from being a necessary evil, politics instead appears as a necessary good to both remain true to the ethical imperative of the face-to-face and solve the problem introduced by the third party. It is by recognizing that the political is already implicated in the face-to-face relation that Levinas seeks to bridge the gap between peace with the Other and peace within a political society. (shrink)

Nietzsche has long been trapped in Heidegger's narrative. Positioned there as the last of a long line of metaphysicians, Nietzsche's philosophy becomes the ultimate conclusion of philosophy's history as onto-theology...

A response to Gschwandtner focused on the spatial and temporal aspects of liturgical experience, especially as relates to textual tradition and interpretation.

The legacy of deconstruction continues to loom large, not least in the field of continental philosophy of religion.