: "Pure, applied and empirical" : Ferdinand Tönnies' system of sociology proper.

This paper will first examine the different versions of social or socialized epistemology, a field that has gathered much support among epistemologists in recent years. After the necessary classification, the paper goes on to suggest that socialized epistemology could benefit from contemporary social theory, and Derek Layder's views are presented as especially fruitful in this respect. To give grounds for this suggestion, features of Layder's theory will be contrasted with certain shortcomings in 'conservative' and 'feminist' versions of socialized epistemology.

Especially in functional-typological linguistics, semantic roles have been studied thoroughly, because they constitute a good starting point for any study on argument marking due to their semantically defined nature. However, the very concept of semantic roles is far from being without problems, and there is still no consensus on how the roles are best defined. In this volume, the notion will be discussed from novel perspectives with the aim of providing new insights into our understanding of semantic roles. Two of (...) the papers deal with semantic role clusters, one with semantic roles in verbless constructions, one with diachrony of semantic roles and two with individual semantic roles that have not been studied in too much detail in previous studies. The book may not offer answers to all questions the readers may have, but at least it raises interesting further questions relevant to arriving at a better understanding of semantic roles. Originally published in Studies in Language Vol. 38:3 (2014). (shrink)

Tony Lawson, Sandra Harding, Drucilla K. Barker, Fabienne Peter and Julie A. Nelson have recently debated the merits and demerits of critical realism as the basis of feminist social research. Yet the dialogue is left unfinished, with no clear agreement attained. Some key features of that failure are analysed in this article. It is suggested that, despite shared support for explicitly post-positivistic stances, critical realists and post-structuralist feminists cannot gain much from a dialogue that proceeds like this one. Other modes (...) of discussion should be looked for. One more promising basis for such discussion - a question-driven approach to social scientific explanation - is introduced at the end of the article. (shrink)

Tony Lawson, Sandra Harding, Drucilla K. Barker, Fabienne Peter and Julie A. Nelson have recently debated the merits and demerits of critical realism as the basis of feminist social research. Yet the dialogue is left unfinished, with no clear agreement attained. Some key features of that failure are analysed in this article. It is suggested that, despite shared support for explicitly post-positivistic stances, critical realists and post-structuralist feminists cannot gain much from a dialogue that proceeds like this one. Other modes (...) of discussion should be looked for. One more promising basis for such discussion - a question-driven approach to social scientific explanation - is introduced at the end of the article. (shrink)

This book offers a concise exposition of the content theory of intentionality, which lies at the root of Husserl’s phenomenology, for student and scholar. Originally published in 1982. The first part traces the history of phenomenology from its beginnings in Aristotle and Aquinas through Hume, Reid and the Brentano school to its first clear formulation in Frege and Husserl. Part two analyses some special problems involved in two important types of mental phenomena – perception and emotion – without abandoning the (...) historical approach. Husserl’s theory of perception is extensively discussed and a Husserlian analysis of so-called de re acts is attempted. (shrink)

This book offers a concise exposition of the content theory of intentionality, which lies at the root of Husserl’s phenomenology, for student and scholar. Originally published in 1982. The first part traces the history of phenomenology from its beginnings in Aristotle and Aquinas through Hume, Reid and the Brentano school to its first clear formulation in Frege and Husserl. Part two analyses some special problems involved in two important types of mental phenomena – perception and emotion – without abandoning the (...) historical approach. Husserl’s theory of perception is extensively discussed and a Husserlian analysis of so-called _de re_ acts is attempted. (shrink)

Veber's theory of value is based on his general classification of mental phenomena. Value-experiences constitute a special variety of emotional experiences: they have a pseudo-cognitive role; that is, they "perceive" values just as ordinary presentations perceive things and their properties. Veber also makes several distinctions between different types of value-perceiving emotions. Finally he discusses the kinds of objective correlates that these experiences have and thereby distinguishes between three types of value: thing-value, person-value and hagiological value. He may be criticised for (...) inconsistency, because he starts f r om the descriptive standpoint but ends up by legislating on how we ought to value persons. (shrink)

Veber's theory of value is based on his general classification of mental phenomena. Value-experiences constitute a special variety of emotional experiences: they have a pseudo-cognitive role; that is, they "perceive" values just as ordinary presentations perceive things and their properties. Veber also makes several distinctions between different types of value-perceiving emotions. Finally he discusses the kinds of objective correlates that these experiences have and thereby distinguishes between three types of value: thing-value, person-value and hagiological value. He may be criticised for (...) inconsistency, because he starts f r om the descriptive standpoint but ends up by legislating on how we ought to value persons. (shrink)

Meinong had problems with reality: when having an experience, one cannot tell whether its object is real or not. The problem surfaced in many contexts but it was always connected with the notion of presentation {Vorstellung). This concept, as used in the Austrian phenomenological tradition, is ambiguous: a presentation can be (1) the neutral content that is a part of any mental act, or (2) the act of mere presentation, i.e. the combination of a content and the psychological mode of (...) mere entertaining, or (3) the act of perceiving a simple object.Meinong's pupil France Veber first adopted an orthodox Meinongian view of presentation but later he became aware of the problems connected with it. He argued that there are mental acts in which the subject is in direct contact with reahty or, as he put it, "hits" reality. Thus, acts of perception have two functions, those of presenting and "hitting".It is argued, first, that there are interesting parallels between Veber's concept of zadevanje Chitting') and modem theories of direct mental reference, de re acts and indexicality; and second, that although Veber correctly saw the problem, his solution is not quite satisfactory, because he thought that one has to abandon phenomenology (or the theory of objects) in order to account for the experience of hitting reality. A thoroughly phenomenological theory of „hitting" may be possible, after all. (shrink)

Meinong had problems with reality: when having an experience, one cannot tell whether its object is real or not. The problem surfaced in many contexts but it was always connected with the notion of presentation {Vorstellung). This concept, as used in the Austrian phenomenological tradition, is ambiguous: a presentation can be (1) the neutral content that is a part of any mental act, or (2) the act of mere presentation, i.e. the combination of a content and the psychological mode of (...) mere entertaining, or (3) the act of perceiving a simple object.Meinong's pupil France Veber first adopted an orthodox Meinongian view of presentation but later he became aware of the problems connected with it. He argued that there are mental acts in which the subject is in direct contact with reahty or, as he put it, "hits" reality. Thus, acts of perception have two functions, those of presenting and "hitting".It is argued, first, that there are interesting parallels between Veber's concept of zadevanje Chitting') and modem theories of direct mental reference, de re acts and indexicality; and second, that although Veber correctly saw the problem, his solution is not quite satisfactory, because he thought that one has to abandon phenomenology (or the theory of objects) in order to account for the experience of hitting reality. A thoroughly phenomenological theory of „hitting" may be possible, after all. (shrink)

Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e. duty and value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms, whereas Mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's Law of Omission which offers, in my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views.

Traditional moral theories appear to be unable to give a credible account of the relationship between deontic and axiological concepts, i.e. duty and value. Of the two traditional solutions to this problem, one emphasises the independence of the two realms, whereas Mill argues that duty is definable in terms of goodness. In this paper I present Meinong's Law of Omission which offers, in my opinion, a promising alternative to these two traditional views.

This paper examines and defends von Wright's view of moral value, put forward in his book The Varieties of Goodness (1963). He holds that moral value is not a primary value like instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical, or hedonic value, but a secondary or second-level one which is based on a combination of primary values. Human actions and intentions are the only bearers of moral value, and they are morally valuable because they protect and promote some set of primary values. It (...) is argued that the same account (i) applies also to juridical value, and (ii) can be used to throw some light on the problem of defining the three competing schools of legal philosophy, viz. legal positivism, natural law theory, and legal constructivism. (shrink)

The idea of replication is based on the premise that there are permanent laws to be replicated and verified, and the scientific method is adequate for doing so. Scientific truth, however, is not absolute but relative to time and context, and the method used. Time and context are inextricably interwoven, in that time creates different contexts and contexts (e.g., Christmas Day vs. New Year’s Day) create different experiences of time, rendering psychological phenomena inherently variable. This means that internal and external (...) conditions fluctuate and are different in a replication study vs. the original. Thus, a replication experiment is just another empirical investigation that has no special status in the establishment of scientific truth. It is not the final arbiter of whether or not something exists. In their pursuit of homogeneous external conditions, replications have ignored the homogeneity of internal conditions. There is not a single replication reported in the literature that would have shown participants’ feelings and thoughts—both conscious and nonconscious—to be identical to those of the original participants. Experimental instructions can create varying ratios of conscious over nonconscious processing from one study to another. Ironically, every replication is a failure at the fundamentals of human psychology. While patterns can be discovered, they are not permanent or unchangeable laws of human behavior to be proven by the pinpoint statistical verification through replication. As scientific knowledge in physics is temporary and incomplete, should it be any surprise that science can only provide “temporary winners” for psychological knowledge of human behavior? (shrink)

It is difficult to understand the meaning of 'dignity' in human rights, bioethics and nursing literature because the word is used so vaguely. Unless dignity's meaning is spelt out it can disappear beneath more tangible priorities. In this article we define dignity and show how this can help health workers to maintain the dignity of people in their care.