Gorgias

El artículo se propone indagar en la concepción de la «realidad» que tiene la sofística, como referente fundamental para entender mejor su propuesta crítica ante el avance que en esa época está teniendo la «filosofía dogmática» de tipo metafísica. En particular centrando el análisis en la invectiva que al respecto realiza Gorgias de Leontinos en los fragmentos conservados de dos de sus obras fundamentales: el tratado De lo que no es o de la naturaleza y el discurso Encomio de Helena. (...) Aquí se considera que esta es una posible ruta que permite reconstruir parte de su sediciosa propuesta filosófica. El núcleo fundamental que impulsa la reflexión gorgiana es la infranqueable distancia que separa la concepción de una supuesta «realidad en sí» del pensamiento y lenguaje; ante esta prerrogativa es factible entender el poder que le atribuye al logos para influir en las almas y acciones de los seres humanos, pero también en la capacidad del discurso para «hacer diciendo»; en este sentido perfila su perspectiva extrema de que las palabras estrictamente humanas en su fuerza performativa hacen factible «crear la realidad». (shrink)

My aim is to investigate the link between Plato’s Sophist and Gorgias’s treatise On What Is Not. This relationship is worth examining because Gorgias’s treatise constitutes an essential, but insufficiently studied stage in the intellectual journey leading from Parmenides to the Sophist. My claims are that 1) Plato’s agenda in the Sophist perfectly meets the challenges Gorgias raises in the first thesis of his treatise, that 2) this becomes clear once we focus on Gorgias’s and Plato’s respective use of the (...) verb ‘to be’ and, finally, that 3) Plato is able to overcome Parmenides’s impasse precisely because he deals with Gorgias’s treatise. (shrink)

This paper deals with an important strand of nihilistic arguments to be found in the works of two philosophers who have so far never been studied comparatively: the sophist Gorgias and the Buddhist monk Nāgārjuna. After having reconstructed Gorgias' moves in the first section of On What is Not (Sections 1-4), the paper shows how the nihilist arguments Gorgias uses mostly feature, under a new light, in the philosophy of emptiness developed by Nāgārjuna (Sections 5-8). The paper ends with a (...) hermeneutical suggestion: that is, to replace traditional ‘sceptical’ interpretations of Gorgias and Nāgārjuna with an alternative one, which takes them as possibly committed to nihilism. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Encomium of Helen must be seen as a speech about the value and importance of wisdom in human life and not as much as one as about logos. Gorgias sustains his vision based on a certain intellectualism which reduces moral faults to intellectual errors. This intellectualist program comprises a rationalization of emotions and a commitment with a certain tradition that discriminates between a minority with knowledge and a majority with only opinion. The consequence for Helen (...) is that she can be excused from her action at the expense of being reproached for her lack of wisdom and is thus relegated to the ignorant majority. Therefore, what is initially praise and an apology turns into severe blame. For this, I argue, the encomium can be qualified as an amusement (paignion). For the Encomium’s listeners the amusement becomes a challenge that demands they decipher the speech’s paradoxical character and appeal to their own wisdom to not be reproached like Helen. Thus the Encomium cannot be seen as a treaty nor as mere joke but rather as an intellectual agôn between the speech and the listener, which serves them “to arm the soul for contests of excellence”, as the epigram dedicated to Gorgias in Delfos says. (shrink)

Gorgias's Thought: An Epistemological Reading is the first monograph published in English entirely devoted to Gorgias's epistemological thought and provides a new perspective on Gorgias's thought more broadly. The book aims to undermine the common idea that Gorgias is either an orator uncommitted to any conception of truth, or a thinker whose interest is confined to the philosophy of language. It considers his major texts - On what is not or on nature, the Apology of Palamedes and the Encomium of (...) Helen - emphasising the originality and specificity of Gorgias' thought. In combining a philological analysis with substantive use of contemporary epistemological approaches, Di Iulio shows that Gorgias is to be considered first and foremost an epistemologist. Gorgias's Thought: An Epistemological Reading is of interest to students, scholars, and specialists in ancient thought, epistemology, history of philosophy, and rhetoric. (shrink)

It is often assumed that the concept of 'alētheia', or ‘truth’, in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an aesthetic concept or even a mere ‘adornment’ of speech. In this paper, it is argued, by contrast, that Gorgianic alētheia is a definable criterion of speech figuring in the practice of moral educa­tion. While the ‘truth’ of a logos indeed has to be assessed on aesthetic grounds, the underlying concept of (...) alētheia is predominantly ethical. For Gorgias, speech is ‘true’ when it promotes virtue (aretē) by being expressive of virtue. The principle stated in the opening passage of the Encomium of Helen, that a speaker has ‘to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy’, explains precisely this understand­ing of alētheia. (shrink)

In this essay I use Socrates’s aside to Callicles at Gorgias 481c5-482b1 to argue that love is essential to philosophy on Plato’s conception. On my reading, Plato uses the drama of the dialogue to critique the discussion therein, against a standard for philosophy which is implicit in Socrates’s remarks. Plato suggests that Socrates’s exchange with Gorgias is the best of the three, since it best realizes the inseparable goals of pursuing truth and becoming more persuadable by reason. What makes it (...) so is that between Socrates and Gorgias alone does there seem to be a genuine good will and love leading to an effective partnership in the social activity which is philosophy. (shrink)

Lógos é termo grego central para a construção do movimento sofístico. Górgias de Leontinos, um dos principais representantes da primeira geração desse movimento, propôs-se a refletir, em Elogio de Helena, sobre o discurso como um grande e soberano senhor, capaz de ao mesmo tempo produzir persuasão em Helena e denunciar esse poder persuasivo. Na primeira parte deste estudo, pretendemos situar o lógos como fabricador de vivências em seu ouvinte, o que sugere a compreensão do poder persuasivo. Na segunda parte, a (...) fabricação de vivências, diferente da persuasão, se identificará com uma realidade fictícia produzida devido ao engano voluntário. Por ser voluntária essa experiência do engano, o motivo da soberania do lógos está para Górgias, em que o discurso, além de persuadir, pode servir como instrumento possível para a fabricação de aprendizados, cuja experiência artística o seu próprio texto exemplifica. (shrink)

Assuming that a nihilist reading of Gorgias’ thought is to be ruled out, the issue of ‘not being’ remains one of the thorniest in his philosophy; indeed, it is fair to conclude that Gorgias is deeply concerned with ‘not being’. But what, after all, is Gorgias’ ‘not being’? This paper aims to answer this crucial question, by taking into consideration Gorgias’ main texts. Each of them provides a serious – although not always explicit – account of ‘not being’. Overall, the (...) aim is to show that Gorgias’ account of ‘not being’ is not concerned with ‘non-existence’ at all. It is deeply concerned, however, with falsehood and language. The paper will, therefore, be structured as follows: in part 1, the Treatise and specifically the the first section of the Particular Proof will be addressed and its ‘linguistic’ conception of ‘not-being’ fully exploited; in part 2, the Apology of Palamedes will be taken into account, in order to enucleate its ‘not-being-as-falsehood’ argument; the results from part 1 and part 2 will allow us, in part 3, to provide an analysis of the Encomium of Helen which points at its underlying conception of ‘not-being’. (shrink)

This essay seeks to understand Gorgias’ reflections upon language and perception in the Encomium of Helen through the threefold vocabularies of medicine, enchantment, and oratory that were often taken together in the fifth century. I demonstrate that the two modes of sorcery to which Gorgias refers have to do with language and its effect on opinion, on the one hand, and perception and its effect upon one’s affective bearing, on the other. Both effects, I claim, are grasped through their forceful (...) means of physically impressing and deforming the soul such that its reliance upon memory and habitual forms of dwelling in the world are subject to oblivion. Further, such conceptual and practical unmooring can be understood as forms of disease that rob an individual of her agency, either temporarily or permanently, and therefore reflect the problematic status of language in early democratic Greece. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to investigate Gorgias’ argument against motion, which is found in his Peri tou mē ontos and preserved only in MXG 980a1˗8. I tried to shed new light both on this specific reflection and on the reliability of Pseudo-Aristotle’s version. By exploring the so called “change argument” and the “argument from divisibility", I focused on the particular strategy used by the Sophist in his synthetikē apodeixis, which should be investigated in relation to the dispute between (...) monistic and pluralistic ontology. In this regard, the puzzle from “divisibility everywhere” and its connection with the void as not-being can provide new elements to grasp the philosophical background in which the Sophist moves. On the one hand, Gorgias’ argument against motion is part of a broader dispute on the divisibility/indivisibility of being; on the other, his original elaboration of this puzzle seems to be perfectly understandable within the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent with the argumentative style of the Sophist. (shrink)

After briefly considering Plato’s objections to rhetoric—it disregards the truth, aiming only to persuade, and it manipulates our emotions rather than instructing us—I turn to the historical Gorgias. The ‘Encomium of Helen’ ascribes to logos virtually all-powerful capacities for persuasion, seduction, and even bewitchment. Here Gorgias celebrates the very things Plato rejects. Yet in the ‘Defense of Palamedes’ considerable anxieties about whether logos actually does possess such strength are voiced: the weakness, not the power, of logos comes to occupy center (...) stage. Gorgias’ own views thus are likely more complex than Plato allows. (shrink)

The philosophical nature of the two versions of paraphrasing the Gorgias’ treatise On Non-Being — the skeptical version by Sextus Empiricus and the peripatetic version by an anonymous author — are discussed. The paper gives a comparative analysis of the arguments upheld by the informants enunciating Gorgias’ thoughts, demonstrates the range of philosophical problems, which Gorgias considered, judging by the reports of his speech, and shows how both versions add to and clarify each other in terms of philosophical issues. The (...) work provides insights as to how Gorgias modernizes and transforms the initial attitudes of Parmenides, shifting the reasoning plan: from how thought can be directed to an object and the qualities of this object to how thought can be directed to the non-existent. Accordingly, the problems of intentionality in the Gorgias’ teaching are considered as well as the privileged status of any of mental states, the nature of word or speech as an autonomous way to develop knowledge about external objects, the issue of meaning as a reference, and inter-subjectivity in cognition. A conclusion is reached that giving preference to one of the paraphrasing versions impoverishes our understanding of the Gorgias’ teaching considerably, while the joint analysis of both versions demonstrates the engagement of the sophistic issues raised by Gorgias, in the philosophical and, particularly, the epistemological paradigm of the ancient as well as modern philosophy. (shrink)

The paper examines whether Gorgias’ On What Is Not should be considered an instance of skepticism. It begins with an analysis of the work as reported by the two sources, Sextus Empiricus and the anonymous author of On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias. It is then argued that the Pyrrhonian skeptics did not regard On What Is Not as skeptical. Nonetheless, it is possible to read the work as offering counter-arguments to Parmenides, with a view to inducing suspension of judgment in (...) Pyrrhonian fashion. However, it is also possible to regard it as skeptical in a sense current in modern philosophy: that is, as posing challenges to our understanding of things with a view to forcing philosophers to come up with better theories. In this light, it can be seen as an important stimulus to the philosophical breakthroughs apparent in Plato’s Sophist. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on Gorgias' suriviving works: esp. Palamedes, but also On Nature, Helen, and the Funeral Oration. While I'm at pains to bring out the diversity of interpretive traditions currently co-existing, I aim to offer a substantially new reading of what these works offer our reflection on the nature of ethical truth.

Gorgias’ Lobrede auf Helena gehört zu den wichtigsten Texten der Sophistik. Im Zentrum der Helena steht der Grundsatz, dass die Rede ein „großer Herrscher" ist und dass stets derjenige im Rededuell – in der Volksversammlung, vor Gericht oder in privaten Auseinandersetzungen – den Sieg davonträgt, der sich auf die Redekunst versteht, unabhängig davon, ob die Rede wahr ist oder nicht. Für diese Schrift wird hier der erste umfassende Kommentar vorgelegt, der die philologischen, literaturwissenschaftlichen, philosophischen und historischen Fragestellungen, die in der (...) Helena eng zusammenhängen, gleichermaßen beachtet. Bedingung hierfür ist, dass die Gorgias-Forschung insgesamt auf eine breitere Grundlage gestellt wird. In der Einleitung werden einige grundsätzliche Fragen neu erörtert: Wann lebte Gorgias? Was schrieb er? Wer las seine Schriften? Wann sind diese Schriften entstanden? Welchen Einfluss hatte er auf seine Nachfolger? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen werden auch solche antiken Zeugnisse zu Leben, Werk und Wirkung des Gorgias herangezogen, die bislang in den maßgeblichen Testimoniensammlungen fehlen. (shrink)

Cet article examine l’influence sur la première hypothèse du Parménide de deux penseurs dont l’importance a été négligée par les critiques : Mélissos et Gorgias. Après avoir observé que les prédicats attribués à l’un ainsi que la forme démonstrative sont plus représentatifs de l’éléatisme de Mélissos que de celui de Parménide, nous expliquons ce constat par le fait que Platon reprenne une partie du Traité du Non-être de Gorgias qui vise elle-même essentiellement Mélissos. Nous démontrons alors que la première hypothèse, (...) et même l’ensemble de la seconde partie du Parménide, est un pastiche du Traité du Non-être, et nous en tirons des conclusions sur le statut de l’exercice dialectique mis en œuvre dans le Parménide. (shrink)

Gorgias’ On Not-Being survives only in two divergent summaries. Diels–Kranz's classic edition prints the better-preserved version that appears in Sextus’ Aduersus Mathematicos. Yet, in recent years there has been rising interest in a second summary that survives as part of the anonymous De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. The text of MXG is more difficult; it contains substantial lacunae that often make it much harder to make grammatical let alone philosophical sense of. As Alexander Mourelatos reports, one manuscript has a scribal note (...) that reads: "The original contains many errors; no one should blame me; I just copy what I see.". The treatise's state of preservation has aptly prompted Michael Gagarin to liken it to a black hole: "something we cannot see directly but know must exist because of certain effects it has on other objects.". (shrink)

It can be thought that Gorgias’ argument on the non-existence consists of three sentences, the first one being an asseveration and the other two being conditionals. However, this paper is intended to show that there is no conditional in the argument, and that the second and third sentences only appear to be so. To do that, a methodology drawn from the framework of the mental models theory is used, which seems to lead to the true logical forms of these last (...) sentences as well. (shrink)

Gorgias, the teacher of Isocrates, is rarely mentioned in Isocrates’ works and never in a flattering way. He is also presented, among other masters and poets, on Isocrates’ grave in a way that appears to be consistent with his pupil’s thought. Thus, the author of the iconographic plan of the grave may have been either Isocrates himself or someone who suffi­ciently knew his works and properly understood his tempestuous rela­tionship with his master.

Le catalogue des Belles Lettres s’est enrichi en 2016 d’une nouvelle traduction de deux œuvres parmi les plus importantes de la philosophie et de la rhétorique, le Gorgias de Platon et l’Éloge d’Hélène de Gorgias, réunies dans un volume unique, accessible, dense, et riche d’un notable travail de synthèse. Cette traduction en langue française rejoint donc celles d’É. Chambry (1912), d’A. Croiset (1923), de L. Robin (1940) et de M. Canto (1987) pour le Gorgias, et celles de J.-L. Poirier (1988)...

Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of (...) speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness. (shrink)

Il s’agit de montrer que Gorgias avait conçu une opposition structurelle entre une persuasion bonne et une persuasion mauvaise et trompeuse. Il a souvent paru difficile de concilier sa prétention à dire la vérité au sujet d’Hélène et sa description, au sein du même texte, du discours comme indissociable d’une persuasion explicitement dite trompeuse. L’ Éloge d’Hélène serait-il lui-même trompeur, sa vérité ne serait-elle en réalité qu’une δόξα parmi d’autres, puisque le discours faillirait à dire ce qui est? Au contraire, (...) Gorgias évoque « quelque mauvaise persuasion », suggérant que la persuasion, ambivalente, peut aussi être bonne ou neutre : il parlerait principalement d’une persuasion mauvaise associée à la tromperie pour démontrer l’innocence d’Hélène qui l’a subie. Cette persuasion trompeuse fonctionnerait parce que ses victimes méconnaîtraient les faits passés, présents et futurs. Toutefois, le texte suggère que certains individus puissent les connaître. Gorgias en ferait partie : il se présente en opposition avec les poètes, qui estiment détenir leur savoir des Muses mais diffusent des discours mensongers, et, loin de transmettre comme eux un discours acquis d’avance, il a recours au raisonnement, λογισμός, seul moyen d’accéder à une connaissance des événements. Il reste cependant comme les poètes tributaire de la tradition. (shrink)

The present paper makes the following points. The summary given in Sextus Emp. Math. VII is of much greater value than usually acknowledged, since it preserves several key elements of Gorgias’ communicational strategy. A sketchy trilemma is available in the opening sentence of Philolaos as well as in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the very first known trilemma was devised by Gorgias and not by Sextus himself or Aenesidemus. Not unlike Zeno, (...) Gorgias enjoyed to be neither serious nor joking, but remained somewhat halfway. This point is seldom acknowledged, though it is crucial in order to understand that he pretends to claim, but his claims do not amount to any points of doctrine. That he remains halfway should not prevent us from appreciating some of his ideas, but, at the same time, we should not expect full intellectual adhesion to what he tells us. Besides, something similar occurs in most of Plato’s dialogues.. Gorgias owes a lot to Melissus. (shrink)

Dowód pierwszej tezy Gorgiasza jest dedukcyjnym wnioskowaniem nie wprost, skon-struowanym przez wielokrotne użycie schematu modus tollens. Te z jego przesłanek, które przyjęte są bez dowodów, są łudząco podobne do niektórych prawd logicznych lub analitycznych. Gdyby rzeczywiście nimi były, w dowodzie musiałyby pojawić się sprzeczności. W czasach Gorgiasza dowód mógł uchodzić za poprawny; możliwość jasnego wskazania i opisania jego defektów poja-wiła się dopiero z wynalezieniem logiki formalnej. Gorgiasz mógł ogłosić swą tezę serio –jako tezę skrajnego nihilizmu metafizycznego –nie obawiając się kompromitacji. (...) Jeżeli dowód jest sofizma-tem, to wśród sofizmatów jest arcydziełem, najwybitniejszym osiągnięciem sofistów w tej dziedzi-nie. (shrink)

The article argues that the doctrine of Gorgias of Leontinoi, as expressed in his "Encomion of Helen", is not a rhetorical technique but a practice of moral education. The medium of this "ethical speech practice" is perceptual forms, its basic mode being the practice of showing or epideictic speech. The crucial standard of this practice is "epideictic rightness", which is identical to Gorgias’ conception of "truth.". According to this conception, speech is true if it exemplifies morally right conduct and moral (...) beauty. True speech in this sense must also be effective speech, since it will promote right behaviour in the future. (shrink)

This is the translation and interpretation of the Gorgias' speech from Plato's dialogue Gorgias (456A1-457C3). In the commentary it is argued that the Gorgias' speech in the dialogue is based on the philosophical and rhetorical motives which can be found both in Gorgias' epideictic speeches ("Helen" and "Palamedes") and doxographical accounts.

The Pseudo-Aristotelian De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia, along with the well-known evidence of Sextus Empiricus, interests scholars as a major evidence about Gorgias’s treatise “On Not-Being or On Nature”. The paper offers the first Russian translation of the section of the De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia, V–VI, which concerns Gorgias; and analyses the sources and the formal structure of the argument in the treatise.

Dalla vertigine dialettica del trattato "Su ciò che non è" alle provocatorie orazioni incentrate sulle figure mitiche di Elena e Palamede, il filosofo e retore Gorgia trasforma la potenza persuasiva del linguaggio in una vera e propria azione terapeutica: l'anima va curata con la pratica dell'armonia, con uno stile rigorosamente strutturato e, insieme, smascherando false verità e vuote ontologie. La parola, perduta l'unicità definitoria e la corrispondenza all'essenza delle cose, non può che rinunciare alla propria pretesa veritativa. In questo vuoto (...) si inserisce l'azione del logos retorico, creatore di un nuovo gioco linguistico, un nuovo "sapiente inganno" di cui anche chi ascolta può entrare a far parte. Il volume raccoglie tutti i frammenti del sofista Gorgia di Leontini e le testimonianze sulla sua vita e sulla sua opera, centrale per la storia del pensiero occidentale nel passaggio dalla riflessione eleatica e atomistica alla tradizione platonico-aristotelica. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to investigate the connection between ancient medicine and sophistry at the end of 5th century B.C. Beginning with analyses of some passages from the De vetere medicina, De natura hominis and De arte, the article identifies many similarities between these treatises, on the one hand, and the sophistic doctrines, on the other: these concern primarily perceptual/intellectual knowledge and the interaction between reality, knowledge and language. Among the Sophists, Gorgias was particularly followed and imitated, (...) as he was admired not only for his tremendous rhetorical skills, but also for his philosophically significant work On not being, which probably influenced various discussions in the Hippocratic treatises. However, if Gorgias argues in favor of language as dynastēs megas, the authors of VM, NH and De arte consider knowledge to be far more relevant and reliable than logos. These Hippocratic treatises criticize the philosophical thesis and the resulting kind of reductionism. Above all they defend the supremacy of medicine over any other art. By using the same argumentative and rhetorical strategies that were employed by Gorgias, these treatises reverse the thought of those Sophists who exalted only the technē tōn logōn. (shrink)

This is the introduction and the translation with a vast commentary in the footnotes of Gorgias' "Palamedes".

The label idios apodeixis/logos «particular demonstration or argument» of Gorgias is known to us only from the third section of the little work attributed to Aristotle under the title De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. Its authenticity seems to be unjustly questioned. We try to show that from the Aristotelian perspective we can properly understand the context of Gorgias’ own argument from his lost treatise On Not-Being or On Nature. Parmenides – using implicitly the polysemy of the verb ἔστιν/εἶναι – presented a (...) certain ontological argument «being is, because being is being». Gorgias, however, makes a parody of this by offering a meontological argument: «not-being is because not-being is not-being». Consequently Gorgias then attempts to demonstrate, by means of refutation, that «it is not either to be or not be», i.e. «nothing is». We propose, thus, a reconstruction of Gorgias’ account of meonological and nihilistic argumentation. In this context we find in Plato’s Sophist and in Aristotle’s writings certain allusions to Gorgias’ idios apodeixis, which have not been sufficiently recognized and properly interpreted. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a reconstruction of the account of meaning and language the Cyrenaics appear to have defended on the basis of a famous passage of Sextus, as well as showing the philosophical parentage of that account.

Este artigo apresenta algumas considerações gorgianas sobre a retórica a fim de contrabalançar a visão da retórica clássica exposta por John Bender e David Wellbery, no interior de suas cinco teses históricas sobre o ressurgimento contemporâneo dessa arte e seu enfraquecimento na Modernidade. Depois de breve introdução ao tema, explico as teses de tais autores, seu conceito de retoricidade e sua concepção da retórica clássica. Analiso então aspectos da retórica grega e três teses de Górgias que contrabalançam a concepção dos (...) autores: a) a indeterminação genérica da retórica, b) a instanciação do discurso sobre a verdade/conhecimento e c) a sua aplicação a contextos não-técnicos e desinstitucionalizados. Minha conclusão é de que Górgias está muito mais próximo de uma situação de “retoricidade” do que julgam tais autores. (shrink)

This is the introduction and the translation of Gorgias' "Helen". The speech is considered to be one of the most interesting pieces of early Greek rhetoric not only because of its rhetorical, but also because of its philosophical value. There is no doubt that it sets out the outlines of the sophistic conception of logos and (along with another Gorgias' speech Palamedes) represents the starting point for the Plato's critique of Gorgias' rhetoric in the dialogue "Gorgias'.

These are the excerpts from the book "Sztuka a prawda. Problem sztuki w dyskusji między Gorgiaszem a Platonem" concerning Gorgias' theory of apate (deception).

Für Gorgias ist Sprache und Rede nicht ein neutrales Medium zur Übermittlung von Sachverhalten, sondern selbst eine Sache eigener Art und als solche hervorragendstes Organ des Menschen, seine Welt praktisch zu verändern. Mitteilung ist Teilnahme an Situationen, die für Menschen jeweils relevant und bewegend sind. Hörend speichern wir nicht Informationen, sondern finden uns ein in die Zugehörigkeit zu den Sachen und Personen von »Interesse«, denen wir so eine Mitsprache in unserem Leben einzuräumen bereit sind. Allein auf solch ein Grundverständnis von (...) Sprache baute eine mit öffentlicher Funktion betraute Rhetorik und allein hierauf baut auch von jeher die Dichtkunst, von welcher auch Gorgias für seine Redekunst das Maß nahm. Mit der vorliegenden Neuausgabe sämtlicher überlieferter Texte und Nachrichten nebst deren erster vollständiger Übersetzung ins Deutsche wird eine der einflußreichsten Persönlichkeiten der klassischen Antike vorgestellt. Die Einleitung des Herausgebers gibt biographische Hinweise und geht ausführlich auf Gorgias’ Verhältnis zur Sprache ein. (shrink)

O tratado de Górgias sobre o nada é dividido por meio da prova de três teses diferentes: 1) que o nada é ou existe; 2) que mesmo que haja algo, não pode ser conhecido; 3) que mesmo que pudesse ser conhecido, não poderia ser comunicado a outrem. Estas teses são tão opostas a Parmênides quanto qualquer tese poderia sê-lo. O tratado de Górgias é uma proeza da polêmica antiparmenidiana. Sua dialética também é uma façanha ao reduzir algo ao absurdo, porque (...) as premissas de que Górgias se utiliza para derrubar Parmênides são tomadas do próprio Parmênides ou da escola parmenidiana. Ademais, e pela mesma razão, os argumentos de Górgias não podem ser derrubados sem abrir mão da tese de Parmênides, de que o ser é uno. Que o ser não é uno é a própria condição de uma metafísica sadia. Por esta razão, que não por outra qualquer, Górgias, e não Parmênides, merece ser lembrado como o primeiro metafísico. (shrink)

This paper explores in detail Gorgias' defense of rhetoric in Plato 's Gorgias, noting its connections to earlier and later texts such as Aristophanes' Clouds, Gorgias' Helen, Isocrates' Nicocles and Antidosis, and Aristotle's Rhetoric. The defense as Plato presents it is transparently inadequate; it reveals a deep inconsistency in Gorgias' conception of rhetoric and functions as a satirical precursor to his refutation by Socrates. Yet Gorgias' defense is appropriated, in a streamlined form, by later defenders of rhetoric such as Isocrates (...) and Aristotle. They present it as an effective reductio against a critique of rhetoric that depends on the "harm criterion." This is puzzling, since Plato 's own critique of rhetoric does not depend on the harm criterion. On the other hand, Plato does seem to embrace the harm criterion as a more general principle—as if pre-emptively embracing the reductio —in his arguments about the good in the Meno and Euthydemus. Nonetheless, Isocrates and Aristotle seem to be deliberately misreading Plato on rhetoric: where he intends to criticize its intrinsic nature, they respond as if he were merely complaining about its contingent effects. (shrink)

After Agathon's speech in Plato's Symposium, Socrates takes a little time to make some comments about it. One of these comments is that the speech brought Gorgias to his memory (198 c 2-5). In this article we intend to track down in three complementary levels the diverse reasons why this recollection took place: (A) regarding the form of the speech, we will try to show that there is an equivalence in how both Gorgias in his Encomium to Helen and the (...) character of Agathon in the Symposium construct their respective logoi; (B) regarding the style of writing, we will see the frequent use in the poet's speech of the rhetoric resource of "saying things alike'' (isa legein) usually ascribed to Gorgias; (C) finally, regarding the contents of both speeches we will try to show that many of the elements used by the sophist to praise the logos in his Encomium to Helen may be found, more or less, in Agathon's praise of Eros. The article will try to show, thus, which are the precise elements that may have made Socrates remember Gorgias after listening to the tragic poet. (shrink)

In this paper I try to solve some problems concerning the interpretation of Socrates' conversation with Gorgias about the nature of rhetoric in Plato's Gorgias (448e6-461b2). I begin by clarifying what, ethically, is at stake in the conversation (section 2). In the main body of the paper (sections 3-6) I address the question of what we are to understand Gorgias as believing about the nature of rhetoric: I criticise accounts given by Charles Kahn and John Cooper, and suggest an alternative (...) account of my own. In the final section I spell out some of the implications of my account for the interpretation of the Gorgias, and of Plato more generally. (shrink)

En Sofista 234b-c, Platón caracteriza al sofista como fabricante de “imágenes habladas” . Para esclarecer la arte que pratica, una analogía es propuesta entre el pintor y el sofista, pero esa analogía ha sido criticada por envolver una asimilación ilegítima entre imágenes visuales e habladas, o entre lo que es visto y lo dicho o creído. Intentaré mostrar en este texto, una interpretación diferente. Platón se refiere a la mímesis como una forma de producción , a diferencia de la adquisición (...) de algo que ya es o que ha llegado a ser dirigiendo la atención al producir antes que al producto. (shrink)