Reputation detection in traditional distributed systems relies heavily on the factor of interaction reputation, which can be derived from direct interactions between agents through bidirectional relationships. However, in the current information diffusion in social network systems, the characteristic of the unidirectional relationship between agents and the decay property of diffusion will result in lacking direct interactions; therefore, interaction reputations will be difficult to be obtained by agents in a distributed manner. To solve this problem, a novel distributed reputation detection model (...) following the pattern “from path to individual” is proposed, which can provide a new reputation factor as an alternative to interaction reputation in such environments. The main idea is that the positive observation of an information diffusion process increases the belief of the corresponding diffusion path, which further increases the reputation of each involved agent. Thus, the reputation of a target agent can be assessed by the superimposition of reputations of multiple paths on which this agent has participated in past information diffusion processes. Furthermore, being aware of agent’s limited capacity for reputation detection in SNS, we then propose the enhanced FPTI model, which simplifies the detection source to reduce detection costs and achieve the approximate performance as FPTI. Theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations validate the efficiency and effectiveness of our models and also show several properties of the models, for example, the robustness for dynamic environments. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a framework for accounting for the self, based on a reconstruction of Galen Strawson’s “theory of SESMETs,” or the Pearl view, with Barry Dainton’s continuous consciousness thesis. I argue that the framework I provide adequately accounts for the self and is preferable to solely adopting either Strawson’s or Dainton’s theory. I call my reconstruction the “Necklace” view of the self.

In most modal logics, atomic propositional symbols are directly representing the meaning of sentences (such as sets of possible worlds). In other words, they use only rigid propositional designators. This means they are not able to handle uncertainty in meaning directly at the sentential level. In this paper, we offer a modal language involving non-rigid propositional designators which can also carefully distinguish de re and de dicto use of these designators. Then, we axiomatize the logics in this language with respect (...) to all Kripke models with multiple modalities and with respect to S5 Kripke models with a single modality. (shrink)

This paper connects the following four topics: a class of generalized graphs whose relations do not have fixed arities called hypergraphs, a family of non-normal modal logics rejecting the aggregative axiom, an epistemic framework fighting logical omniscience, and the classical group knowledge modality of ‘someone knows’. Through neighborhood frames as their meeting point, we show that, among many completeness results obtained in this paper, the limit of a family of weakly aggregative logics is both exactly the modal logic of hypergraphs (...) and also the epistemic logic of local reasoning with veracity and positive introspection, and upon adding a single combinatorial axiom, it is also the logic of ‘someone knows’ for a fixed finite number of positively introspective agents. At the core of all these completeness results is a new canonical neighborhood model construction for monotone modal logics that is capable of dealing with all these diverse cases. We also provide an axiomatization for the logic of all non-n-colorable hypergraphs based on a filtration argument that also shows the decidability of the logics of hypergraphs we study. (shrink)

This paper studies connections between two alternatives to the standard probability calculus for representing and reasoning about uncertainty: imprecise probability andcomparative probability. The goal is to identify complete logics for reasoning about uncertainty in a comparative probabilistic language whose semantics is given in terms of imprecise probability. Comparative probability operators are interpreted as quantifying over a set of probability measures. Modal and dynamic operators are added for reasoning about epistemic possibility and updating sets of probability measures.

本书将佛学中一些大师们重点强调的智慧闪光点重新编创,内容包括:活一天就要有一天的意义、感情上的事不可太执着、该出手时便出手、生在红尘中便忙人间事等。.

In "A Problem in Possible-World Semantics," David Kaplan presented a consistent and intelligible modal principle that cannot be validated by any possible world frame (in the terminology of modal logic, any neighborhood frame). However, Kaplan's problem is tempered by the fact that his principle is stated in a language with propositional quantification, so possible world semantics for the basic modal language without propositional quantifiers is not directly affected, and the fact that on careful inspection his principle does not target the (...) world part of possible world semantics—the atomicity of the algebra of propositions—but rather the idea of propositional quantification over a complete Boolean algebra of propositions. By contrast, in this paper we present a simple and intelligible modal principle, without propositional quantifiers, that cannot be validated by any possible world frame precisely because of their assumption of atomicity (i.e., the principle also cannot be validated by any atomic Boolean algebra expansion). It follows from a theorem of David Lewis that our logic is as simple as possible in terms of modal nesting depth (two). We prove the consistency of the logic using a generalization of possible world semantics known as possibility semantics. We also prove the completeness of the logic (and two other relevant logics) with respect to possibility semantics. Finally, we observe that the logic we identify naturally arises in the study of Peano Arithmetic. (shrink)

This paper investigates the principles that one must add to Boolean algebra to capture reasoning not only about intersection, union, and complementation of sets, but also about the relative size of sets. We completely axiomatize such reasoning under the Cantorian definition of relative size in terms of injections.

We consider extending the modal logic KD45, commonly taken as the baseline system for belief, with propositional quantifiers that can be used to formalize natural language sentences such as “everything I believe is true” or “there is something that I neither believe nor disbelieve.” Our main results are axiomatizations of the logics with propositional quantifiers of natural classes of complete Boolean algebras with an operator validating KD45. Among them is the class of complete, atomic, and completely multiplicative BAOs validating KD45. (...) Hence, by duality, we also cover the usual method of adding propositional quantifiers to normal modal logics by considering their classes of Kripke frames. In addition, we obtain decidability for all the concrete logics we discuss. (shrink)

This paper connects the following three apparently unrelated topics: an epistemic framework fighting logical omniscience, a class of generalized graphs without the arities of relations, and a family of non-normal modal logics rejecting the aggregative axiom. Through neighborhood frames as their meeting point, we show that, among many completeness results obtained in this paper, the limit of a family of weakly aggregative logics is both exactly the modal logic of hypergraphs and also the epistemic logic of local reasoning with veracity (...) and positive introspection. The logics studied are shown to be decidable based on a filtration construction. (shrink)

Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In (...) this paper, we address three possible responses to the Parity Argument from moral error theorists: (1) accept the parity but still reject epistemic error theory, (2) reject the parity, (3) accept the parity and defend epistemic error theory. We argue that there are problems with each of these responses, so the Parity Argument stands as a strong counterargument to the Metaphysical Argument. We conclude by drawing some lessons for any future challenges to the Parity Argument. (shrink)

Scroggs's theorem on the extensions of S5 is an early landmark in the modern mathematical studies of modal logics. From it, we know that the lattice of normal extensions of S5 is isomorphic to the inverse order of the natural numbers with infinity and that all extensions of S5 are in fact normal. In this paper, we consider extending Scroggs's theorem to modal logics with propositional quantifiers governed by the axioms and rules analogous to the usual ones for ordinary quantifiers. (...) We call them Π-logics. Taking S5Π, the smallest normal Π-logic extending S5, as the natural counterpart to S5 in Scroggs's theorem, we show that all normal Π-logics extending S5Π are complete with respect to their complete simple S5 algebras, that they form a lattice that is isomorphic to the lattice of the open sets of the disjoint union of two copies of the one-point compactification of N, that they have arbitrarily high Turing-degrees, and that there are non-normal Π-logics extending S5Π. (shrink)

Deconstruction is decidedly unsettling in that it destabilizes the otherwise comfortably assumed understanding of the nature of translation. What is also controversial is that it may make translation impossible, considering that it explicitly acknowledges the impossibility of translation. Yet Derrida emphasizes the necessity of translation as well, thus foregrounding the need to negotiate with the non-negotiable, and for this reason, to translate the untranslatable. Deconstruction captures and elucidates the complexity of translation in relation to the variability and complexity of its (...) nature and practice. Despite the disconcerting observation of his devastatingly relativist overtone and open-endedness, Derrida does not uphold complete free play, as is repeatedly pointed out by himself and other scholars. This paper argues that the context of translation plays a regulating role and intends to unravel what he calls translation as both possible and impossible, both respectful and abusive. Inspired by Derrida's profound contention that translation is in a way more about ‘what is not there’ than ‘what is there’, this paper will map some of the multiple implications of meaning and various modes of representation in translation, in which different meanings can be played with so as to give rise to spaces for exploring and expanding the range of translation strategies and methods. (shrink)

本书旨在对文学翻译的本质进行探讨,论述文学语言与翻译、文学翻译的过程、文学翻译的策略,及翻译的文化差异等。.

Generally believed that "theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" is a "Cultural Revolution" guiding ideology, which in ten years the "Cultural Revolution" period has been widely publicized, has written to the Chinese Communists "nine", "Top Ten", "Eleventh large "by the political report and constitution, but also to write the fourth and fifth National People's Congress meeting adopted constitutional changes, the impact is huge. When it was proposed that "the history of Marxism has set a third great (...) milestone," and after more than ten years later, "since the founding of the party on a number of resolutions on the question of history" has made ​​it a completely different assessment that It is the "leftist" errors and this should be "resolutely corrected." In this paper, the editorial "October Socialist Revolution opened up along the path," CPC "nine", Hua Guofeng, the Third Plenum and "since the founding of the party on a number of resolutions on the question of history," as the coordinates of the tracking the fate of its history and study. q "The Theory on Continuing the Revolution under the Leadership of Proletarians" is commonly regarded as the guiding ideology of the Cultural Revolution. Widely publicized during the decade-long Cultural Revolution, it has been incorporated into the Chinese Communist Party's constitution and the People's Republic of China's constitution for numerous times and has exerted a great influence on the state. By the time it was initially proposed in 1967, it was regarded as' the third landmark in the history of Marxism. But it was subject to a completely different fate more than ten years later as it was labeled "pinko" and was required to he "corrected" in Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China. This paper aims to conduct an investigation of the historical fate of "the Theory on Continuing the Revolution under the Dictatorship of Proletarians" with reference to the following texts: Go Ahead Along the Way Inaugurated by October Socialist Revolution, Report of the Ninth National Congress of the CPC, Hua Guofeng's Talkings, Report of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China. (shrink)

本书包括绪论、定义、论证、谬误、命题逻辑、归纳推理和类比推理、科学和假说等八章,每章后都附有思考题和练习题。.

本书记录了人类千百万年生命经验的诸多反思与总结的生存箴言;汇集了有史以来植物、动物、人类三个层级的生命世界与大自然互相演绎出的,至今仍令人悲伤叹惋而又足以激动人心的生命现象与生活的真理。.

本书第一编主要讨论刑法客观主义理论中所蕴含的抽象性、行为事实的客观性问题及其与法治立场的契合性。第二编主要研究刑法客观主义的反对派即刑法主观主义理论对法治立场的动摇。.

该书通过争霸之梦、求索之梦、恢复之梦以及狂妄之梦四部分内容,对战争与梦想的关系进行了解析。.

本书内容包括:儒学与全球化浪潮、儒学与知识经济、儒家精神与网络世界、儒学与环境伦理、儒学与当代生命伦理等。.

本书主要探讨传统思想与科学发展之间的关系,涉及传统哲学的科学基础、科学发展的思想原因、科学思想的涵义和演变、以及传统思想对数学、医学等各门学科的作用和影响。.

本书从马克思的原著出发,详尽地展示这位著作家在各个主要理论时期对自然概念的多方面阐述;阐明马克思自然概念的主要理论原则,进而从理论科学及社会工业实践方面论证马克思自然概念的现时代意义。.

A large part of Hilary Putnam’s latest work is spent on disagreeing with John McDowell’s conceptualist view of perception which has been expressed in Mind and World and the McDowellian disjunctivism. Nevertheless, Putnam does not articulate which specific aspects of McDowell’s view he disagrees with. This paper endeavours to: first, clarify what Putnam’s disagreement with McDowell precisely is based on an investigation of the views held by each of the two philosophers regarding the problem of the mind and perception, as (...) well as their attitudes toward the relevant sciences; and second, examine Putnam’s argument against McDowell, then reconstruct it in its most plausible form. Before diving into Putnam’s exact disagreement with McDowell in §3, I consider it important to first clarify the common stance that the two philosophers share, namely the stance which opposes reductionism and eliminativism about the mind. Following that, I will explicate the views held by each of the two philosophers as well as point out where they diverge or disagree on. We will see that Putnam has appreciated the virtue in McDowell’s conceptualist view of doxastic perception. Nevertheless, Putnam argues that perceptual experience is not exhausted by what must be put under the actualisation of the perceiving subject’s conceptual capacities, and there is the dimension of ‘sense impression’, together with the possibility for science’s intervention to our discussion on perception, that has been neglected by McDowell. Finally, in §4, I will discuss some problems I have found in Putnam’s argument and give my own solutions in the hope of contributing to today’s current debates. I argue that ‘sense impression’, though it exceeds the perceiver’s acquired conceptual capacities, must in principle be conceptual insofar as it can be intelligible to us. Putnam’s criticism of McDowell only stands if McDowell’s conceptualist view is understood as a static first-order metaphysical picture of human perception. Meanwhile, Putnam’s proposal for science’s intervention should be taken not as aiming at a better substitutive picture to McDowell’s, but as advocating a certain attitude towards our enterprise of studying human perception which is always open to possible collaborations between different disciplines as well as to possible critiques from future reflections. (shrink)

Background: Losing one’s only child may lead to post-traumatic stress disorder, of which re-experiencing is the core symptom. However, neuroimaging studies of sex differences in re-experiencing in the context of the trauma of losing one’s only child and PTSD are scarce; comparisons of the functional networks from the hippocampal subfields to the thalamus might clarify the neural basis.Methods: Thirty couples without any psychiatric disorder who lost their only child, 55 patients with PTSD, and 50 normal controls underwent resting-state functional magnetic (...) resonance imaging. The functional connectivity from the hippocampal subregions to the thalamus and the correlations of FC with re-experiencing symptoms were analyzed within and between the sexes.Results: Compared with husbands without PTSD, wives without PTSD had higher re-experiencing symptoms and weaker FC between the right hippocampal cornu ammonis 3 and the right thalamus. Moreover, only the correlation between the RCA3-RT FC and re-experiencing in wives without PTSD was significant. Among the three groups, only the RCA3-RT FC in female subjects was markedly different. Additionally, the RCA3-RT FC in wives without PTSD was remarkably lower relative to female patients with PTSD.Conclusion: Wives without PTSD who lost their only child had worse re-experiencing symptoms relative to their husbands, which was associated with the FC alteration between the hippocampal subregions and the thalamus. Importantly, the low level of the RCA3-RT FC may play a potentially protective role against the development of PTSD in wives who have lost their only child. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a framework for accounting for the self, based on a reconstruction of Galen Strawson’s “theory of SESMETs,” or the Pearl view, with Barry Dainton’s continuous consciousness thesis. I argue that the framework I provide adequately accounts for the self and is preferable to solely adopting either Strawson’s or Dainton’s theory. I call my reconstruction the “Necklace” view of the self.

本书主要内容包括:新人本主义的“人一自然”观,关于人与自然关系的哲学伦理学思考,文明生态视角下的“人一自然”观,关于人与自然关系的宗教伦理学思考等.

周山(1949-),上海社会科学院哲学研究所副研究员、周易研究中心秘书长、中国逻辑史研究会理事、上海市逻辑学会理事.

The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about "introspection axioms" such as the 4 and 5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about (...) what agent B believes about what agent A believes; but it is rarely important to reason just about what agent A believes about what agent A believes. This raises the question of the extent to which single-agent introspection axioms actually matter for multi-agent epistemic reasoning. In this paper, we formalize and answer this question. To formalize the question, we first define a set of multi-agent formulas that we call agent-alternating formulas, including formulas like Box_a Box_b Box_a p but not formulas like Box_a Box_a p. We then prove, for the case of belief, that if one starts with multi-agent K or KD, then adding both the 4 and 5 axioms (or adding the B axiom) does not allow the derivation of any new agent-alternating formulas—in this sense, introspection axioms do not matter. By contrast, we show that such conservativity results fail for knowledge and multi-agent KT, though they hold with respect to a smaller class of agent-nonrepeating formulas. (shrink)