Stakeholder participation is an increasingly popular ingredient within environmental management and decision-making. While much has been written about its purported benefits, a question that has been largely neglected is whether decision-making informed through stakeholder participation is actually likely to yield decisions that are morally justified in their own right. Using moral methodology as a starting point, we argue that stakeholder participation in environmental decision-making may indeed be an appropriate means to produce morally justified decisions, the reason being that such participation (...) may constitute an efficient way to satisfy the standard requirements on moral reasoning and moral justification. This finding also emphasizes the importance of identifying those settings most conducive to allowing different stakeholders to both challenge each other’s arguments and to adopt each other’s perspectives in order to make effective use of participation in environmenta... (shrink)

Uncertainty is a pervasive feature in natural resource management. Adaptive management, an approach that focuses on identifying critical uncertainties to be reduced via diagnostic management experiments, is one favored approach for tackling this reality. While adaptive management is identified as a key method in the environmental management toolbox, there remains a lack of clarity over when its use is appropriate or feasible. Its implementation is often viewed as suitable only in a limited set of circumstances. Here we restructure some of (...) the ideas supporting this view, and show why much of the pessimism around AM may be unwarranted. We present a new framework for deciding when AM is appropriate, feasible, and subsequently successful. We thus present a new paradigm for adaptive management that shows that there are no categorical limitations to its appropriate use, the boundaries of application being defined by problem conception and the resources available to managers. In doing so we also separate adaptive management as a management tool, from the burden of failures that result from the complex policy, social, and institutional environment within which management occurs. (shrink)

The internet provides us with a multitude of ways of interacting with one another. In discussions about how technological innovations impact and shape our interpersonal interactions, there is a tendency to assume that encountering people online is essentially different to encountering people offline. Yet, individuals report feeling a sense of togetherness with one another online that echoes offline descriptions. I consider how we can understand people’s experiences of being together with others online, at least in certain instances, as arising out (...) of their feeling together as a we. Using Walther’s phenomenological framework of communality, I explore whether the following might take place online: habitual communal experiences and actual we-experiences. While neither of these sketches amount to a full account of how we find ourselves with others online, I suggest that they reveal how insights from the phenomenology of sociality can be used to deepen our understanding of online communality. What is more, I suggest that the strength of this approach is that in some cases it allows us to circumvent tricky questions about embodiment online and, in others, prompts us to ask to what extent a fully-embodied interaction is really required for we-experiences. (shrink)

Despite its long history of investigating sociality, phenomenology has, to date, said little about online sociality. The phenomenological tradition typically claims that empathy is the fundamental way in which we experience others and their experiences. While empathy is discussed almost exclusively in the context of face-to-face interaction, I claim that we can empathetically perceive others and their experiences in certain online situations. Drawing upon the phenomenological distinction between the physical, objective body and the expressive, lived body, I: (i) highlight that (...) empathy involves perceiving the other’s expressive, lived body, (ii) show that the lived body is not tied to the physical body and that empathy can take place outside of face-to-face interactions, and (iii) argue that the lived body can enter online space and is empathetically available to others there. I explore two ways in which the other’s lived body enters online space and can be empathetically perceived: first, in cases where our face-to-face encounter is technologically-mediated over video link and, second, by showing how the other’s texts, as speech, can form part of the other’s lived body. Investigating empathy online not only furthers our understanding of online encounters but also leads to a refined conception of empathy more generally. (shrink)

Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is a complex disorder characterised by self-starvation, an act of self-destruction. It is often described as a disorder marked by paradoxes and, despite extensive research attention, is still not well understood. Much AN research focuses upon the distorted body image that individuals with AN supposedly experience. However, based upon reports from individuals describing their own experience of AN, I argue that their bodily experience is much more complex than this focus might lead us to believe. Such research (...) often presents an overly cognitive understanding of bodily experience in AN, underplaying the affective, felt experience of individuals with AN, as well as descriptions of empowerment, strength and control reported in the early stages of AN. This paper seeks to enrich our understanding of bodily experience in AN as it progresses throughout the various stages of the disorder. I show how the classical phenomenological distinction between the body-as-subject and the body-as-object, as well as Leder’s conception of the visceral body, can inform our understanding of bodily experience in AN. I suggest that the project of self-starvation is an attempt to overcome the noisy demands of the visceral body, which are experienced as threatening the body-as-subject, through a process of objectifying the body-as-object. By cashing out AN as a project of radical bodily control that, tragically, comes to control the individual, we can capture important aspects of the bodily experience of AN and the temporal progression of the disorder. -/- . (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

John Rist surveys the history of ethics from Plato to the present and offers a vigorous defence of an ethical theory based on a revised version of Platonic realism. In a wide-ranging discussion he examines well-known alternatives to Platonism, in particular Epicurus, Hobbes, Hume and Kant as well as contemporary 'practical reasoners', and argues that most post-Enlightenment theories of morality (as well as Nietzschean subversions of such theories) depend on an abandoned Christian metaphysic and are unintelligible without such grounding. (...) He also argues that contemporary choice-based theories, whether they take a strictly ethical or more obviously political form, are ultimately arbitrary in nature. His lively and accessible 2001 study is informed by a powerful sense of philosophical history, and will be of interest to both students and scholars of ethics. (shrink)

Lucy Allais presents an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. She argues that his distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to us has both epistemological and metaphysical components. Kant is committed to a genuine idealism about things as they appear to us, but this is not a phenomenalist idealism. He is committed to the claim that there is an aspect of reality that grounds mind-dependent spatio-temporal objects, and which we cannot cognize, but he does not (...) assert the existence of distinct non-spatio-temporal objects. On Allais's account, we cannot understand Kant's idealism without a clear account of his notion of intuition and of the role of intuition in cognition: she understands Kantian intuitions as representations that give us acquaintance with the objects of thought. This enables us to make sense of Kant's central argument for his idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and to see why he takes the complete idealist position to be established there. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider three ‘promises’ of bringing phenomenology into dialogue with networked learning. First, a ‘conceptual promise’, which draws attention to conceptual resources in phenomenology that can inspire and inform how we understand, conceive of, and uncover experiences of participants in networked learning activities and environments. Second, a ‘methodological promise’, which outlines a variety of ways that phenomenological methodologies and concepts can be put to use in empirical research in networked learning. And third, a ‘critical promise’, which suggests (...) how work done in the realm of critical phenomenology is complementary to and useful for exploring the social justice and emancipatory aims of networked learning researchers. Through this framework, I reflect upon multiple ways in which phenomenology has and might continue to fruitfully inform and shape networked learning research. In doing so, I emphasise that deploying phenomenology in the context of networked learning not only enriches our understanding of networked learning but that phenomenology itself is enriched through testing, finetuning, and expanding its methods, concepts, and understanding, as well as unveiling its own limitations and constraints. (shrink)

When I started reading Sara Protasi’s book, The Philosophy of Envy, I was excited to learn more about an emotion I thought I rarely experienced. In the opening pages, I found myself nodding along as Protasi quotes her mother saying: “I never feel envy, but I often feel jealousy!” (6). But envy, it turns out, is sneaky, often masking itself in the guise of other emotions, hiding just below the surface. What this meticulously argued book unveils is both a nuanced (...) taxonomy of different kinds of envy and the intimate relationship that envy has to all manner of other emotions, including jealousy, shame, resentment, despair, and love. I now recognize that not only am I more familiar with envy than I supposed, but I experience envy rather often. This got me thinking about other instances of envy that I experience which I have previously overlooked or perhaps mislabeled. Prompted by Protasi’s insightful handling of envy in its varied forms, one question kept coming back to me: can you envy yourself? (shrink)

The passage in Proverbs 31:10–31 is a beautiful depiction of the virtuous wife, also known as the Proverbs 31 woman. This passage is often used as a guide for women in their roles within their families and communities. The heart of her husband trusts in her” (Proverbs 31:11). She seeks wool and flax and works with willing hands” (Proverbs 31:13). She opens her hand to the poor and reaches out her hands to the needy” (Proverbs 31:20). 4. She opens her (...) mouth with wisdom, and the teaching of kindness is on her tongue” (Proverbs 31:26). Charm is deceitful, and beauty is vain, but a woman who fears the Lord is to be praised” (Proverbs 31:30). The Role of the Husband and Family The passage also highlights the role of the husband and family in relation to the virtuous wife. The husband of the virtuous wife is respected and known in the gates, which indicates that he benefits from her hard work and reputation (Proverbs 31:23). The children and husband of the virtuous wife praise her, and her works bring them honor (Proverbs 31:28). Reflection on Proverbs 31:10–31 The passage in Proverbs 31:10–31 provides a timeless model of a woman who is dedicated to her family, diligent in her work, and deeply rooted in her faith. It serves as a source of inspiration and encouragement for women in their various roles within the family and society. (shrink)

La philosophy of mind est le terrain principal sur lequel Gilbert Ryle a mis à l'épreuve sa réponse personnelle à la question "Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?". Il nous montre comment la philosophie peut nous remettre sur la piste d'une meilleure compréhension des phénomènes humains. Cette philosophie de l'homme est ancrée dans une méthode qui a reçu le nom d'analyse du langage ordinaire : prêter une attention particulière à la façon dont nous parlons de nous-même et des autres devrait nous permettre (...) d'atteindre des conclusions positives. Lucie Antoniol nous propose ici une interprétation originale du célèbre ouvrage La notion d'esprit (1949) : l'argument de l'erreur de catégorie repose sur des catégories sémantiques et non ontologiques. C'est là un des apports philosophiques majeurs d'un philosophe dont on commence à peine à voir l'importance. (shrink)

The phenomenon of trash has rarely been addressed in the cultural theoretical literature. However, its structural similarity with the concept of taboo as well as its role in the dynamics of culture has been stated. Current paper aims to summarize the partial contributions that have been made so far, localize them in a larger semiotic framework, and deriving from Lonnan's approach to culture suggest a few further ideas for a semiotic definition of trash. It is proposed to define trash as (...) a phenomenon marking the boundary between culhlre and non-culture/nature. In the context of the deepening environmental crisis (to which accumulation of trash contributes) a semiotic approach opens a new perspective for identifying the origin of the problem in our mind/culture rather than in nature. (shrink)

As John McMillan notes in January’s editorial,1 many countries are reflecting on how they responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, what went wrong and how responses to such system shocks can be better managed in the future. However, while it is tempting to think that the COVID-19 pandemic is over and that what is now needed is a reflection on how countries could have responded better, some of the underlying issues and problems COVID-19 both highlighted and created are still with us. (...) The legacy of the pandemic has continued particularly for healthcare workers at all levels, who have had to continue providing services with little time to rest and reflect and with new ‘shocks’ to the systems to cope with. For example, in England, industrial action by junior doctors has put already fragile systems under pressure, and the issues that staff are campaigning about remain unaddressed. Many of these issues are not distinctive to COVID-19, but as has been noted, ‘From an ethical perspective, the COVID-19 pandemic is like a prism: it helps us see the spectrum of …. (shrink)

The COVID pandemic was an exceptional public health situation – which brought with it unprecedented restrictions across the global populace. But what was it about this pandemic which caused us to implement such drastic restrictions on liberty? Much of the ethical debate on restrictive measures such as lockdowns and vaccine requirements focused on the potential harm that individuals cause to other individuals by the risk of infection. I will suggest that this may come from a reliance on J.S. Mill’s harm (...) principle as providing the ultimate justification for coercion – i.e., the well-accepted principle that state coercion is justified in order to prevent the imposition of unacceptable risk of harm to others. Though there have been attempts, in the wider public health ethics literature, to use the harm principle as a basis for restricting contribution to collective harms, I will suggest that these attempts cannot rely on the harm principle alone. I will then turn to the ways in which an individual-based line of reasoning does not capture a distinctive sort of harm posed by the COVID pandemic (and others like it): the potential failure of healthcare systems. I will draw out three ways in which a focus on the harm that an individual poses to another individual fails to capture the full scope of harm wrought by the collapse of healthcare systems. First, it can’t adequately capture the cumulative and “looping effects” of the harm caused by strained healthcare systems. Second, it fails to capture the widespread ripple effects the failure of a central societal institution can have on other institutions. And third, the failure of a healthcare system can impose “psychic costs”, affecting the moral character of all members of society, reducing trust in institutions, and potentially posing an existential threat to the fabric of society. Finally, I will sketch some implications of the recognition of this distinctive sort of harm for the justification of coercive public health measures. (shrink)

In this book, John M. Rist offers an account of the concept of 'person' as it has developed in the West, and how it has become alien in a post-Christian culture. He begins by identifying the 'mainline tradition' about persons as it evolved from the time of Plato to the High Middle Ages, then turns to successive attacks on it in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, then proceeds to the 'five ways' in which the tradition was savaged or distorted (...) in the nineteenth century and beyond. He concludes by considering whether ideas from contemporary philosophical movements, those that combine a closer analysis of human nature with a more traditional metaphysical background, may enable the tradition to be restored. A timely book on a theme of universal significance, Rist ponders whether we persons matter, and how we have reached a position where we are not sure whether we do. (shrink)

Despite its cultural prominence, shaming has been neglected in moral philosophy. I develop an overdue account of shaming, which distinguishes it from both blaming and the mere production of shame. I distinguish between two kinds of shaming. Agential shaming is a form of blaming. It involves holding an individual morally responsible for some wrongdoing or flaw by expressing a negative reactive attitude towards her and inviting an audience to join in. Non-agential shaming also involves negatively evaluating a person and inviting (...) an audience to join in. Yet it is not a form of blaming, because the shamer does not hold the target morally responsible for anything. For example, we non-agentially shame people for their body shapes, for having periods, or for being victims of rape. Non-agential shaming involves the expression of an emotionally toned objective attitude, like disgust. While agential shaming enforces social norms, non-agential shaming enforces social standards. (shrink)

This paper looks at the possibilities of using biographical research in social work focusing on the elderly. Social work with the elderly uses or should use biographical data to create individual plans for clients or for the purpose of sensory activation. Narrative interviews are a form of interaction between a senior client and a social worker. The social worker supports the senior’s narrative so they can view their life for themselves and explain its meaning from their own perspective. The use (...) of sensory activation in social work is only possible when the individual’s identity is supported by a sufficient amount of environmental stimuli, which can be achieved only by acquiring and analyzing data on the life events of the individual. The paper contains examples of the use of biographical data in social work with the elderly, which is essential for further structuring their lives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late AntiquityJohn RistLloyd P. Gerson, editor. The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity. 2 vols. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 1313. Cloth, $240.00.1313 pages, including 915 pages of text and 200 of bibliography; 51 authors—in about 800 words! The editor of the present Cambridge History makes plain that his new two-volume monument is the successor to Armstrong’s Cambridge History (...) of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy—8 contributors—and is intended to build on its strengths and correct its deficiencies in the light of some 40 years of highly successful investigation of the thought of late antiquity. The result is a professional structure in which the “giants” (Plotinus and Augustine) are awarded comparatively modest coverage, while figures often neglected, such as Damascius, of whom our understanding has greatly increased of late, are given much more space. Damascius secures 30 pages: the only individual to get more is Porphyry (33), while Augustine has 29 and Plotinus 24 (four more than Hierocles). There are those (as Tacitus might have put it) who will fear that the wood has been lost for the trees, and at least it must be said that one overall impression of these volumes is that some of their authors are recounting what will be of interest to a worldwide group of aficionados whose number can be counted on the fingers of a mutilated hand—and the importance of which lies less in philosophical achievement than in the handing on of a great tradition.Gilbert Ryle is supposed to have asserted that in France everyone can talk about philosophy but that there are no philosophers; some of Gerson’s more philosophically minded readers may find their prejudices confirmed that in late antiquity there were many who talked about Plato and Aristotle but few who understood what they were trying to do. For it is clear that a general theme of the present volumes is that in late antiquity philosophers were largely concerned to “interpret” Plato and (especially after Porphyry) Aristotle while occasionally seizing the opportunity not merely to rubbish their similarly-engaged predecessors but to add (if shamefacedly) something of their own. Except, that is, for the Christians, whose enterprise was very different and who, quite properly, are more visible in Gerson’s account of late antique thought than in that of Armstrong (though there remain strange omissions in a work on this scale: Methodius, Ambrose, Evagrius).Gerson has tried to contextualize his story by including short (and helpful) historical introductions by Elizabeth DePalma Digeser to the various epochs with which his volumes are concerned, and which can perhaps be divided into four sections: pre-Plotinian Platonism [End Page 136] (plus extras) from Cicero to Numenius; later pagan Platonism, including extensive treatment of the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle; Christian thought before Constantine; and later Christian philosophy-cum-theology. Rounding off the volume are introductions to the transition from “ancient” to “medieval” thought in the Latin West (Gersh), in Byzantium—a remarkably honest presentation of a largely stagnant philosophical world by Ierodiakonou and Zografidis—and (in a magisterial improvement on what is to be found in Armstrong) in Islam (Cristina d’Ancona) where (inter multa alia) the roots of the virtually inevitable later destruction of a flourishing philosophical tradition founded by al-Kindi and al-Farabi are identified in the more “orthodox” and theocratic approach—here there are Byzantine parallels—of the followers of al-Ash’ari (885).Gerson’s readers can inspect philosophical wisdom and conceptual muddle among late antique intellectuals—Christians, a few Muslims, pagans—down to Scotus Eriugena and al-Farabi. But some of them may suspect that an opportunity has been lost to reflect on the origins and nature of early Christian thought, and to ask why Christians soon jumped for Platonism rather than Stoicism (Aristotle, let alone Epicurus, was not—yet—considered a serious option)—and that is not intended as criticism of the excellent, if brief, treatment of important Christian thinkers such as Origen. But it was an adventure for Christians to begin to philosophize, and when they embarked on this adventure—here the significance... (shrink)

This book argues that philosophy is as practical as plumbing and what we need right now is what philosophers can offer as philosophers to help us all, our species, and beyond, through this ecological emergency, this climate change, this anthropocene. This book is about the meaning and purpose of philosophy as a way of, a practice of, responding to the ecological emergency, which includes climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, habitat destruction, and all the associated impacts that fragment, and threaten to (...) create collapse, among the systems that created and sustain us. There are the related economic and social impacts, the fragmentation of communities and political ideologies through attitude polarisation, and the increasing threats to systems by those who seek to promote further exploitation at the expense of attempts to regain some system of cooperation and an attitude of compassion which is at the heart of our survival strategies as a species. Philosophy has always sought to address questions related both to our place in the universe, and to how to live, given our understanding of our place. Those of us committed to a philosophical life have used a range of metaphors and narratives to enlighten, and to exhort to action, those who would seek to understand what to do, how, and why. Philosophy has played a key role in helping us as a species to respond to the ecological emergency. What, then, is the practice of philosophy, given that we’re in an ecological emergency? This question is the thread, and it forms the framework for the dialogue that runs through the book. (shrink)

:Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me , thus in order for me to represent them as outside and next to one another, thus not merely different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is (...) itself first possible only through this representation. 1Abstract:Der Raum is kein empirischer Begriff, der von äußeren Erfahrungen abgezogen worden. Denn damit gewisse Empfindungen auf etwas außer mir bezogen werden, imgleichen damit ich sie als außer und neben einander, mithin nicht bloß verschieden, sondern als in verschiedenen Orten vorstellen können, dazu muß die Vorstellung des Raumes schon zum Grunde liegen. (shrink)

During the Covid-19 pandemic we increasingly turned to technology to stay in touch with our family, friends, and colleagues. Even as lockdowns and restrictions ease many are encouraging us to embrace the replacement of face-to-face encounters with technologically mediated ones. Yet, as philosophers of technology have highlighted, technology can transform the situations we find ourselves in. Drawing insights from the phenomenology of sociality, we consider how digitally-enabled forms of communication and sociality impact our experience of one another. In particular, we (...) draw attention to the way in which our embodied experience of one another is altered when we meet in digital spaces, taking as our focus the themes of perceptual access, intercorporeality, shared space, transitional spaces, and self-presentation. In light of the way in which technological mediation alters various dimensions of our social encounters, we argue that digital encounters constitute their own forms of sociality requiring their own phenomenological analysis. We conclude our paper by raising some broader concerns about the very framework of thinking about digitally and non-digitally mediated social encounters simply in terms of replacement. (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce the Japanese philosopher Tetsurō Watsuji’s phenomenology of aidagara (“betweenness”) and use his analysis in the contemporary context of online space. We argue that Watsuji develops a prescient analysis anticipating modern technologically-mediated forms of expression and engagement. More precisely, we show that instead of adopting a traditional phenomenological focus on face-to-face interaction, Watsuji argues that communication technologies — which now include Internet-enabled technologies and spaces — are expressive vehicles enabling new forms of emotional expression, shared experiences, (...) and modes of betweenness that would be otherwise inaccessible. Using Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis, we argue that the Internet is not simply a sophisticated form of communication technology that expresses our subjective spatiality (although it is), but that it actually gives rise to new forms of subjective spatiality itself. We conclude with an exploration of how certain aspects of our online interconnections are hidden from lay users in ways that have significant political and ethical implications. (shrink)

Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, (...) I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form. (shrink)

Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is an eating disorder characterised by self-starvation. Accounts of AN typically frame the disorder in individualistic terms: e.g., genetic predisposition, perceptual disturbances of body size and shape, experiential bodily disturbances. Without disputing the role these factors may play in developing AN, we instead draw attention to the way disordered eating practices in AN are actively supported by others. Specifically, we consider how Pro-Anorexia (ProAna) websites—which provide support and solidarity, tips, motivational content, a sense of community, and understanding (...) to individuals with AN—help drive and maintain AN practices. We use C. Thi Nguyen’s work on epistemic “echo chambers”, along with Maria Lugones’ work on “worlds” and “ease”, to explore the dynamics of these processes. Adopting this broader temporal and intersubjective perspective, we argue, not only helps to further illuminate the experiential character of AN but also has important clinical and therapeutic significance. (shrink)

The twelve specially written essays in this volume investigate the neglected topic of mental action, and show its importance for the metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology of mind. The essays investigate what mental actions are, how we are aware of them, and what is the relationship between mental and physical action.

Craig Callender claims that ‘time is the great informer’, meaning that the directions in which our ‘best’ physical theories inform are temporal. This is intended to be a metaphysical claim, and as such expresses a relationship between the physical world and information-gathering systems such as ourselves. This article gives two counterexamples to this claim, illustrating the fact that time and informative strength doubly dissociate, so the claim cannot be about physical theories in general. The first is a case where physical (...) theories inform in directions that we have no reason to regard as temporal. The second is a case where our best physical theories fail to inform in directions that we have independent (pre-theoretic) reasons to regard as temporal. Taking these two cases into account suggests that the connection Callender makes between time and informativeness is perspectival. The second case demonstrates that although scientists often seek information in temporal directions, the behaviour of the physical world can present serious difficulties for finding it. In response, this article proposes a perspectival reading of Callender’s claim, according to which the connection between time and informative strength has more to do with the aims and objectives of science than the workings of the physical world. (shrink)

Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar made use of Gaston Bachelard’s concept of phenomenotechnique in Laboratory Life. Stating that this use of a Bachelardian concept contrasts with the sharp criticism Latour made of Bachelard in his later work, I consider whether it belongs to an early Bachelardian stage of Latour’s study of science or whether Latour and Woolgar made, from the beginning, an original and anti-Bachelardian use of the concept of phenomenotechnique. I address this question by offering two symmetrical readings of (...) Laboratory Life: one reading adopts a Bachelardian perspective, in which Latour and Woolgar’s ethnological and sociological investigation appears as an empirical corroboration of Bachelard’s epistemological theses, whereas the other reading insists on the way in which Latour and Woolgar depart from Bachelard, as the sociological study of the way in which power relations shape scientific practice challenges the latter’s rationalist convictions. Although I contrast Bachelard’s epistemological use of the concept of phenomenotechnique with Latour and Woolgar’s sociological one, I wonder in the conclusion whether these approaches to science may be regarded as complements rather than antagonists and find in Pierre Bourdieu’s theses on the specificity of the scientific field resources to combine them. (shrink)

This book considers the thought and personalities of two popular icons of twentieth century philosophical and psychological thought - Nietzsche and Jung - and reveals the extraordinary connections between them. Through a thorough examination of their work, Nietzsche and Jung succeeds in illuminating complex areas of Nietzsche's thought and resolving ambiguities in Jung's reception of these theories. This demonstration of how our understanding of analytical psychology can be enriched by investigating its philosophical roots will be of great interest to students (...) in psychology, philosophy and religion as well as practising Jungian analysts. (shrink)

At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, high hopes were placed on digital contact tracing. Digital contact tracing apps can now be downloaded in many countries, but as further waves of COVID-19 tear through much of the northern hemisphere, these apps are playing a less important role in interrupting chains of infection than anticipated. We argue that one of the reasons for this is that most countries have opted for decentralised apps, which cannot provide a means of rapidly informing users (...) of likely infections while avoiding too many false positive reports. Centralised apps, in contrast, have the potential to do this. But policy making was influenced by public debates about the right app configuration, which have tended to focus heavily on privacy, and are driven by the assumption that decentralised apps are “privacy preserving by design”. We show that both types of apps are in fact vulnerable to privacy breaches, and, drawing on principles from safety engineering and risk analysis, compare the risks of centralised and decentralised systems along two dimensions, namely the probability of possible breaches and their severity. We conclude that a centralised app may in fact minimise overall ethical risk, and contend that we must reassess our approach to digital contact tracing, and should, more generally, be cautious about a myopic focus on privacy when conducting ethical assessments of data technologies. (shrink)

After a long period of comparative neglect, in the last few decades growing numbers of philosophers have been paying attention to the startling contrast presented between Kant’s universal moral theory, with its inspiring enlightenment ideas of human autonomy, equality and dignity and Kant’s racism. Against Charles Mills, who argues that the way to make Kant consistent is by attributing to him a threshold notion of moral personhood, according to which some races do not qualify for consideration under the categorical imperative, (...) I argue that Kant cannot be made consistent on race, and that rather than trying to make him so, we should use the example of Kant’s racism to tell us something about the nature of racism. I argue that Kant’s own moral philosophy and moral psychology in fact give some materials for thinking about his racism, and about racism. (shrink)

Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have some power over whether it is performed. Call this (...) the ratification theory of uptake. Several philosophers have recently endorsed an alternative theory of uptake, according to which the hearer can determine the nature of the act the speaker performs. According to this theory, if the hearer regards an utterance as illocutionary act y, then it is act y, even if the speaker intended to perform act x. Call this the constitution theory of uptake. The purported advantage of this theory is that it identifies a common but underanalysed way in which speakers can be silenced. I argue that despite its initial intuitive pull, the constitution theory of uptake should be rejected. It is incompatible with ordinary intuitions about speech, it entails a conceptual impossibility, and it has unsavoury political implications, entailing that marginalised speakers barely qualify as agents. (shrink)

Seen as contributing to human enhancement, implanted technologies have recently been receiving a lot of attention. However, reflections on these technologies have taken the shape of rather speculative ethical judgments on “hyped” technological devices. On the other hand, while science and technology studies and philosophy of technology have a long tradition of analyzing how technological artifacts and tools transform and configure our lives, they tend to focus on use configurations rather than the intimate relations brought about by implanted technologies. Even (...) the cyborg has lost some of its hermeneutic power as it has been detached from its material grounds, becoming a discursive entity. In this article, I reclaim the importance of materiality and explore how people live with spinal cord stimulation, which is a type of neuromodulation technology. Implanted in bodies and seemingly out of sight, this technology does not cease to matter. Embodiment and incorporation are crucial for people to live well with SCS. Embodying the neuromodulation technology entails groping processes in which gestures are central and an increased intimacy with one’s bodily materiality. Incorporating it is highly relational and entangled with the bodies of loved and distant ones, humans and nonhumans. (shrink)

When talking about personal identity in the context of medical ethics, ethicists tend to borrow haphazardly from different philosophical notions of personal identity, or to abjure these abstract metaphysical concerns as having nothing to do with practical questions in medical ethics. In fact, however, part of the moral authority for respecting a patient’s self-regarding decisions can only be made sense of if we make certain assumptions that are central to a particular, psychological picture of personal identity, namely, that patients will (...) remain psychologically connected to a certain degree with their future selves. I draw this out, show problems with approaches in medical ethics based on alternate theories of personal identity that do not recognise this, and explore some important implications. Namely, I show how this recognition can better explain the circumstances under which we should respect advance directives and why, and how it can better make sense of patient fears that they will not "survive" personality-altering deep brain stimulation procedures, and provide guidance on approaching patient decisions concerning this type of procedure in a manner that captures and addresses such concerns. (shrink)

Arguably one of the strengths of the discipline of medical ethics is its close attention to the context in which ethical dilemmas, questions and issues play out. As a discipline that is concerned with helping and supporting practitioners, policy-makers and the public to address the ethical aspects of healthcare provision and practice in the best way they can, context is crucially important. As McMillan puts it, ‘ethics should be grounded’ in the practical realities of the situation.1 What, where and who (...) are important questions that set the parameters of the debate and, to some extent, frame the subsequent solution or decision. What is happening in a particular case, what is the source of controversy, is it a conflict of values, regulations or professional viewpoints? Where does it take place, under which rules, jurisdiction or in which professional setting? And who does it involve? Whose rights, interests or decision-making capacity do we prioritise? All these contextual questions need to be carefully articulated before it is possible to draw any normative conclusions. The importance of context is clear in this issue’s ‘Engagement without entanglement: a framework for non-sexual patient–physician boundaries’ by Appel.2 What might be seen as entirely appropriate behaviour in one context, for example, when I help out a friend and let them stay in my house for a few weeks while they recover from an operation, is entirely inappropriate in another—in …. (shrink)

Antichrist versus anti-life -- The death of God -- Nietzsche's faith : the revaluation of values -- Testing faith : redeeming Christians from themselves.

Envisageant à nouveaux frais les rapports entre forme et fonction, l’Art nouveau privilégie l’épure, la simplification des formes au profit de l’utile, et consacre ainsi le triomphe de la beauté adhérente. C’est ainsi que l’une des pièces emblématiques du mouvement, le bureau en forme de courge d’Henry Van de Velde, a vocation à satisfaire aussi bien le désir de l’esthète que les besoins de l’utilisateur : agencement pratique et beauté se renforcent et se soutiennent mutuellement, donnant for...

Kant has a number of harsh-sounding things to say about beggars and giving to beggars. He describes begging as “closely akin to robbery”, and says that it exhibits self-contempt. In this paper I argue that on a particular interpretation of his political philosophy his critique of giving to beggars can be seen as part of a concern with social justice, and that his analysis makes sense of some troubling aspects of the phenomenology of being confronted with beggars. On Kant's view, (...) without absolute poverty relief, the poor persons' external freedom is subject to the arbitrary choices of those who have means. But the legitimacy of the state is based on ensuring that no one's basic freedom is subject to the arbitrary choices of another. This means that in a legitimate state public structures must ensure that there is unconditional poverty relief. Having your basic needs met through private charity wrongs you. Kant's analysis is that when you encounter someone in a public space who asks you for money to meet their basic survival needs, you are being asked to solve a public problem in a private interaction, and there is no rightful way for you to do this. (shrink)

In a recent article, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their other arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vaccination.

Actor network theory and supply chainmanagement theory provide suggestive researchdirections for understanding regional agri-foodnetworks. These theories claim that relationshipsbased upon trust and cooperation are critical to thestrength and vitality of the network. This means thatexploring and detailing these relationships among thesuppliers, producers, workers, processors, brokers,wholesalers, and retailers within specific regionalgeographies of these networks are critical forfurthering cooperation and trust. Key areas ofcooperation include resource sharing andapprenticeship programs. Employing food networks as akey unit of contextual analysis will deepen ourunderstanding of how (...) to enhance their resiliency andvibrancy. Important questions can be raised about thedifference gender makes for farmers, brokers,entrepreneurs, and workers in local food networks. (shrink)

How could the initial, drastic decisions to implement “lockdowns” to control the spread of COVID-19 infections be justifiable, when they were made on the basis of such uncertain evidence? We defend the imposition of lockdowns in some countries by first, and focusing on the UK, looking at the evidence that undergirded the decision, second, arguing that this provided us with sufficient grounds to restrict liberty given the circumstances, and third, defending the use of poorly-empirically-constrained epidemiological models as tools that can (...) legitimately guide public policy. (shrink)