하루 10분, 나를 변화시키는 짧고 깊은 생각 고전문헌학자 배철현의 인문 에세이 ◎ 도서 소개 베스트셀러 『심연』 『수련』 『정적』 『승화』 4부작 완결판! 승화, 더 높은 차원의 삶을 산다는 것 자신의 마음을 변화시킬 수 없는 사람은 그 무엇도 바꿀 수 없다. 내가 바라는 나 자신이 되기 위해 오늘 어떤 생각을 하고 어떤 행동을 할 것인가! 고전문헌학자 배철현의 인문 에세이 시리즈 중 마지막 책인 『승화』는, 흔들리는 삶 속에서 나를 지켜내기 위한 성찰의 방법을 이야기한다. 저자는 ‘흠모하는 나 자신으로 살고 있는가’라는 질문을 마음에 새긴 하루는 (...) 어제와 다를 것이라고 말한다. ‘승화’란 더 나은 자신을 위해 혁신하려는 용기를 갖는 삶의 태도다. 단어의 어원과 개념 속에서 숨은 의미를 발굴해 풀어내는 저자의 문장들은, 삶의 의미를 찾고 싶은 사람들에게 소중한 매뉴얼이 되어줄 것이다. ◎ 출판사 서평 산다는 것은 매일 천천히 태어나는 과정이다 이대로 살 것인가, 내가 바라는 삶을 살 것인가 『승화』는 『심연』(2016), 『수련』(2018), 『정적』(2019)을 거쳐 완성한 인문 에세이 4부작의 마지막 책이다. 자신의 ‘심연’에서 내면의 소리를 듣고, 삶의 군더더기와 같은 불필요한 생각을 버리는 ‘수련’을 한 후, 평정심을 위한 마음의 ‘정적’을 지니고 나면 비로소 만나는 단계가 ‘승화’다. ‘승화’는 지금의 삶보다 더 높은 차원의 삶을 추구하려는 마음을 뜻한다. ‘승화’는 아무런 유혹도 시련도 없는 완성된 상태가 아니다. 이전에는 보이지 않던 더 높은 정상을 발견한 후 생기는 겸허한 마음이다. 마치 동네 야산의 정상에 오른 사람이 그 산보다 높은 산의 존재가 있다는 것을 깨닫고 겸손한 마음을 지니게 되는 것과 같다. 이때 필요한 질문이 “내가 바라는 나는 무엇인가”, “나는 나 자신을 흠모하며 살고 있는가”이다. 저자는 다른 사람과의 관계가 아니라 ‘자기-자신’과의 관계를 새롭게 정의하려는 노력이 필요하다고 말한다. 변화는 삶의 가치와 방향을 외부가 아닌 자기 내부에 두는 것에서 시작한다. 어제와 달라질 오늘의 자기 자신에 대한 신뢰, 지속적으로 자신을 혁신하려는 용기 있는 도전이 일상의 변화를 만든다. 자기 성찰을 돕는 28개의 단어 사유의 정수가 응축된 인생의 아포리즘 이 책은 공허, 고통, 양심, 내면, 변모, 미지 등 28개의 글로 이루어져 있다. 각각의 단어는 자기 자신을 변화시키는 길잡이이기도 하다. 고전문헌학자인 저자는 산스크리트어, 히브리어, 라틴어 등 고대 언어에서 어원을 찾아 숨은 뜻을 발굴해내고 새롭게 재구성했다. 또한 『요가수트라』, 『우파니샤드』와 같은 잘 알려지지 않은 경전에서부터 단테, 소포클레스, 아우렐리우스 등의 고전에 대한 깊이 있는 해석은 시대와 학문의 경계를 넘어 사유의 정수를 느끼게 한다. 나아가 저자가 시골 생활을 하며 느낀 자연에 대한 묵상이 어우러져 삶의 본질에 대한 묵직한 울림을 준다. [주요 문장] - 오늘 나는 누구와 또 무엇과 부딪칠까? 내 머릿속 어떤 생각들과 만나 어떻게 반응할까? 나는 오늘 내가 그것들을 어떻게 처리하는지를 관찰하고 싶다. - 하루의 마무리는 저녁이 아니라 아침에 완성된다. 아침을 어떻게 보내느냐에 따라 하루의 질이 결정된다. - 자신의 일에 몰입하면 우주의 주인인 시간조차 달아나버린다. 자기 자신에게 몰입하는 사람은 시간에게 자신을 양보하지 않는다. - 하루라는 시간은 흠모하는 나를 만들기 위한 훈련이다. 훈련은 과거의 나로 주저앉히는 게으름과 욕심에 대한 체계적인 공격이다. 변화란 내가 나에게 하는 간절한 부탁이다 나는 오늘, 나에게 무엇을 당부할 것인가 일상에서 부딪히는 벽은 방해물이 아니라 내가 극복해야 할 유일한 길이다. 하지만 극복의 결과는 미미할 수 있음을 기억해야 한다. 불안한 일상은 변함없을 것이기 때문이다. 그럼에도 무의미와 모순으로 가득해 보이는 삶을 있는 그대로 수용하고, 오늘 하루를 인생의 마지막 날처럼 정성스럽게 살려는 노력만이 우리가 할 수 있는 최선일 것이라고 저자는 말한다. 이른 아침 혹은 잠들기 전, 하루 10분씩이라도 책에서 소개하는 단어들을 삶의 일부로 받아들인다면 조용한 변화가 일어나는 것을 경험할 수 있을 것이다. 내가 발견해야 할 별은 도달할 수 없는 먼 하늘에 있지 않다. 그 별은 눈을 감고 자신의 마음을 들여다볼 때 비로소 보이는 원석이기 때문이다. 그 원석은 지금도 발견되기만을 기다리고 있다. ◎ 본문 중에서 현대 문명은 키르케고르가 말한 “죽음에 이르는 병”처럼 영적인 병에 걸려 외로움이라는 늪에 빠져 있다. 우리는 그 안에 갇혀 심연에 묻어둔 금기된 악을 분출하고 있는 것인가? (…) 오늘날 우리를 이 늪에서 건져낼 가치는 무엇인가? [공허, 자신을 관찰하는 터전 : 32쪽] 어리석은 자는 그런 역경을 상상한 적이 없다. 그는 모든 것들이 자기 생각대로 ‘순조롭게’ 흘러갈 거라고 착각한다. 우주와 자연은 인간의 상상대로 돌아가는 법이 없다. 인간의 생각은 언제나 부족하고 편협하기 때문이다. [고통, 생명의 존재 방식 : 40쪽] 오늘 하루, 내가 가야 할 방향을 지시하는 ‘또 다른 나’와 마주한다. 부산한 일과 생각을 정지시키고 나만의 제단에서 가만히 눈을 감는다. 묵상이란 좌정과 몰입을 방해하기 위해 계속 짖어대는 사납고 무시무시한 한 마리 검은 개 앞에서도 꿈쩍하지 않는 개다. [도야, 나만의 임무 : 116쪽] 요즘처럼 속절없이 흐르는 시간이 야속하기도 하고 아쉽기도 한 적이 없다. 나 자신에게 무언가를 요구하지만, 그것에 잘 부응하지 못하는 것 같아 늘 아쉽다. 그 아쉬움을 방치하면 소홀과 게으름이 나를 꼼짝달싹 못 하게 붙들고 깊은 실의의 늪으로 데려간다. [신중, 허상으로부터의 탈출 : 161쪽] 우리가 사는 세상은 베이스캠프다. 우리는 이곳에서 영원히 살 수 없다. 인간은 탐구하고 모험하고 자신이 가진 잠재력의 한계를 팽창시키려 시도할 때, 비로소 대중에서 개인으로, 범인에서 초인으로, 동물적 인간에서 신적 인간으로 승화한다. [안내, 인생이라는 베이스캠프 : 211쪽] 침묵한 채 자족하는 나무들을 내려다보았다. 모두 자기 모습 그대로의 품위를 지키며 순간을 즐기고 있다. 옆에 있는 나무를 쳐다보지도 부러워하지도 시기하지도 않는다. 나무들이 나에게 묻는다. “당신은 당신입니까?” [자기문화, 개화를 기다리는 인내 : 221쪽] 변화는 누구에게 요구하는 폭력이 아니라 자신에게 부탁하는 정중한 초대이며, 그 변화를 이루기 위해 의도하는 섬세한 연습이다. 당신은 지금 누군가를 변화시키려 하고 있지는 않은가? 아니면 자신을 변화의 대상으로 삼아 변화하는 중인가? [변화, 나에게 보내는 정중한 초대 : 281쪽]. (shrink)

Many prominent critiques of philosophical methods proceed by suggesting that some method is unreliable, especially in comparison to some alternative method. In light of this, it may seem natural to conclude that these (comparatively) unreliable methods should be abandoned. Drawing upon work on the division of cognitive labour in science, we argue things are not so straightforward. Rather, whether an unreliable method should be abandoned depends heavily on the crucial question of how we should divide philosophers’ time and effort between (...) different methods, in order to maximise our prospects of achieving epistemic success. We show that, in a range of cases, even a (comparatively) unreliable method deserves to be allocated some of these resources. (shrink)

During the Asian and Pacific War, the Japanese government mobilized approximately 200,000 Asian women to military brothels to sexually serve Japanese soldiers. The majority of these victims were unmarried young women from Korea, Japan’s colony at that time. In the early 1990s, Korean feminist leaders helped more than 200 Korean survivors of Japanese military sexual slavery to come forward to tell the truth, which has further accelerated the redress movement for the women. One major issue in the redress movement and (...) research relating to the so-called “comfort women” issue is whether Japan’s colonization of Korea or gender hierarchy was a more fundamental cause of the Korean women’s suffering. Using an intersectional perspective, this article analyzes how colonial power, gender hierarchy, and class were inseparably tied together to make the victims’ lives miserable. By doing so, it shows that a one-sided emphasis on colonization or gender hierarchy will misrepresent the feminist political issue and misinterpret the “comfort women’s” experiences. (shrink)

Bestselling author Sam Harris dismantles the most common justification for religious faith-that a moral system cannot be based on science.

In this enlightening book, Sam Harris argues that free will is an illusion but that this truth should not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom; indeed, this truth can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.

Inquiry aims at knowledge. Your inquiry into a question succeeds just in case you come to know the answer. However, combined with a common picture on which misleading evidence can lead knowledge to be lost, this view threatens to recommend a novel form of dogmatism. At least in some cases, individuals who know the answer to a question appear required to avoid evidence bearing on it. In this paper, we’ll aim to do two things. First, we’ll present an argument for (...) this novel form of dogmatism and show that it presents a substantive challenge. Second, we’ll consider a way those who take knowledge to be the aim of inquiry can mount a response. In the course of doing so, we’ll try to get clearer on the normative connections between inquiry, knowledge and evidence gathering. (shrink)

Suppositional theories of conditionals take apparent similarities between supposition and conditionals as a starting point, appealing to features of the former to provide an account of the latter. This paper develops a novel form of suppositional theory, one which characterizes the relationship at the level of semantics rather than at the level of speech acts. In the course of doing so, it considers a range of novel data which shed additional light on how conditionals and supposition interact.

Sam Harris dismantles the most common justification for religious faith--that a moral system cannot be based on science.

The visual system adapts to a wide range of visual features, from lower-level features like color and motion to higher-level features like causality and, perhaps, number. According to some, adaptation is a strictly perceptual phenomenon, such that the presence of adaptation licenses the claim that a feature is truly perceptual in nature. Given the theoretical importance of claims about adaptation, then, it is important to understand exactly when the visual system does and does not exhibit adaptation. Here, we take as (...) a case study one specific kind of adaptation: visual adaptation to size. Supported by evidence from four experiments, we argue that, despite robust effects of size adaptation in the lab, (1) size adaptation effects are phenomenologically underwhelming (in some cases, hardly appreciable at all), (2) some effects of size adaptation appear contradictory, and difficult to explain given current theories of size adaptation, and (3) prior studies on size adaptation may have failed to isolate size as the adapted dimension. Ultimately, we argue that while there is evidence to license the claim that size adaptation is genuine, size adaptation is a puzzling and poorly understood phenomenon. (shrink)

We develop a new version of the causal theory of spacetime. Whereas traditional versions of the theory seek to identify spatiotemporal relations with causal relations, the version we develop takes causal relations to be the grounds for spatiotemporal relations. Causation is thus distinct from, and more basic than, spacetime. We argue that this non-identity theory, suitably developed, avoids the challenges facing the traditional identity theory.

The curriculum design, faculty characteristics, and experience of implementing masters' level international research ethics training programs supported by the Fogarty International Center was investigated. Multiple pedagogical approaches were employed to adapt to the learning needs of the trainees. While no generally agreed set of core competencies exists for advanced research ethics training, more than 75% of the curricula examined included international issues in research ethics, responsible conduct of research, human rights, philosophical foundations of research ethics, and research regulation and ethical (...) review process. Common skills taught included critical thinking, research methodology and statistics, writing, and presentation proficiency. Curricula also addressed the cultural, social, and religious context of the trainees related to research ethics. Programs surveyed noted trainee interest in Western concepts of research ethics and the value of the transnational exchange of ideas. Similar faculty expertise profiles existed in all programs. Approximately 40% of faculty were female. Collaboration between faculty from low- and middleincome countries (LMICs) and high-income countries (HICs) occurred in most programs and at least 50% of HIC faculty had previous LMIC experience. This paper is part of a collection of papers analyzing the Fogarty International Research Ethics Education and Curriculum Development program. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether corporate philanthropic decisions are associated with a firm’s listing status and business group affiliation. Analyzing a large sample of public and private firms in Korea, we find that public firms make more charitable contributions than private firms and business group-affiliated firms make more charitable contributions than non-affiliated firms. The results suggest that public firms, owing to greater public scrutiny, and business groups, owing to higher political costs, are encouraged to make more corporate charitable contributions. Further, we (...) find that greater corporate giving by public firms than private firms is more pronounced for business group-affiliated firms, compared with non-affiliated firms. The result is consistent with business groups’ strategic coordination of their affiliates’ philanthropic decisions to tunnel business group resources out to controlling shareholders who hold a larger portion of private affiliates than public affiliates. (shrink)

The popularity of ‘food sovereignty’ to cover a range of positions, interventions, and struggles within the food system is testament, above all, to the term’s adaptability. Food sovereignty is centrally, though not exclusively, about groups of people making their own decisions about the food system—it is a way of talking about a theoretically-informed food systems practice. Since people are different, we should expect decisions about food sovereignty to be different in different contexts, albeit consonant with a core set of principles. (...) In this paper we look at the analytical points of friction in applying ideas of food sovereignty within the context of Indigenous struggles in North America. This, we argue, helps to clarify one of the central themes in food sovereignty: that it is a continuation of anti-colonial struggles, even in post-colonial contexts. Such an examination has dividends both for scholars of food sovereignty and for those of Indigenous politics: by helping to problematize notions of food sovereignty and postcoloniality, but also by posing pointed questions around gender for Indigenous struggles. (shrink)

Standard approaches to counterfactuals in the philosophy of explanation are geared toward causal explanation. We show how to extend the counterfactual theory of explanation to non-causal cases, involving extra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of physical facts by mathematical facts. Using a structural equation framework, we model impossible perturbations to mathematics and the resulting differences made to physical explananda in two important cases of extra-mathematical explanation. We address some objections to our approach.

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ?On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy?, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create (...) finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason. (shrink)

On a now orthodox view, humans and many other animals possess a “number sense,” or approximate number system, that represents number. Recently, this orthodox view has been subject to numerous critiques that question whether the ANS genuinely represents number. We distinguish three lines of critique – the arguments from congruency, confounds, and imprecision – and show that none succeed. We then provide positive reasons to think that the ANS genuinely represents numbers, and not just non-numerical confounds or exotic substitutes for (...) number, such as “numerosities” or “quanticals,” as critics propose. In so doing, we raise a neglected question: numbers of what kind? Proponents of the orthodox view have been remarkably coy on this issue. But this is unsatisfactory since the predictions of the orthodox view, including the situations in which the ANS is expected to succeed or fail, turn on the kind of number being represented. In response, we propose that the ANS represents not only natural numbers, but also non-natural rational numbers. It does not represent irrational numbers, however, and thereby fails to represent the real numbers more generally. This distances our proposal from existing conjectures, refines our understanding of the ANS, and paves the way for future research. (shrink)

The theoretical virtue of parsimony values the minimizing of theoretical commitments, but theoretical commitments come in two kinds : ontological and ideological. While the ontological commitments of a theory are the entities it posits, a theory’s ideological commitments are the primitive concepts it employs. Here, I show how we can extend the distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony, commonly drawn regarding ontological commitments, to the domain of ideological commitments. I then argue that qualitative ideological parsimony is a theoretical virtue. My (...) defense proceeds by demonstrating the merits of qualitative ideological parsimony and by showing how the qualitative conception of ideological parsimony undermines two notable arguments from ideological parsimony: David Lewis’ defense of modal realism and Ted Sider’s defense of mereological nihilism. (shrink)

Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the normality (...) of error. Sometimes, it is more normal for reality and appearance to diverge than to match. We show that this simple idea has dramatic consequences for the theory of knowledge and justification. Among other things, we argue that a proper treatment of The Preface requires a departure from the internalist idea that epistemic justification supervenes on the appearances and the widespread idea that one knows most when free from error. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have argued in favour of extended simples on the grounds that they are needed by fundamental physics. The arguments typically appeal to theories of quantum gravity. To date, the argument in favour of extended simples has ignored the fact that the very existence of spacetime is put under pressure by quantum gravity. We thus consider the case for extended simples in the context of different views on the existence of spacetime. We show that the case for (...) extended simples based on physics is far more complex than has been previously thought. We present and then map this complexity, in order to present a much more textured picture of the argument for extended simples. (shrink)

This paper refines a controversial proposal: that core systems belong to a perceptual kind, marked out by the format of its representational outputs. Following Susan Carey, this proposal has been understood in terms of core representations having an iconic format, like certain paradigmatically perceptual outputs. I argue that they don’t, but suggest that the proposal may be better formulated in terms of a broader analogue format type. Formulated in this way, the proposal accommodates the existence of genuine icons in perception, (...) and avoids otherwise troubling objections. (shrink)

Some critics argue that the types of psychiatric diagnosis found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and International Classification of Disease are superfluous and should be abandoned. These are known as categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses. To receive a categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnosis an individual need only exhibit some, rather than all, of the symptoms on the diagnostic criteria. Consequently, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses only associate an individual with a range of symptoms rather than specify which symptoms they (...) have. Drawing on Giere’s account of scientific models, I portray categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses as abstract models that guide the building of less abstract models. These models can specify which symptoms a particular individual has. Additionally, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses can guide investigation of symptoms towards difficult to spot symptoms, guide investigation towards changing symptoms, and guide investigation towards how symptoms manifest. These important roles mean categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses should not be abandoned. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of pluralities based on the following simple claim: some things are nothing over and above the individual things they comprise. For some, this may seem like a mysterious statement, perhaps even meaningless; for others, like a truism, trivial and inferentially inert. I show that neither reaction is correct: the claim is both tractable and has important consequences for a number of debates in philosophy.

According to the modal view, essence admits of reductive analysis in exclusively modal terms. Fine (1994) argues that modal view delivers an inadequate analysis of essence. This paper defends the modal view from Fine's challenge. This defense proceeds by examining the disagreement between Finean primitivists and Quinean eliminativists about essence. In order to model this disagreement, a distinction between essence and a separable concept, nature, is required. This distinction is then used to show that Fine's challenge is misdirected and therefore (...) unsuccessful. (shrink)

We investigate corporate giving behaviors of prestigious business award winners in Korea. In particular, we examine whether firms strategically use corporate giving to enhance corporate reputation. We find that award winners generally make more charitable contributions than nonwinners prior to winning awards and maintain significant charitable contributions after winning awards; multiple award winners make even more charitable contributions than single-award winners; and an increase in charitable contributions does not raise the probability of winning awards in the year after the increase. (...) The results suggest that CEOs of award-winning firms do not use corporate giving opportunistically to enhance their status and reputation. Rather, significant charitable contributions by award winners may be indicative of a sound business strategy to maximize long-term firm value. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor deemed informational encapsulation ‘the essence’ of a system’s modularity and argued that human perceptual processing comprises modular systems, thus construed. Nowadays, his conclusion is widely challenged. Often, this is because experimental work is seen to somehow demonstrate the cognitive penetrability of perceptual processing, where this is assumed to conflict with the informational encapsulation of perceptual systems. Here, I deny the conflict, proposing that cognitive penetration need not have any straightforward bearing on the conjecture that perceptual processing is composed (...) of nothing but informationally encapsulated modules, the conjecture that each and every perceptual computation is performed by an informationally encapsulated module, and the consequences perceptual encapsulation was traditionally expected to have for a perception-cognition border, the epistemology of perception and cognitive science. With these points in view, I propose that particularly plausible cases of cognitive penetration would actually seem to evince the encapsulation of perceptual systems rather than refute/problematize this conjecture. (shrink)

Mathematics appears to play a genuine explanatory role in science. But how do mathematical explanations work? Recently, a counterfactual approach to mathematical explanation has been suggested. I argue that such a view fails to differentiate the explanatory uses of mathematics within science from the non-explanatory uses. I go on to offer a solution to this problem by combining elements of the counterfactual theory of explanation with elements of a unification theory of explanation. The result is a theory according to which (...) a counterfactual is explanatory when it is an instance of a generalized counterfactual scheme. (shrink)

Sam Gillespie's The Mathematics of Novelty presents a new account of Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze, identifying conceptual impasses in their philosophical ...

Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be represented in relation to distinct, (...) incongruent proximal goals. Instead they can be represented in relation to a single proximal goal – especially if the movements are, or appear to be, mechanically linked to a more distal joint action goal. To test this, we implemented a paradigm in which participants produced finger movements that were either congruent or incongruent with those of a virtual partner, and either with or without a joint action goal (the joint flipping of a switch, which turned on two light bulbs). Our findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that visuomotor interference effects can be reduced when two physically incongruent actions are represented as mechanically interdependent contributions to a joint action goal. (shrink)

It is often claimed that pre-attentive vision has an ‘iconic’ format. This is seen to explain pre-attentive vision's characteristically high processing capacity and to make sense of an overlap in the mechanisms of early vision and mental imagery. But what does the iconicity of pre-attentive vision amount to? This paper considers two prominent ways of characterising pre-attentive visual icons and argues that neither is adequate: one approach renders the claim ‘pre-attentive vision is iconic’ empirically false while the other obscures its (...) ability to do the explanatory work, which motivates positing pre-attentive visual icons in the first place. With this noted, I introduce the notion of an ‘Analogue Map’ and argue that it provides a superior characterisation of pre-attentive vision's iconicity. I then argue that this forces a reassessment of debates which have traditionally presupposed the iconicity of pre-attentive vision, emphasising ramifications for the viability of a format-based perception-thought border. (shrink)

Time is woven into the fabric of our lives. Everything we do, we do in and across time. It is not just that our lives are stretched out in time, from the moment of birth to the moment of our death. It is that our lives are stories. We make sense of ourselves, today, by understanding who we were yesterday, and the day before, and the day before that; by understanding what we did and why we did it. Our memories (...) shape our present selves, since we are the product of who we were, and who we remember being. Yet who we are lasts for but a moment. It is who we will be that demands attention. We are forever projecting ourselves into the future. We painstakingly plan for the needs of our future selves, all the while knowing that while what we do will make those future selves who they are, still, our future selves are elusive. So it is not simply that we happen to live our lives in time, the way, say, one might happen to live in Australia, or Singapore. It is hard to fathom how things could be otherwise. What would it be to live a life without time? Yet time itself is intangible. Though we are keenly aware of what has been ‒ of pain and loss, regret and pride ‒ and of what might be ‒ of anticipation, and dread, and longing ‒ time itself seems unaffected by anything we do. Though we can anticipate a future birthday cake, time itself cannot be tasted. Though we can dread a future dentist’s appointment, time itself cannot be touched. Though we remember the crunching of leaves this past autumn, time itself cannot be heard. How can it be that something so central to each of us, to who we are, and what we care about, can be so spectral? What, in the end, is time? Is time real, like a substance in which each of us, like insects in amber, finds ourselves trapped? Is time a dimension through which we can move? Is time not a thing at all, but some connection between events? If time is real, what is it like? Does it flow like a river, taking each of us prisoner in its current, washing us ever closer to the end of our lives? Is time like a cresting wave, coming ever closer to each of us from the future, engulfing us, and then receding into the past? Or is time static? Like a one-way road that each of us might wander, with no chance to turn back? Or perhaps time is like none of these things. Perhaps time is more like space; something we can navigate freely, so that we can visit different times just like we visit different places. Perhaps we can we travel in time the way we can travel in space. These questions, and many more, are the focus of this book. Now, you might wonder what philosophers are doing writing a book about time. Surely that’s a job for physicists! It is true: a great deal of what we know about time stems from our understanding of physics. However, even in physics we find that there are questions about time that go unanswered. Moreover, increasingly, physicists are turning to philosophers for help in understanding the role that time plays in current physical theories. Our goal is to get the reader up to speed on some of the central issues that influence our understanding of time so that they too may play a role in this ongoing discussion between science and philosophy. We hope that in doing so it will become clear what philosophy can bring to the study of time. There is a natural narrative in philosophy regarding the study of time, and we have chosen to organise this book according to that narrative. However, the book may also be approached in a ‘choose-your-own adventure’ spirit. While later chapters build on material introduced in earlier chapters, you can skip around, reading the book in any order you choose. For the instructor, this means that she can design her course around this book in any number of ways, depending on the particular topic she wishes to focus on. (shrink)