Pythagoras von Samos (ca. 570-510 v.Chr.) war in den antiken Uberlieferungen nicht nur als Naturphilosoph, sondern auch als religioser Experte und Wundertater bekannt. Diesen Wundererzahlungen rund um Pythagoras widmet sich Stephan Scharinger in der vorliegenden Studie. Basis seiner Uberlegungen sind Analyse und Auswertung des einschlagigen Quellenmaterials, beginnend mit den altesten schriftlichen Quellen, die in die Lebenszeit des Pythagoras zuruckreichen, bis hin zu den Pythagorasviten der romischen Kaiserzeit. Darauf aufbauend und mithilfe der historischen Kontextualisierung des Pythagoras (Pythagoreismus und Orphik, Pythagoras (...) und die "Sieben Weisen", Schamanismus) klassifiziert Scharinger die pythagoreischen Wundertaten in Abhangigkeit von der griechisch-romischen Umwelt (ethnische Religionen, altindische und alttestamentarisch-fruhkirchliche Vorstellungen). Die Wundertraditionen in den pythagoreischen Uberlieferungen werden schliesslich in einem zweifachen Vergleich beleuchtet. Der "interne" Vergleich zeigt Parallelen und Unterschiede zwischen den Wunderberichten bei Diogenes Laertios, Porphyrios von Tyros und Iamblichos von Chalkis auf, wahrend der "externe" Vergleich die pythagoreischen Wundertaten mit den Berichten rund um andere Wundertater der antiken Mittelmeerwelt in einen grosseren Zusammenhang stellt. Uberlegungen zum religionshistorischen Umfeld, zur Diskussion um Pythagoras als theios aner sowie zur Klassifikation der Wundertaten als "magische" oder "religiose" Wunder runden die Arbeit ab. (shrink)

A commonly held idea regarding the nature of time is that the future is open and the past is fixed or closed. This article investigates the notion that there is an asymmetry in openness between the past and the future. The following questions are considered: How exactly is this asymmetry in openness to be understood? What is the relation between an open future and various ontological views about the future? Is an open future a branching future? What is the relation (...) between an open future and the question of whether contingent statements about the future are true or false? Is an open future compatible with a single determinate future? (shrink)

There is currently disagreement about whether the phenomenon of first-person, or de se, thought motivates a move towards special kinds of contents. Some take the conclusion that traditional propositions are unable to serve as the content of de se belief to be old news, successfully argued for in a number of influential works several decades ago.1 Recently, some philosophers have challenged the view that there exist uniquely de se contents, claiming that most of the philosophical community has been under the (...) grip of an attractive but unmotivated myth.2 At the very least, this latter group has brought into question the arguments in favor of positing special kinds of content for de se belief; I think they have successfully shown that these arguments are not as conclusive, or fully articulated, as many have taken them to be. In this paper I will address these challenges directly and I will present and defend an argument for the conclusion that the phenomenon of de se thought does indeed motivate the move to a special kind of content, content that is uniquely de se. First, I characterize a notion of de se belief that is neutral with respect to friends and foes of uniquely de se content. I then argue for a determination thesis relating de se belief to belief content: that there is no difference in de se belief without a difference in belief content. I argue that various proposals for rejecting this determination thesis are unsuccessful. In the last part of the paper, I employ this determination thesis to argue for the existence of a type of belief content that is uniquely de se. (shrink)

De se attitudes seem to play a special role in action and cognition. This raises a challenge to the traditional way in which mental attitudes have been understood. In this chapter, we review the case for thinking that de se attitudes require special theoretical treatment and discuss various ways in which the traditional theory can be modified to accommodate de se attitudes.

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions (...) for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences. (shrink)

Professor H. L. Van Breda had hoped to write this preface, but his recent, unexpected and untimely death has left that task in my hands. Although my remarks will not be as eloquent and insightful as his surely would have been, some few words are clearly in order here; for the phenomenological community has not only lost the leadership of Fr. Van Breda these last years, but also the scholarship and leadership of Aron Gurwitsch and Alden Fisher - both contributors (...) to this volume - as well as that of Dorion Cairns and John Wild. Our leaders are fewer now but Herbert Spiegelberg is still very obviously one of them. This volume thus presents the work of some of the past and presently recognized leaders in phenomenology - e. g. Gurwitsch, Straus, and Fisher - but, more important perhaps, it also presents the work of some of those who are sure to be future leaders of our community of phenomenological philosophers, if in fact they have not already achieved this status. Most, if not all, of the contribu tors to this volume are in some way or another indebted to Herbert Spiegelberg and his work in phenomenology. (shrink)

The formation of blood vessels within the vascular system entails a variety of cellular processes, including proliferation, migration and differentiation. In many cases, these diverse processes need to be finely coordinated among neighbouring endothelial cells in order to establish a functional vascular network. For instance, during angiogenic sprouting specialized endothelial tip cells follow guidance cues and migrate extensively into avascular tissues while trailing stalk cells must stay connected to the patent blood vessel. The vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) and Notch (...) signalling pathways have emerged as the major players in governing these different cellular behaviours. In particular, recent work indicates an important role for Notch signalling in determining how an endothelial cell responds to VEGF. In this review, we provide an overview of these biochemically distinct pathways and discuss how they may interact during endothelial cell differentiation and angiogenesis. BioEssays 30:303–313, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...) of the self-ascription account of tensed belief, one that is compatible with a perdurantist account of persons and the other that is compatible with an endurantist account of persons. I argue that a self-ascription account of tensed beliefs for enduring subjects most plausibly involves the self-ascription of relations rather than properties. I argue that whether one takes the subject of self-ascription to be a momentary personstage or an enduring person, the self-ascription theory provides a plausible B-theoretic account of how tensed belief and timely action are possible. (shrink)

Michael Peters, Sonja Arndt & Marek TesarThis is a collective writing experiment of PESA members, including its Executive Committee, asking questions of the Philosophy of Education in a New Key. Co...

When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers, ‘under any conditions whatsoever’. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently, some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent (...) article, Nikk Effingham argues that the standard objections to views that endorse restrictions on composition do not apply to a view that restricts composition according to compliance with the laws of nature. On the face of it, such restrictions on diachronic composition preserve our common-sense ontology while eliminating from it scientifically revisionary objects that travel faster than the speed of light. I argue that these attempts to restrict diachronic composition by appealing to either causal or nomological constraints face insurmountable difficulties within the context of special relativity. I discuss how the universalist should best respond to Hudson’s argument for superluminal objects, and in doing so, I present and defend a new sufficient condition for motion that does not entail that such objects are in superluminal motion. 1 Introduction2 Diachronic Composition3 Diachronic Composition and Superluminal Objects4 Restricting Diachronic Composition5 Causal and Nomological Restrictions on Composition in a Relativistic Context6 Superluminal Objects and Motion7 Conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made by Patrick Grim for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument, proposed by Edward Wierenga, that appeals to first-person propositions and (...) argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis’s theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being. (shrink)

In 1922, philosopher Jakob Klatzkin and Zionist politician and later president of the World Jewish Congress, Nahum Goldmann founded the Eschkol publishing company in Berlin and began their major work on the Encyclopaedia Judaica. Eschkol was active during the Weimar Republic, where culture and politics were shaped by a Jewish renaissance and by the sustained migration of Jews from Eastern Europe. Most of the publisher’s books and brochures show emblematic historical ruptures and the migration of knowledge to new spaces, languages, (...) and cultures. This article analyzes Eschkol’s publications and cultural agenda from the perspective of a material culture of printed works, and focuses on its textbook program. It concentrates the discussion on the historian Simon Bernfeld and Jakob Klatzkin, two formative scholars of that period. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Naharaim Jahrgang: 12 Heft: 1-2 Seiten: 3-8.

Corruption continues to be a considerable challenge for internationally active companies. In this article, we examine personal and socioenvironmental antecedents of corrupt behavior in organizations. In particular, we aim to illuminate the links between Machiavellianism, on-the-job experience with corrupt behavior at work, neutralization, and the attitude of business professionals toward corruption. The empirical analysis is based on the responses of 169 professionals. At first, a positive relationship between both Machiavellianism and on-the-job experience and the acceptance of corruption appears in the (...) model. However, an in-depth mediation analysis shows that neutralization is the keystone linking both Machiavellianism and on-the-job experience to the likelihood to condone corruption. Based on these results, we offer avenues for further research and implications for practitioners. (shrink)

In Walter Benjamin. Presence of Mind, Failure to Comprehend Stéphane Symons offers an innovative reading of the work of German philosopher, essayist and literary critic Walter Benjamin that characterizes his writings as "neither a-theological, nor immediately theological.".

Vigilanz wird alltäglich ausgeübt, etwa im Bereich der Sicherheit, des Rechts, der Religionen oder auch der Öffentlichen Gesundheit: überall dort, wo wir auf etwas achten, gegebenenfalls auch etwas tun oder melden sollen. Der Münchner SFB 1369, in dem dieser Band entstanden ist, untersucht die Geschichte, kulturellen Varianten und aktuellen Formen dieses Phänomens nichtinstitutioneller, aber doch hochgradig funktionaler Wachsamkeit. Der erste Band der Publikationsreihe,Vigilanzkulturen' widmet sich der zeitlichen Dimension von Vigilanz. So wie menschliche Aufmerksamkeit erheblichen Schwankungen unterliegt, ist auch Wachsamkeit zeitlich (...) instabil. Die hohe physiologisch-kognitive Intensität von Wachsamkeit lässt sich nur schwer auf Dauer stellen. Wird über längere Zeit hinweg ein ereignisloses oder unstrukturiertes Geschehen beobachtet, sinkt die Aufmerksamkeit oder richtet sich auf anderes. Kulturelle Anleitungen zur Wachsamkeit arbeiten daher in der Regel selbst mit zeitlichen Strukturen: mit Rhythmisierungen, Habitualisierungen oder Dramatisierungen. Sie geben vor, in welcher Abfolge Wachsamkeit herauf- oder herabgestuft werden soll oder sie variieren denkbare Gefahren. Sie arbeiten mit natürlichen Zeitverläufen (wie Tag und Nacht, Licht und Dunkelheit), die sie, kulturell überformt, nutzbar machen. Darüber hinaus können auch Techniken und Medien helfen, Wachsamkeit zu verstetigen. Der Band untersucht diese zeitliche Gestaltung der Wachsamkeit anhand historisch spezifischer Konstellationen. Er versammelt Beiträge aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen wie Geschichte, Ethnographie, Kunstgeschichte, Literatur- und Medienwissenschaft, um die Zeiten der Wachsamkeit zu erforschen. (shrink)

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

Biobanks, collecting human specimen, medical records, and lifestyle-related data, face the challenge of having contradictory missions: on the one hand serving the collective welfare through easy access for medical research, on the other hand adhering to restrictive privacy expectations of people in order to maintain their willingness to participate in such research. In this article, ethical frameworks stressing the societal value of low-privacy expectations in order to secure biomedical research are discussed. It will turn out that neither utilitarian nor communitarian (...) or classical libertarian ethics frameworks will help to serve both goals. Instead, John Rawls’ differentiation of the “right” and the “good” is presented in order to illustrate the possibility of “serving two masters”: individual interests of privacy, and societal interests of scientific progress and intergenerational justice. In order to illustrate this counterbalancing concept with an example, the five-pillar concept of the German Ethics Council will be briefly discussed. (shrink)

There are different ways in which imaginings can involve the first-person. I can imagine skiing down a mountain, looking down the slope, the wind whipping me in the face. I can also imagine myself skiing down a mountain from the outside, adopting the point of view of a spectator watching myself fly down the mountain. I can also imagine that I am someone else entirely, say Angela Merkel, skiing down a mountain. In this paper I develop and defend a new (...) account of the content of first-person imaginings. I first look at two existing accounts, one proposed by Francois Recanati (2007a, 2007b) and the other proposed by Dilip Ninan (2008), and I argue that they lack the resources to model the rich and distinct types of first-person imaginings that we can have. I then present and defend a new account that reconstrues the imagining from the inside vs. imagining from the outside distinction and can accommodate the various ways in which imaginings involve the first-person. (shrink)

In recent years consumer law has come more and more into the focus of legislation within the EU. One of the EU’s key objectives, completing the final stage of the internal market, is to place consumer rights in the centre of it. Following the adaption of various consumer law measures for some decades, the EU has undertaken a thorough review of its consumer acquis. After years of consultations, the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/ EU, which was supposed to set new standards (...) of consumer protection, came into force and will have to be implemented by the Member States by 13 December, 2013. Renouncing its principal practice of minimum harmonisation in the area of consumer law, i.e. allowing Member States on the basis of Directives to adopt more protective rules, the EU legislator now turned to a targeted full harmonisation approach by means of the Consumer Rights Directive, aiming at increasing the consumer protection across the EU by bringing together the currently distinct laws for distance selling and off-premises contracts as well as other types of consumer contracts in a single instrument. The article briefly introduces the background of the Directive and discusses the shift in means of harmonisation concepts. Then, it analyses the scope, concepts and content of the Directive, which mainly brings considerable reforms in the areas of information requirements and the right of withdrawal. Taking into account the Directive’s improvements and shortcomings, conclusions are drawn that further harmonisation and a uniform and universally applicable set of European consumer rights are needed. (shrink)

Fifty years ago, on 12 September, 1963, the association agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey was signed in Ankara. However, in contrast to many other countries who applied later on, Turkey has not yet become a member of the EU. Nevertheless, Turkey’s candidacy to join the EU is still one of the most considerable and controversial topics within the European political arena. Within the accession negotiations, apart from human rights and the Kurdish and the Cypriot issues, one (...) of the greatest challenges to Turkey’s successful candidacy is the issue of respect for and protection of minorities. It might indeed represent an unsolvable problem, which will ultimately block Turkey joining the EU. Neither the EU nor Turkey has really come to terms or dealt with what the EU sees as an “unsatisfactory” protection of minorities in Turkey. What lies at the root of this disagreement is what the term “minority” actually means. Due to Turkey’s own nation state concept as being a united and undivided country and to the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, which defined Turkey as a nation, the country only recognises non-Muslim minorities. Moreover, contrary to the wording of the minority protection clauses in the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey restricts its recognition of non-Muslim minorities only to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish religious populations. Although being a non-Muslim group as well, the Assyrians are excluded from the Turkish concept of minorities and, therefore, also from minority protection. In contrast to that, the EU’s concept of minority includes ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, which means that according to the EU’s concept of minorities, also ethnic minorities like the Kurds, linguistic minorities like the Laz and religious minorities like the Alevis are included in the term “minority” and, therefore, these minorities should benefit from specific minority protection rights. To find a common basis for discussing the unsatisfactory issue of minority rights in Turkey, the concept of “ethnic groups” is introduced by the author as the most promising approach to deal with this unreconciled conceptual difference. According to this concept, ethnic groups could form a sub-identity of Turkishness and help build a legal basis to the treatment of minority groups founded on human rights, which would be compatible with both Turkish and EU Law. (shrink)

First published in 1990. How we perceive and respond to the visual image has been traditional concern of psychologists, philosophers and art historians. Today, where the visual image increasingly permeates our everyday life and consciousness, the question becomes ever more relevant. How do we, for instance, instinctively ‘know’ what it is that a picture represents without having to be taught? How it is that we experience pleasure in looking at certain pictures? How is it that we often want to talk (...) about the pictures we look at? Such questions are currently asked by a wide range of disciplines, including: semiotics, psychoanalysis, anthropology, neuropsychology, and in general, contemporary critical analysis of the visual arts. In _A Transformational Theory of Aesthetics_, Michael Stephan links the findings of these areas. Drawing on their common area of knowledge, he has developed a theory of picture perception and aesthetic response, arguing that images can generate in us a complex pattern of mental changes, or transformations. A Transformation Theory of Aesthetics is essential reading to those seriously involved in linking the arts and cognitive sciences. (shrink)

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s (...) account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities. (shrink)

This comprehensive new book introduces the core history of phenomenology and assesses its relevance to contemporary psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. From critiques of artificial intelligence research programs to ongoing work on embodiment and enactivism, the authors trace how phenomenology has produced a valuable framework for analyzing cognition and perception, whose impact on contemporary psychological and scientific research, and philosophical debates continues to grow. The first part of _An Introduction to Phenomenology_ is an extended overview of the history (...) and development of phenomenology, looking at its key thinkers, focusing particularly on Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as its cultural and intellectual precursors. In the second half Chemero and Käufer turn their attention to the contemporary interpretations and uses of phenomenology in cognitive science, showing that phenomenology is a living source of inspiration in contemporary interdisciplinary studies of the mind. Käufer and Chemero have written a clear, jargon-free account of phenomenology, providing abundant examples and anecdotes to illustrate and to entertain. This book is an ideal introduction to phenomenology and cognitive science for the uninitiated, as well as for philosophy and psychology students keen to deepen their knowledge. (shrink)