京都学派の経済哲学者として知られた梯明秀の本格的研究書。梯の戦時下における哲学の再評価と創造的復権をめざして、形而上学批判と根源的自然の復権というまったく新たな視点からその意義と射程を明らかにしようと する力作。.

現代哲学の最先端を踏まえ、フッサール以来の現象学の根源的問題をたどりなおし、全く新しい生命の哲学、「媒体性の現象学」を世界に先駆けて提唱する。.

儒教が「国教」となったのはいつか。皇帝と天子は同じものか。曹操はなぜ文学を称揚したか。諸葛亮は何を守ろうとしたのか。「竹林の七賢」は何に抵抗したか。国家の正統性を主張し、統治制度や世界観の裏づけとなる 「正統思想」の意置に儒教が上り、その思想内容が変転していく様を、体系性と神秘思想の鄭玄、合理性と現実主義の王粛、光武帝、王莽、曹操や諸葛亮など、多彩な人物を軸にして、「漢」の成立と衰退、三国、魏晉時代 の歴史を交えながら描き出す。.

Modern technology has radically altered the conditions for human action, endowing us with tremendous power to affect the future. Patterns of action that appear positive in their short-term effects must sometimes be judged unsustainable. Hans Jonas and Thomas Berry are among those who emphasize the necessity of transforming ethics in light of these considerations. In a Whiteheadian framework, this needed transformation is rooted in the nature of things.

Die Arbeit widmet sich den zentralen Gedanken Ferdinand Ebners als einem Vertreter der Ich-Du-Philosophie. Ebner sieht im "Wort, das im Anfang war" (Joh 1,1) den Ursprung des menschlichen Wortes. Da er die Bedeutung des Pneumas in der Ich-Du-Beziehung betont und dieses mit der Liebe in Beziehung setzt, ist es naheliegend, im Ursprung der Liebe den Heiligen Geist zu sehen. Wahrend Ebner in einem engen menschlichen Rahmen bleibt, erweitert Daishiro Nakajima die Sicht auf die gesamte Schopfung. Er sieht in ihr (...) die Grundstruktur von Wort und Liebe als Grundoffenbarung des drei-einigen Schopfers als Ursprung des Seins. Sein - Wort - Liebe ist die gemeinsame Wesensstruktur fur den Schopfer und das Geschopf. Von hier versucht Nakajima unter Einbeziehung asiatischer Denktraditionen auch die Beziehung zwischen Wort und Schweigen zu klaren. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Guest Editor’s IntroductionNakajima Takahiro 「東京学派」とは聞きなれない名称であろう。日本研究において「京都学派」は大変よく知られている。たとえ「京都学派」が、「無の論理は論理ではない」と述べた上で、戸坂潤が発明した批判的な概念であったとしても 、現在ではそれは西田幾多郎や田辺元を中心とした一大哲学運動として世界的に認知されている。ところが、西田にしても田辺にしてももともとは東京帝国大学で学んだ学生であった。また、戦前においては、井上哲次郎か ら桑木厳翼へと続く東京帝国大学哲学科の流れは、当時の社会状況と相互に影響しあって、一定の意義を示していたのである。また、大森荘蔵、廣松渉、坂部恵といった戦後の東京大学の哲学者たちは、「京都学派」の問題 系を乗り越えることを重視していた。 この特別号では、発見的概念として「東京学派」を用いて、戦前・戦後におけるその意義と広がりを探究することにした。それは東京大学もしくは東京帝国大学に限定されたものではなく、それ以外の東京圏の大学との相互 交流も含まれるものである。「京都学派」に対しては、政治との距離をどう測るかがしばしば議論されてきたが、「東京学派」は政治により密着したものである。日本の近代の哲学の有している政治性そして倫理性を考える のであれば、やはり「東京学派」の議論は避けて通る ことのできないものである。 無論、「学派」というほどのまとまりを「東京学派」が有しているわけではないことも確かである。西田幾多郎が「京都学派」で果たした中心性は、「東京学派」にはない。そこで、トマス・カスリスが示唆するように、「 学派」の代わりに「サークル」や「スタイル」という言葉を使った方がより正確かもしれない。それでも、あえて「東京学派」と呼ぶのは、「京都学派」に比べて関心を持たれることの少ない、しかし当時は圧倒的な影響力 を有し、戦後決定的に忘却されていった東京の哲学者たちに光をあて、近代日本の哲学の総体を明らかにしたいからである。「東京学派」の研究は緒についたばかりである。今後、国際的な研究の高まりを期待しながら擱筆 する。The “Tokyo School” may be an unfamiliar term to readers. The Kyoto School is very well known in Japanese studies. Even if the Kyoto School is a critical concept invented by Tosaka Jun, who stated [End Page 2] that “the logic of nothingness is not logic,” it is now recognized worldwide as a major philosophical movement led by Nishida Kitarō and Tanabe (...) Hajime. However, both Nishida and Tanabe were originally students at Tokyo Imperial University. In addition, before the war, the output of the Department of Philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University, from Inoue Tetsujirō to Kuwaki Gen’yoku, had a certain significance because it interacted with the social conditions of the time. In addition, postwar philosophers at the University of Tokyo, such as Ōmori Shōzō, Hiromatsu Wataru, and Sakabe Megumi emphasized overcoming the problematics of the Kyoto School.In this special issue, we use the Tokyo School as a heuristic concept to explore its significance and spread in the prewar and postwar periods. It is not limited to the University of Tokyo or Tokyo Imperial University but includes interactions with other universities in the Tokyo area. While the Kyoto School has often been discussed in terms of how to measure its distance from politics, the Tokyo School is more closely connected to politics. If we consider the political and ethical dimensions of modern Japanese philosophy, we cannot avoid discussing the Tokyo School.Of course, it is true that the Tokyo School is not as coherent as a “school.” The central role that Nishida fulfilled in the Kyoto School is perhaps lacking in the Tokyo School. Therefore, as Thomas P. Kasulis suggests, it might be more accurate to use the term “circle” or “style” instead of “school.” Nevertheless, I dare to call it the Tokyo School because I would like to shed light on the Tokyo philosophers who were less popular than those of the Kyoto School but whose influence was overwhelming at the time and who were definitively forgotten after the war, so as to clarify the totality of philosophy in modern Japan.Research on the Tokyo School has only just begun. I am writing this introductory note in anticipation of further international research on the Tokyo School. [End Page 3]Copyright © 2023 State University of New York Press... (shrink)

In this paper, we introduce systems of nonstandard second-order arithmetic which are conservative extensions of systems of second-order arithmetic. Within these systems, we do reverse mathematics for nonstandard analysis, and we can import techniques of nonstandard analysis into analysis in weak systems of second-order arithmetic. Then, we apply nonstandard techniques to a version of Riemannʼs mapping theorem, and show several different versions of Riemannʼs mapping theorem.

We define a new theory of concatenation WTC which is much weaker than Grzegorczyk's well-known theory TC. We prove that WTC is mutually interpretable with the weak theory of arithmetic R. The latter is, in a technical sense, much weaker than Robinson's arithmetic Q, but still essentially undecidable. Hence, as a corollary, WTC is also essentially undecidable.

独自の視点から思想の可能性をつかみ出し、現代の倫理として編み直す。鶴見哲学の中心へ、気鋭の哲学者による決定的論考。.

We pursue the idea that predicate logic is a “fibred algebra” while propositional logic is a single algebra; in the context of intuitionism, this algebraic understanding of predicate logic goes back to Lawvere, in particular his concept of hyperdoctrine. Here, we aim at demonstrating that the notion of monad-relativised hyperdoctrines, which are what we call fibred algebras, yields algebraisations of a wide variety of predicate logics. More specifically, we discuss a typed, first-order version of the non-commutative Full Lambek calculus, which (...) has extensively been studied in the past few decades, functioning as a unifying language for different sorts of logical systems (classical, intuitionistic, linear, fuzzy, relevant, etc.). Through the concept of Full Lambek hyperdoctrines, we establish both generic and set-theoretical completeness results for any extension of the base system; the latter arises from a dual adjunction, and is relevant to the tripos-to-topos construction and quantale-valued sets. Furthermore, we give a hyperdoctrinal account of Girard’s and Gödel’s translation. (shrink)

Specification acquisition in the system design process has been improved since the middle of the 1980s when the upper CASE tools appeared. On the contrary the quality of requirement acquisition in the upper processes of system design has not been enhanced as much as specification acquisition. Understanding the user's requirements is indispensable as one of the basic conditions for building systems that can really satisfy users.This article discusses obtaining requirement knowledge, in terms of human-centred design. The focus is on the (...) process of requirement acquisition, where there is room for one to make full use of human knowledge in a dynamic manner. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of imagination in environmental ethics and introduce an imaginative dimension as an essential part of environmental ethics. Imagination constitutes a basic condition for ethical thinking and action. Matters of environmental ethics have revealed the indispensable role of imagination in ethics. I’ll advance an imagination-based environmental ethics by developing Hans Jonas’ ethical thought. From his viewpoint, various effects of our action on nature and future generations, generally out of our sight, have (...) become an ethical concern. This necessitates the exercise of imagination because we must “imagine” those distant effects to act in an environmentally responsible way. Jonas’ “heuristics of fear” is an imaginative approach necessary for responsible action. Further, I reinterpret the role of imagination as motivating our “will to know.” In conclusion, I suggest the importance of environmental education as cultivating ecological imagination from the standpoint of environmental ethics. (shrink)

The Zhuangzi is a deliciously protean text: it is concerned not only with personal realization, but also with social and political order. In many ways the Zhuangzi established a unique literary and philosophical genre of its own, and while clearly the work of many hands, it is one of the finest pieces of literature in the classical Chinese corpus. It employs every trope and literary device available to set off rhetorically charged flashes of insight into the most unrestrained way to (...) live one's life, free from oppressive, conventional judgments and values. The essays presented here constitute an attempt by a distinguished community of international scholars to provide a variety of exegeses of one of the Zhuangzi's most frequently rehearsed anecdotes, often referred to as "the Happy Fish debate." The editors have brought together essays from the broadest possible compass of scholarship, offering interpretations that range from formal logic to alternative epistemologies to transcendental mysticism. Many were commissioned by the editors and appear for the first time. Some of them have been available in other languages—Chinese, Japanese, German, Spanish—and were translated especially for this anthology. And several older essays were chosen for the quality and variety of their arguments, formulated over years of engagement by their authors. All, however, demonstrate that the Zhuangzi as a text and as a philosophy is never one thing; indeed, it has always been and continues to be, many different things to many different people. (shrink)

It is proved that $\Pi^1_1$ -indescribability in $P_{\kappa}\lambda$ can be characterized by combinatorial properties without taking care of cofinality of $\lambda$ . We extend Carr's theorem proving that the hypothesis $\kappa$ is $2^{\lambda^{<\kappa}}$ -Shelah is rather stronger than $\kappa$ is $\lambda$ -supercompact.

The Zhuangzi is a deliciously protean text: it is concerned not only with personal realization, but also with social and political order. In many ways the Zhuangzi established a unique literary and philosophical genre of its own, and while clearly the work of many hands, it is one of the finest pieces of literature in the classical Chinese corpus. It employs every trope and literary device available to set off rhetorically charged flashes of insight into the most unrestrained way to (...) live one's life, free from oppressive, conventional judgments and values. The essays presented here constitute an attempt by a distinguished community of international scholars to provide a variety of exegeses of one of the Zhuangzi's most frequently rehearsed anecdotes, often referred to as "the Happy Fish debate." The editors have brought together essays from the broadest possible compass of scholarship, offering interpretations that range from formal logic to alternative epistemologies to transcendental mysticism. Many were commissioned by the editors and appear for the first time. Some of them have been available in other languages—Chinese, Japanese, German, Spanish—and were translated especially for this anthology. And several older essays were chosen for the quality and variety of their arguments, formulated over years of engagement by their authors. All, however, demonstrate that the Zhuangzi as a text and as a philosophy is never one thing; indeed, it has always been and continues to be, many different things to many different people. (shrink)

Science does not exist in vacuum; it arises and works in context. Ground-breaking achievements transforming the scientific landscape often stem from philosophical thought, just as symbolic logic and computer science were born from the early analytic philosophy, and for the very reason they impact our global worldview as a coherent whole as well as local knowledge production in different specialised domains. Here we take first steps in elucidating rich philosophical contexts in which Samson Abramsky’s far-reaching work centring around categorical science (...) as a new kind of science may be placed, explicated, and articulated. We argue, inter alia, that Abramsky’s work, as a whole, may be construed as demonstrating the categorical unity of science, or rather the sciences, in a mathematically rigorous, down-to-earth manner, which has been a salient feature of his work. At the same time we trace his intellectual history, leading from duality, to intensionality, and to contextuality, and place it in a broader context of philosophy beyond the analytic-continental divide, namely towards the reintegration of them as in the post-analytic tradition. Besides, we address issues in philosophy of category theory, such as the foundational autonomy of category theory and the (presumably two) dogmas of set-theoretical foundationalism, which Abramsky actually touch upon in one of his few philosophically inclined works. As to philosophy of category theory, we also address categorical structuralism as higher-order structuralism, categorical epistemology as elucidating higher-order meta-laws, and categorical ontology as allowing for reduction of ontological commitment via structural realism, the structuralist resolution of Benaceraff’s dilemma, and the pluralistic multiverse view of science as opposed to the set-theoretical reductionist ‘universe’ view. We conclude by speculating about the existence of the Oxford School of (Pluralistic) Unified Science as opposed to the Vienna Circle of (Monistic) Unified Science and to the Stanford School of (Pluralistic) Disunified Science; Categorical Unified Science may potentially allow us to reconcile the two camps on the unity and disunity of science whilst doing justice to both of them. Categorical unity arguably allows for unification via epistemological and ontological networking, and via knowledge transfer thus enabled, rather than unification via the reduction of everything and every truth to a single foundationalist framework, whilst taking at face value disunity, plurality, and diversity, and their significance in science and in human civilisation as a whole. (shrink)

Inspired by locale theory, we propose “pointfree convex geometry”. We introduce the notion of convexity algebra as a pointfree convexity space. There are two notions of a point for convexity algebra: one is a chain-prime meet-complete filter and the other is a maximal meet-complete filter. In this paper we show the following: the former notion of a point induces a dual equivalence between the category of “spatial” convexity algebras and the category of “sober” convexity spaces as well as a dual (...) adjunction between the category of convexity algebras and the category of convexity spaces; the latter notion of point induces a dual equivalence between the category of “m-spatial” convexity algebras and the category of “m-sober” convexity spaces. We finally argue that the former notion of a point is more useful than the latter one from a category theoretic point of view and that the former notion of a point actually represents a polytope and the latter notion of a point properly represents a point. We also remark on the close relationships between pointfree convex geometry and domain theory. (shrink)

Abstract.A type of subtlety for Pκλ called “strongly subtle” is introduced to show almost ineffability is consistencywise stronger than Shelah property. The following are also shown: is strongly subtle” has rather strong consequences. (ii) The ideal is not strongly subtle} is not λ-saturated, and completely ineffable ideal is not precipitous. (iii) In case that λ<κ=2λ, almost λ-ineffability coincides with λ-ineffability. (iv) It is not provable that κ is λ<κ-ineffable whenever κ is λ-ineffable.

Different aspects of competition in stock exchanges have been discussed from either a positive or normative perspective, but this article seeks to come up with an approach encompassing both positive and normative dimensions of competition in various aspects of stock exchanges' activities. As far as the positive nature of the securities market and industry is concerned, conflicting trends are emerging. The liberalization of securities markets and the disappearance of technical barriers have dismantled the monopoly of national stock exchanges but led (...) to more consolidation. However, we are also witnessing a destabilizing and fragmenting effect of competition on these markets. Following an analysis of the normative/positive dichotomy in approaching competition in financial services, we discuss the centrality of information disclosure in creating a competitive and stable financial market. Disclosure of information, therefore, reinforces both competitive and prudential objectives alike. In a further attempt, we discuss the tension between the principles of competition and prudence alongside the conflict between competition objectives and economies of scope and scale. While arguments in weighing competition against economies of scope and scale are evenly balanced, the unique characteristics of such markets do not allow the absolute application of competition principles when it comes to prudential concerns. (shrink)

This paper explores relationships between many-valued logic and fuzzy topology from the viewpoint of duality theory. We first show a fuzzy topological duality for the algebras of Łukasiewicz n -valued logic with truth constants, which generalizes Stone duality for Boolean algebras to the n -valued case via fuzzy topology. Then, based on this duality, we show a fuzzy topological duality for the algebras of modal Łukasiewicz n -valued logic with truth constants, which generalizes Jónsson-Tarski duality for modal algebras to the (...) n -valued case via fuzzy topology. We emphasize that fuzzy topological spaces naturally arise as spectrums of algebras of many-valued logics. (shrink)

Lawvere hyperdoctrines give categorical algebraic semantics for intuitionistic predicate logic. Here we extend the hyperdoctrinal semantics to a broad variety of substructural predicate logics over the Typed Full Lambek Calculus, verifying their completeness with respect to the extended hyperdoctrinal semantics. This yields uniform hyperdoctrinal completeness results for numerous logics such as different types of relevant predicate logics and beyond, which are new results on their own; i.e., we give uniform categorical semantics for a broad variety of non-classical predicate logics. And (...) we introduce an analogue of Lawvere–Tierney topology and cotopology in the hyperdoctrinal setting, which gives a unifying perspective on different logical translations, in particular allowing for a uniform treatment of Girard’s exponential translation between linear and intuitionistic logics and of Kolmogorov’s double negation translation between intuitionistic and classical logics. In the hyerdoctrinal conception, type theories are categories, logics over type theories are functors, and logical translations between them, then, are natural transformations, in particular Lawvere–Tierney topologies and cotopologies on hyperdoctrines. The view of logical translations as hyperdoctrinal Lawvere–Tierney topologies and cotopologies has not been elucidated before, and may be seen as a novel contribution of the present work. From a broader perspective, this work may be regarded as taking first steps towards interplay between algebraic and categorical logics; it is, technically, a combination of substructural algebraic logic and hyperdoctrinal categorical logic, as the hyperdoctrinal completeness theorem is shown via the integration of the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra construction with the syntactic category construction. As such this work lays a foundation for further interactions between algebraic and categorical logics. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is often devalued due to its peculiar features, especially its radical departure from any of standard positions in foundations of mathematics, such as logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. We first contrast Wittgenstein’s finitism with Hilbert’s finitism, arguing that Wittgenstein’s is perspicuous or surveyable finitism whereas Hilbert’s is transcendental finitism. We then further elucidate Wittgenstein’s philosophy by explicating his natural history view of logic and mathematics, which is tightly linked with the so-called rule-following problem and Kripkenstein’s paradox, yielding (...) vital implications to the nature of mathematical understanding, and to the nature of the certainty and objectivity of mathematical truth. Since the incompleteness theorems, foundations of mathematics have mostly lost their philosophical driving force, and anti-foundationalism has become prevalent and pervasive. Yet new foundations have nevertheless emerged and come into the scene, namely categorical foundations. We articulate the foundational significance of category theory by explicating three forms of foundations, i.e., global foundations, local foundations, and conceptual foundations. And we explore the possibility of categorical unified science qua pluralistic unified science, arguing for the categorical unity of science on both mathematical and philosophical grounds. We then turn to an issue in conceptual foundations of mathematics, namely the nature of the concept of space. We elucidate Wittgenstein’s intensional conception of space in relation to Brouwer’s theory of space continua and to the modern conception of space as point-free structure in category theory and algebraic geometry. We finally give a bird’s-eye view of mathematical philosophy from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and further sheds new light on Wittgenstein’s constructive structuralism and his view of incompleteness and contradictions in mathematics. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is often devalued due to its peculiar features, especially its radical departure from any of standard positions in foundations of mathematics, such as logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. We first contrast Wittgenstein’s finitism with Hilbert’s finitism, arguing that Wittgenstein’s is perspicuous or surveyable finitism whereas Hilbert’s is transcendental finitism. We then further elucidate Wittgenstein’s philosophy by explicating his natural history view of logic and mathematics, which is tightly linked with the so-called rule-following problem and Kripkenstein’s paradox, yielding (...) vital implications to the nature of mathematical understanding, and to the nature of the certainty and objectivity of mathematical truth. Since the incompleteness theorems, foundations of mathematics have mostly lost their philosophical driving force, and anti-foundationalism has become prevalent and pervasive. Yet new foundations have nevertheless emerged and come into the scene, namely categorical foundations. We articulate the foundational significance of category theory by explicating three forms of foundations, i.e., global foundations, local foundations, and conceptual foundations. And we explore the possibility of categorical unified science qua pluralistic unified science, arguing for the categorical unity of science on both mathematical and philosophical grounds. We then turn to an issue in conceptual foundations of mathematics, namely the nature of the concept of space. We elucidate Wittgenstein’s intensional conception of space in relation to Brouwer’s theory of space continua and to the modern conception of space as point-free structure in category theory and algebraic geometry. We finally give a bird’s-eye view of mathematical philosophy from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and further sheds new light on Wittgenstein’s constructive structuralism and his view of incompleteness and contradictions in mathematics. (shrink)

There are still on-going debates on what exactly is wrong with Prior’s pathological “tonk.” In this article I argue, on the basis of categorical inferentialism, that two notions of inconsistency ought to be distinguished in an appropriate account of tonk; logic with tonk is inconsistent as the theory of propositions, and it is due to the fallacy of equivocation; in contrast to this diagnosis of the Prior’s tonk problem, nothing is actually wrong with tonk if logic is viewed as the (...) theory of proofs rather than propositions, and tonk perfectly makes sense in terms of the identity of proofs. Indeed, there is fully complete semantics of proofs for tonk, which allows us to link the Prior’s old philosophical idea with contemporary issues at the interface of categorical logic, computer science, and quantum physics, and thereby to expose commonalities between the laws of Reason and the laws of Nature, which are what logic and physics are respectively about. I conclude the article by articulating the ideas of categorical logical positivism and pluralistic unified science as its goal, including the unification of realist and antirealist conceptions of meaning by virtue of the categorical logical basis of metaphysics. (shrink)

Although Wittgenstein’s influence on logic and foundations of mathematics is well recognized, nonetheless, his legacy concerning other sciences is much less elucidated, and in this article we aim at shedding new light on physics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science from a Wittgensteinian perspective. We focus upon three issues amongst other things: the Chosmky versus Norvig debate on the nature of language; a Neo-Kantian parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of physics and Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics; the relationships between cognitive contextuality and physical (...) contextuality as shown by recent Bell-type results. The Chosmky versus Norvig debate may be seen as a battle between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later conceptions of meaning, i.e., picture theory and use theory. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, quantum physics may be seen as a physical version of the Linguistic Turn. The parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of classical concepts and Hilbert’s philosophy of finitism builds upon transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, both Bohr and Hilbert having been influenced by Neo-Kantian thinkers, such as Hertz, whose sign theory is actually a common root of Wittgenstein’s picture theory and Hilbert’s axiomatics. Wittgenstein is considered a root of contextualism in contemporary philosophy. Contextuality has different manifestations in physics and cognitive science, and contextuality studies across the sciences are rapidly developing in cutting-edge research. We elucidate both analogies and disanalogies between contextuality of reality and contextuality of reason in terms of the nature of probabilities involved. In passing, we also give a reformulation of Penrose’s quantum mind thesis. (shrink)

Although Wittgenstein’s influence on logic and foundations of mathematics is well recognized, nonetheless, his legacy concerning other sciences is much less elucidated, and in this article we aim at shedding new light on physics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science from a Wittgensteinian perspective. We focus upon three issues amongst other things: the Chosmky versus Norvig debate on the nature of language; a Neo-Kantian parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of physics and Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics; the relationships between cognitive contextuality and physical (...) contextuality as shown by recent Bell-type results. The Chosmky versus Norvig debate may be seen as a battle between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later conceptions of meaning, i.e., picture theory and use theory. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, quantum physics may be seen as a physical version of the Linguistic Turn. The parallelism between Bohr’s philosophy of classical concepts and Hilbert’s philosophy of finitism builds upon transcendental philosophy in the Kantian tradition, both Bohr and Hilbert having been influenced by Neo-Kantian thinkers, such as Hertz, whose sign theory is actually a common root of Wittgenstein’s picture theory and Hilbert’s axiomatics. Wittgenstein is considered a root of contextualism in contemporary philosophy. Contextuality has different manifestations in physics and cognitive science, and contextuality studies across the sciences are rapidly developing in cutting-edge research. We elucidate both analogies and disanalogies between contextuality of reality and contextuality of reason in terms of the nature of probabilities involved. In passing, we also give a reformulation of Penrose’s quantum mind thesis. (shrink)

The frame problem is a fundamental challenge in AI, and the Lucas-Penrose argument is supposed to show a limitation of AI if it is successful at all. Here we discuss both of them from a unified Gödelian point of view. We give an informational reformulation of the frame problem, which turns out to be tightly intertwined with the nature of Gödelian incompleteness in the sense that they both hinge upon the finitarity condition of agents or systems, without which their alleged (...) limitations can readily be overcome, and that they can both be seen as instances of the fundamental discrepancy between finitary beings and infinitary reality. We then revisit the Lucas-Penrose argument, elaborating a version of it which indicates the impossibility of information physics or the computational theory of the universe. It turns out through a finer analysis that if the Lucas-Penrose argument is accepted then information physics is impossible too; the possibility of AI or the computational theory of the mind is thus linked with the possibility of information physics or the computational theory of the universe. We finally reconsider the Penrose’s Quantum Mind Thesis in light of recent advances in quantum modelling of cognition, giving a structural reformulation of it and thereby shedding new light on what is problematic in the Quantum Mind Thesis. Overall, we consider it promising to link the computational theory of the mind with the computational theory of the universe; their integration would allow us to go beyond the Cartesian dualism, giving, in particular, an incarnation of Chalmers’ double-aspect theory of information. (shrink)

El libro ilustra un caso de migración de ideas a través de un análisis contextual e histórico-filosófico que introduce al lector en la traducción de la tesis doctoral del filósofo japonés Nakajima Rikizo (1858-1918), La doctrina kantiana de la cosa en sí (1889), defendida en la Universidad de Yale. En el estudio introductorio se examina la aportación del pensador a la luz de la querella sobre la cosa en sí de Kant y esta se enmarca en la corriente neokantiana (...) del siglo XIX, extrayéndose, de ahí, consecuencias para situar el papel de la disertación en el interior de la recepción del idealismo alemán y el neokantismo en la historia de la modernidad filosófica en Japón a partir de la época Meiji (1868). En la tarea de la edición literaria que acompaña a la traducción, el lector encontrará referenciadas de manera sistemática las muchas fuentes que cita Nakajima en su tesis doctoral, aunque, como signo de su tiempo, en el original lo haga sin una convención coherente y, en ocasiones, sin detalles suficientes. Así pues, al aportar al lector acceso a las referencias a los libros que manejó el filósofo, se contribuye a que el texto tenga, además, un interés histórico que se suma al eminentemente filosófico, con el objetivo de impulsar y potenciar estudios sobre la red de interacciones filosóficas que atraviesan el escrito del autor japonés. Por último, el libro se suma a las publicaciones que, en torno a la obra de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), ganan relevancia filosófica en un momento en el que se está a las puertas de la celebración del 300 aniversario de su nacimiento. (shrink)