Computer Ethics

The literature addressing bias and fairness in AI models (fair-AI) is growing at a fast pace, making it difficult for novel researchers and practitioners to have a bird’s-eye view picture of the field. In particular, many policy initiatives, standards, and best practices in fair-AI have been proposed for setting principles, procedures, and knowledge bases to guide and operationalize the management of bias and fairness. The first objective of this paper is to concisely survey the state-of-the-art of fair-AI methods and resources, (...) and the main policies on bias in AI, with the aim of providing such a bird’s-eye guidance for both researchers and practitioners. The second objective of the paper is to contribute to the policy advice and best practices state-of-the-art by leveraging from the results of the NoBIAS research project. We present and discuss a few relevant topics organized around the NoBIAS architecture, which is made up of a Legal Layer, focusing on the European Union context, and a Bias Management Layer, focusing on understanding, mitigating, and accounting for bias. (shrink)

Current techno-utopian visions of metaverse raise ontological, ethical, and political questions. Drawing on existing literature on virtual worlds but also philosophically moving beyond that body of work and responding to political contexts concerning identity, capitalism, and climate, this paper begins to address these questions by offering a conceptual framework to think about the ontology of metaverse(s) in ways that see metaverse as real, experienced and shaping our experience, technologically constituted, and political. It shows how this non-dualist political-ontological approach helps to (...) better identify, understand, predict, and evaluate some real and potentially dangerous ethically and politically relevant phenomena, including what I call ‘metacapitalism’’s environmentally problematic dream. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become nearly ubiquitous in modern society, from components of mobile applications to medical support systems, and everything in between. In societally impactful systems imbued with AI, there has been increasing concern related to opaque AI, that is, artificial intelligence where it is unclear how or why certain decisions are reached. This has led to a recent boom in research on “explainable AI” (XAI), or approaches to making AI more explainable and understandable to human users. In the (...) military domain, numerous bodies have argued that autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems ought not incorporate unexplainable AI, with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Department of Defense both explicitly including explainability as a relevant factor in the development and use of such systems. In this article, I present a cautiously critical assessment of this view, arguing that explainability will be irrelevant for many current and near-future autonomous systems in the military (which do not incorporate any AI), that it will be trivially incorporated into most military systems which do possess AI (as these generally possess simpler AI systems), and that for those systems with genuinely opaque AI, explainability will prove to be of more limited value than one might imagine. In particular, I argue that explainability, while indeed a virtue in design, is a virtue aimed primarily at designers and troubleshooters of AI-enabled systems, but is far less relevant for users and handlers actually deploying these systems. I further argue that human–machine teaming is a far more important element of responsibly using AI for military purposes, adding that explainability may undermine efforts to improve human–machine teamings by creating a prima facie sense that the AI, due to its explainability, may be utilized with little (or less) potential for mistakes. I conclude by clarifying that the arguments are not against XAI in the military, but are instead intended as a caution against over-inflating the value of XAI in this domain, or ignoring the limitations and potential pitfalls of this approach. (shrink)

Smartphone apps might offer a low-threshold approach to the detection of mental health conditions, such as depression. Based on the gathering of ‘passive data,’ some apps generate a user’s ‘digital phenotype,’ compare it to those of users with clinically confirmed depression and issue a warning if a depressive episode is likely. These apps can, thus, serve as epistemic tools for affected users. From an ethical perspective, it is crucial to consider epistemic injustice to promote socially responsible innovations within digital mental (...) healthcare. In cases of epistemic injustice, people are wronged specifically as epistemic agents, i.e., agents of the production and distribution of knowledge. We suggest that epistemic agency relies on different resource- and uptake-related preconditions which can be impacted by the functionality of passive self-tracking apps. We consider how this can lead to different forms of epistemic injustice (testimonial, hermeneutical, and contributory injustice) and analyze the influence of the apps’ use on epistemic practices on an individual level, in mental healthcare settings, and on the structural level. (shrink)

Bài viết này tóm lược các điểm quan trọng và những triết lý xã hội trong Tầm nhìn Xã hội 5.0 (Society 5.0) của Nhật Bản, đồng thời đưa ra bài học cho Việt Nam trong việc hình thành một xã hội “lấy dân làm gốc”, được hiện thực hoá bởi trí tuệ nhân tạo (AI). Nhằm tiến tới một xã hội nơi con người được đặt làm trung tâm đồng thời chung sống hài hoà với công nghệ ngày càng (...) thông minh, năm gợi ý cụ thể cho Việt Nam đã được đưa ra: Tầm nhìn lấy con người làm trung tâm; Góc nhìn đa chiều về mối quan hệ giữa người và máy; Lấy AI làm động lực phát triển kinh tế-xã hội; Cách tiếp cận từ dưới lên trên và thúc đẩy tính tham gia trong việc thiết lập tầm nhìn; và Tính bền vững và bao quát trong các ứng dụng của AI. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly being used not only to classify and analyze but also to generate images and text. As recent work on the content produced by text and image Generative AIs has shown (e.g., Cheong et al., 2024, Acerbi & Stubbersfield, 2023), there is a risk that harms of representation and bias, already documented in prior AI and natural language processing (NLP) algorithms may also be present in generative models. These harms relate to protected categories such as (...) gender, race, age, and religion. There are several kinds of harms of representation to consider in this context, including stereotyping, lack of recognition, denigration, under-representation, and many others (Crawford in Soundings 41:45–55, 2009; in: Barocas et al., SIGCIS Conference, 2017). Whereas the bulk of researchers’ attention thus far has been given to stereotyping and denigration, in this study we examine ‘exnomination’, as conceived by Roland Barthes (1972), of religious groups. Our case study is DALL-E, a tool that generates images from natural language prompts. Using DALL-E mini, we generate images from generic prompts such as “religious person.” We then examine whether the generated images are recognizably members of a nominated group. Thus, we assess whether the generated images normalize some religions while neglecting others. We hypothesize that Christianity will be recognizably represented more frequently than other religious groups. Our results partially support this hypothesis but introduce further complexities, which we then explore. (shrink)

Intelligibility and interpretability related to artificial intelligence (AI) are crucial for enabling explicability, which is vital for establishing constructive communication and agreement among various stakeholders, including users and designers of AI. It is essential to overcome the challenges of sharing an understanding of the details of the various structures of diverse AI systems, to facilitate effective communication and collaboration. In this paper, we propose four fundamental terms: “I/O,” “Constraints,” “Objectives,” and “Architecture.” These terms help mitigate the challenges associated with intelligibility (...) and interpretability in AI by providing appropriate levels of abstraction to describe structure of AI systems generally, thereby facilitating the sharing of understanding among various stakeholders. The relationship between the Objective of AI designers and the Purpose of AI users is linked to the issues of AI alignment. (shrink)

With regard to current debates on the ethical implementation of AI, especially two demands are linked: the call for explainability and for ultimate human responsibility. In the medical field, both are condensed into the role of one person: It is the physician to whom AI output should be explainable and who should thus bear ultimate responsibility for diagnostic or treatment decisions that are based on such AI output. In this article, we argue that a black box AI indeed creates a (...) rationally irresolvable epistemic situation for the physician involved. Specifically, strange errors that are occasionally made by AI sometimes detach its output from human reasoning. Within this article it is further argued that such an epistemic situation is problematic in the context of ultimate human responsibility. Since said strange errors limit the promises of explainability and the concept of explainability frequently appears irrelevant or insignificant when applied to a diverse set of medical applications, we deem it worthwhile to reconsider the call for ultimate human responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper, I support a hybrid form of expressivism called constructive ecumenical expressivism (CEE) which I have previously used (to attempt) to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. (Young, 2016. Resolving the gamer’s dilemma. London: Palgrave Macmillan.) In support of CEE, I argue that the various other attempts at either resolving, dissolving or resisting the dilemma are consistent with CEE’s moral framework. That is, with its way of explaining what a claim to morality is, with how moral norms are established, with (...) the role intuition is able to play in establishing these norms, and therefore with how the gamer’s dilemma can be resolved. I also demonstrate, more broadly, how CEE advocates robust relativism as a means of justifying the constructed moral norm’s normative credentials, and therefore how one society’s norm can be judged morally superior to another’s. (shrink)

This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the impact of AI technologies on the climate crisis beyond their mere resource consumption. To critically examine this impact, I introduce the concept of AI futurism. With this term I capture the ideology behind AI, and argue that this ideology is inherently connected to the climate crisis. This is because AI futurism construes a socio-material environment overly fixated on AI and technological progress, to the extent that it loses sight of the existential threats (...) ahead. In that way, the perceived significance of the planetary reality is softened, and the unsustainable paths charted by the AI industry remain opaque. To make this argument the paper unfolds in two main sections. (1) It delves into the ideology of AI futurism and its discursive impact on the societal perception of the climate crisis. (2) It employs a materialist perspective to elucidate the tangible effects of the AI industry on the climate crisis, and to show what is going on behind the façade of AI futurism. Adding to a critical theory of AI and the climate crisis, this paper starts a realistic conversation about the challenges posed by the intersection of these transformations. (shrink)

We discuss the implementation of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) within a project for the development of an AI-supported exergame for assisted movement training, outline outcomes and reflect on methodological opportunities and limitations. We adopted the responsibility-by-design (RbD) standard (CEN CWA 17796:2021) supplemented by methods for collaborative, ethical reflection to foster and support a shift towards a culture of trustworthiness inherent to the entire development process. An embedded ethicist organised the procedure to instantiate a collaborative learning effort and implement RRI (...) in a translational context. Within the interdisciplinary setting of the collaboration and with the support of a technoethicist, we successfully identified relevant, project-specific challenges and developed a roadmap with derived actions, thus meaningfully integrating RRI into the development process. We discuss the methodological procedure in terms of its effectiveness and efficiency, the allocation of responsibilities and roles, particularly regarding potential frictions in the interdisciplinary context with embedded ethics, and the challenges of the translational context. We conclude that the responsibility-by-design standard effectively established a productive workflow for collaborative investigation and work on ethical challenges. We reflect on methodological difficulties and propose possible avenues to our approach. (shrink)

Virtual assistants (VAs), like Amazon’s Alexa, Google’s Assistant, and Apple’s Siri, are on the rise. However, despite allegedly being ‘assistants’ to users, they ultimately help firms to maximise profits. With more and more tasks and leeway bestowed upon VAs, the severity as well as the extent of conflicts of interest between firms and users increase. This article builds on the common law field of fiduciary law to argue why and how regulators should address this phenomenon. First, the functions of VAs (...) resemble established fiduciaries, namely mandataries when they perform tasks on behalf of users, and increasingly advisors whenever they provide recommendations or suggestions. Second, users grant firms deploying VAs ever more discretion over their economic, and more and more significant non-economic interests, such as their health or finances. This delegation of power renders users vulnerable to abuse of power and inadequate performance by firms deploying VAs. Moreover, neither specification or monitoring nor market forces are alternatives that can sufficiently protect users. Thus, regulation is needed, departing from the recognition of the relationship between firms deploying VAs and users as a fiduciary relationship. In the EU, this could be realised through fiduciary requirements for VAs. First and foremost, to adequately protect users from abuse of power by firms deploying VAs, the core fiduciary duty of loyalty should be converted into corresponding fiduciary requirements for VAs, obliging firms to align VAs with their users. (shrink)

It is often claimed that social media accelerate political extremism by employing personalization algorithms that filter users into groups with homogenous beliefs. While an intuitive position, recent research has shown that social media users exhibit self-filtering tendencies. In this paper, I apply Hannah Arendt’s theory of political judgment to hypothesize a cause for self-filtering on social media. According to Arendt, a crucial step in political judgment is the imagination of a general standpoint of distinct yet equal perspectives, against which individuals (...) compare their own judgments in order to test their defensibility. I argue that social media inhibit this step by gamifying the pursuit of social status, which encourages users to consider the perspectives of others not for the sake of a general standpoint but for the sake of improving their social status, resulting in self-filtering. Consequently, ameliorating political extremism on social media requires not just reforming the algorithms that deliver content to users, but the interfaces on which users present their social identities. (shrink)

Despite recent efforts by the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community to move towards standardised procedures for documenting models, methods, systems or datasets, there is currently no methodology focused on use cases aligned with the risk-based approach of the European AI Act (AI Act). In this paper, we propose a new framework for the documentation of use cases that we call use case cards, based on the use case modelling included in the Unified Markup Language (UML) standard. Unlike other documentation methodologies, we (...) focus on the intended purpose and operational use of an AI system. It consists of two main parts: firstly, a UML-based template, tailored to allow implicitly assessing the risk level of the AI system and defining relevant requirements, and secondly, a supporting UML diagram designed to provide information about the system-user interactions and relationships. The proposed framework is the result of a co-design process involving a relevant team of EU policy experts and scientists. We have validated our proposal with 11 experts with different backgrounds and a reasonable knowledge of the AI Act as a prerequisite. We provide the 5 use case cards used in the co-design and validation process. Use case cards allows framing and contextualising use cases in an effective way, and we hope this methodology can be a useful tool for policy makers and providers for documenting use cases, assessing the risk level, adapting the different requirements and building a catalogue of existing usages of AI. (shrink)

With the emergence of quantum technologies such as quantum computing, quantum communications, and quantum sensing, new potential has emerged for smart manufacturing and Industry 4.0. These technologies, however, present ethical concerns that must be addressed in order to ensure they are developed and used responsibly. This article outlines some of the ethical challenges that quantum technologies may raise for Industry 4.0 and presents the value sensitive design methodology as a strategy for ethics-by-design of quantum computing in Industry 4.0. This research (...) further investigates the potential ethical difficulties that may come from the use of quantum technologies in Industry 4.0, such as concerns about privacy, security, accountability, and the influence of these technologies on workers and society as a whole. The article argues, based on current literature, that these issues necessitate a proactive and comprehensive approach to ethics-by-design. (shrink)

Recent work on philosophy of technology emphasises the ways in which technology can disrupt our concepts and conceptual schemes. We analyse and challenge existing accounts of conceptual disruption, criticising views according to which conceptual disruption can be understood in terms of uncertainty for conceptual application, as well as views assuming all instances of conceptual disruption occur at the same level. We proceed to provide our own account of conceptual disruption as an interruption in the normal functioning of concepts and conceptual (...) schemes. Moreover, we offer a multilevel taxonomy thereof, where we distinguish between instances of conceptual disruptions occurring at different levels (conceptual scheme, conceptual clusters, and individual concepts), taking on different forms (conceptual gaps and conceptual conflicts), and leading to different degrees of severity (extending from mild to severe). We also provide detailed accounts through historical examples of how conceptual gaps and conceptual conflicts can occur at different times in the very same process of conceptual disruption. Finally, we make the case that different kinds of conceptual engineering can provide meaningful ways to assess and overcome distinct types of conceptual disruption. (shrink)

My focus is on the contemporary astrobiological activity of Messaging ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (METI). This intentional astrobiological signaling typically involves embedding digital communications in powerful radio signals and transmitting those signals out into the cosmos in an explicit effort to make contact with extraterrestrial others. Some who criticize METI express concern that contact with technologically advanced extraterrestrial life could be seriously harmful to Earth or humanity. One popular response to this critique of messaging is an appeal to causal impotence sometimes referred (...) to as the ‘Barn Door’ Argument—we are already engaged in many other detectable activities not intended for cosmic communication. If the Barn Door Argument is correct, then those who engage in messaging arguably have a moral excuse. They are permitted to continue messaging because there is no point in abstaining. I develop three ways in which the claim of causal impotence in the Barn Door Argument could be understood. I evaluate each of these in turn and demonstrate that only one is appropriate to contemporary messaging. However, this interpretation does not generate the moral excuse on which the proponents of the Barn Door Argument rely; thus, the argument fails. Finally, I entertain and respond to candidate objections. (shrink)

This paper argues that one problem that besets black-box AI is that it lacks algorithmic justifiability. We argue that the norm of shared decision making in medical care presupposes that treatment decisions ought to be justifiable to the patient. Medical decisions are justifiable to the patient only if they are compatible with the patient’s values and preferences and the patient is able to see that this is so. Patient-directed justifiability is threatened by black-box AIs because the lack of rationale provided (...) for the decision makes it difficult for patients to ascertain whether there is adequate fit between the decision and the patient’s values. This paper argues that achieving algorithmic transparency does not help patients bridge the gap between their medical decisions and values. We introduce a hypothetical model we call Justifiable AI to illustrate this argument. Justifiable AI aims at modelling normative and evaluative considerations in an explicit way so as to provide a stepping stone for patient and physician to jointly decide on a course of treatment. If our argument succeeds, we should prefer these justifiable models over alternatives if the former are available and aim to develop said models if not. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the concept of attentional scaffolds and show the resemblance between social media platforms and slot machines, both functioning as hostile attentional scaffolds. The first section establishes the groundwork for the concept of attentional scaffolds and draws parallels to the mechanics of slot machines, to argue that social media platforms aim to capture users’ attention to maximize engagement through a system of intermittent rewards. The second section shifts focus to the interplay between emotions and attention, revealing (...) how online attentional capture through emotionally triggering stimuli leads to distraction. The final section elucidates the collective implications of scaffolding attention through social media platforms. The examination of phenomena such as emotional contagion and the emergence of group emotions underscores the transition from individual experiences to shared collective outcomes. Employing online moral outrage as a case study, we illustrate how negative emotions serve as scaffolds for individuals’ attention, propagate within social groups, and give rise to collective attitudes. (shrink)

Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, gene editing, nanotechnology, neurotechnology and robotics, which were originally unrelated or separated, are becoming more closely integrated. Consequently, the boundaries between the physical-biological and the cyber-digital worlds are no longer well defined. We argue that this technological convergence has fundamental implications for individuals and societies. Conventional domain-specific governance mechanisms have become ineffective. In this paper we provide an overview of the ethical, societal and policy challenges of technological convergence. Particularly, we scrutinize the adequacy of (...) domain-specific governance mechanisms in the face of such integrated technologies and highlight their growing ineffectiveness. Furthermore, we propose a comprehensive governance framework that is anticipatory, inclusive, and resilient. Central to this framework is the principle of participatory governance, which calls for a proactive engagement of all stakeholders, including those from marginalized and vulnerable populations, ensuring that their voices and concerns shape the trajectory of technological development. The framework emphasizes the need for protective measures that preemptively address potential risks and inequities that may arise from the adoption and integration of emerging technologies. Based on a detailed analysis of case studies and current governance models, we present and discuss a set of ten actionable recommendations. These are designed to facilitate the transition towards a governance approach that not only respects individual autonomy and privacy, but also fosters a collective responsibility towards sustainable and fair technological progress. By placing human dignity, societal welfare and the protection of the most vulnerable at the center of technological innovation, we advocate for a future where convergence is synonymous with progress that is both ethically grounded and universally beneficial. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on technology-induced ‘conceptual disruption’ has spotlighted the notion of a conceptual gap. Conceptual gaps have also been discussed in scholarship on epistemic injustice, yet up until now these bodies of work have remained disconnected. This article shows that ‘gaps’ of interest to both bodies of literature are closely related, and argues that a joint examination of conceptual disruption and epistemic injustice is fruitful for both fields. I argue that hermeneutical marginalization—a skewed division of hermeneutical resources, which serves to (...) diminish the experiences of marginalized folk—does not only transpire because of conceptual gaps, but also because of two other kinds of conceptual disruption: conceptual overlaps and conceptual misalignments. Hence, there are multiple kinds of conceptual disruption that can be usefully studied through the normative lens of epistemic injustice. Technology can play different roles vis-a-vis epistemic injustices, both as a causal trigger of conceptual disruption, but also as a mediator of hermeneutical resources. Its role is normatively significant, in particular because socially disruptive technologies can have different epistemic implications for different groups: they may amplify the epistemic resources of some groups, while diminishing those of others. (shrink)

Machine ethics is the field that strives to develop ‘artificial moral agents’ (AMAs), artificial systems that can autonomously make moral decisions. Some authors have questioned the feasibility of machine ethics, by questioning whether artificial systems can possess moral competence, or the capacity to reach morally right decisions in various situations. This paper explores this question by drawing on the work of several moral philosophers (McDowell, Wiggins, Hampshire, and Nussbaum) who have characterised moral competence in a manner inspired by Aristotle. Although (...) disparate in many ways, these philosophers all emphasise what may be called ‘moral sensitivity’ as a precondition for moral competence. Moral sensitivity is the uncodified, practical skill to recognise, in a range of situations, which features of the situations are morally relevant, and how they are relevant. This paper argues that the main types of AMAs currently proposed are incapable of full moral sensitivity. First, top-down AMAs that proceed from fixed rule-sets are too rigid to respond appropriately to the wide range of qualitatively unique factors that moral sensitivity gives access to. Second, bottom-up AMAs that learn moral behaviour from examples are at risk of generalising from these examples in undesirable ways, as they lack embedding in what Wittgenstein calls a ‘form of life’, which allows humans to appropriately learn from moral examples. The paper concludes that AMAs are unlikely to possess full moral competence, but closes by suggesting that they may still be feasible in restricted domains of public morality, where moral sensitivity plays a smaller role. (shrink)

This paper argues Moral Turing Test (MTT) developed by Allen et al. for evaluating morality in AI systems is designed inaptly. Different versions of the MTT focus on the conversational ability of an agent but not the performance of morally significant actions. Arnold and Scheutz also argue against the MTT and state that without focusing on the performance of morally significant actions, the MTT is insufficient. Morality is mainly about morally relevant actions because it does not matter how good a (...) person is at conversing about morally relevant actions. When discussing morality, we consider an agent’s ability to perform specific actions in a morally given situation. We show that Allen et al. do not take into account the distinction between the performance ofthe moral attribution and the performance of the morally relevant action. This distinction gives a robust account of assessing the morality of an AI system in the MTT. (shrink)

Nel 1956, in piena guerra fredda, una conferenza di scienziati al Dartmouth College negli Stati Uniti annunciò il lancio di un audace progetto scientifico, l’Intelligenza Artificiale (I.A.). Dopo l’iniziale fallimento degli sforzi della “Hard AI” di produrre un’intelligenza simile a quella umana, alla fine del XX secolo è emerso il movimento della “Soft AI”. Invece di essere orientato a imitare il comportamento umano in relazione a compiti specifici, ha preferito cercare modi alternativi di eseguire i compiti basati sulle particolari funzioni (...) e strutture della macchina. Il fattore decisivo è stata la combinazione della tecnologia di apprendimento automatico con le comunicazioni digitali online, l’incontro tra l’IA e Internet. Le applicazioni dell’IA “soft” sono quelle che vediamo nel mondo dei dispositivi automatici “intelligenti” che informano la nostra vita sociale digitale. Nel seguente articolo mi concentrerò su una particolare applicazione dell’IA per le discussioni online con utenti umani, ChatGPT, per mostrare le implicazioni della tecnologia digitale online nelle modalità storico-sociali dell’esistenza umana. ChatGPT è un’applicazione che combina l’IA con Internet, le possibilità della corrispondenza tra macchine e le potenzialità della tele-comunicazione umana. Il mio approccio si concentra sulle implicazioni fenomenologiche e storico-sociali della proliferazione della tecnologia AI per quanto riguarda la coscienza e la socialità umana. -/- Abstract (english) -/- In 1956, amidst the Cold War, a conference of scientists at Dartmouth College in the United States announced the launch of a bold, scientific project, Artificial Intelligence (A.I.). After the initial failure of “Hard AI” efforts to produce a human-like intelligence, the “Soft AI” movement emerged in the late 20th century. Instead of being oriented towards imitating human behaviour concerning specific tasks, it preferred to seek alternative ways of performing tasks based on the particular functions and structures of the machine. The decisive factor was the combination of Machine Learning technology with Digital Online Communications, the meeting between AI and the Internet. The applications of “Soft” AI are those we see in the world of “smart”, “intelligent” automatic devices that inform our digital social life. In the following article, I will focus on a particular application of AI for online discussions with human users, ChatGPT, in order to show the implications of online digital technology in the social-historical modalities of human existence. ChatGPT is an application that combines AI with the Internet, the possibilities of Machine correspondence with the potentialities of human telecommunications. My approach focuses on the phenomenological and social-historical implications of the proliferation of AI technology as regards human consciousness and sociality. (shrink)

Increasingly, our cities are confronted with crises. Fuelled by climate change and a loss of biodiversity, increasing inequalities and fragmentation, challenges range from social unrest and outbursts of violence to heatwaves, torrential rainfall, or epidemics. As crises require rapid interventions that overwhelm human decision-making capacity, AI has been portrayed as a potential avenue to support or even automate decision-making. In this paper, I analyse the specific challenges of AI in urban crisis management as an example and test case for many (...) super wicked decision problems. These super wicked problems are characterised by a coincidence of great complexity and urgency. I will argue that from this combination, specific challenges arise that are only partially covered in the current guidelines and standards around trustworthy or human-centered AI. By following a decision-centric perspective, I argue that to solve urgent crisis problems, the context, capacities, and networks need to be addressed. AI for crisis response needs to follow dedicated design principles that ensure (i) human control in complex social networks, where many humans interact with AI; (ii) principled design that considers core principles of crisis response such as solidarity and humanity; (iii) designing for the most vulnerable. As such this paper is meant to inspire researchers, AI developers and practitioners in the space of AI for (urban) crisis response – and other urgent and complex problems that urban planners are confronted with. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between AI urbanism and sustainability by drawing upon some key concepts of Bruno Latour’s philosophy. The idea of a sustainable AI urbanism - often understood as the juxtaposition of smart and eco urbanism - is here critiqued through a reconstruction of the conceptual sources of these two urban paradigms. Some key ideas of smart and eco urbanism are indicated as incompatible and therefore the fusion of these two paradigms is assessed (...) as an unstable basis for shaping sustainable AI urbanism. The concepts in question - modernity, science and nature – are subsequently redefined following Latour’s philosophical perspective, in an attempt to define a different theoretical basis for a sustainable AI urbanism in the Anthropocene. Finally, the principles of a design philosophy shaped by Latour are used to change the design culture that informs AI urbanism towards a more sustainable practice. This paper constructs and promotes a dialogue between the disciplines of philosophy and urban theory with urban design in the conviction that the principles produced by the former and the practices carried out by the latter must start a biunivocal relationship. The paper reveals that in order to change design culture in the field of AI urbanism, it is necessary to rethink some of the key ideas that inform the Western and modern worldview through novel philosophical reflections. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Coeckelbergh’s (2023) performative view of moral status. Drawing parallels to Searle’s social ontology, two key claims of the performative view are identified: (1) Making a moral status claim is equivalent to making a moral status declaration. (2) A successful declaration establishes the institutional fact that the entity has moral status. Closer examination, however, reveals flaws in both claims. The second claim faces a dilemma: individual instances of moral status declaration are likely to fail because they do (...) not conform to established moral discourse conventions, and reliance on declarations becomes both unnecessary and implausible for explaining widespread collective recognition of moral status. As for the first claim, accepting it undermines the potential for meaningful moral disagreement. As a remedy, this paper proposed a shift in perspective: interpreting moral status claims as assertions rather than declarations. This refined perspective provides a more plausible framework for understanding moral status and avoids the pitfalls associated with the performative view. (shrink)

Generative AI enables automated, effective manipulation at scale. Despite the growing general ethical discussion around generative AI, the specific manipulation risks remain inadequately investigated. This article outlines essential inquiries encompassing conceptual, empirical, and design dimensions of manipulation, pivotal for comprehending and curbing manipulation risks. By highlighting these questions, the article underscores the necessity of an appropriate conceptualisation of manipulation to ensure the responsible development of Generative AI technologies.

It is well known that AI-based language technology—large language models, machine translation systems, multilingual dictionaries, and corpora—is currently limited to three percent of the world’s most widely spoken, financially and politically backed languages. In response, recent efforts have sought to address the “digital language divide” by extending the reach of large language models to “underserved languages.” We show how some of these efforts tend to produce flawed solutions that adhere to a hard-wired representational preference for certain languages, which we call (...) language modeling bias. Language modeling bias is a specific and under-studied form of linguistic bias were language technology by design favors certain languages, dialects, or sociolects with respect to others. We show that language modeling bias can result in systems that, while being precise regarding languages and cultures of dominant powers, are limited in the expression of socio-culturally relevant notions of other communities. We further argue that at the root of this problem lies a systematic tendency of technology developer communities to apply a simplistic understanding of diversity which does not do justice to the more profound differences that languages, and ultimately the communities that speak them, embody. Drawing on the concept of epistemic injustice, we point to the broader ethico-political implications and show how it can lead not only to a disregard for valuable aspects of diversity but also to an under-representation of the needs of marginalized language communities. Finally, we present an alternative socio-technical approach that is designed to tackle some of the analyzed problems. (shrink)

“Deathbots,” digital constructs that emulate the conversational patterns, demeanor, and knowledge of deceased individuals. Earlier moral discussions about deathbots centered on the dignity and autonomy of the deceased. This paper primarily examines the potential psychological and emotional dependencies that users might develop towards deathbots, considering approaches to prevent problematic dependence through temporary use. We adopt a hermeneutic method to argue that deathbots, as they currently exist, are unlikely to provide substantial comfort. Lacking the capacity to bear emotional burdens, they fall (...) short of meeting idealistic expectations. By repositioning deathbots, we aim to mitigate the risk of emotional dependency and respect the natural grieving process. Our goal is to propose the use of deathbots as a novel means of mourning through transitory use, rather than as a method to alleviate grief or as a patterns for communication with the deceased. (shrink)

Debate over the normativity of virtual phenomena is now widespread in the philosophical literature, taking place in roughly two distinct but related camps. The first considers the relevant problems to be within the scope of applied ethics, where the general methodological program is to square the intuitive (im)permissibility of virtual wrongdoings with moral accounts that justify their (im)permissibility. The second camp approaches the normativity of virtual wrongdoings as a metaphysical debate. This is done by disambiguating the ‘virtual’ character of ‘virtual (...) wrongdoings’. Doing so is supposed to provide illuminating ontological distinctions that inform ethical aspects of the debate. We argue that each approach faces its own set of issues, and as a result, motivates consideration of an alternative. The alternative we suggest turns inquiry concerning the normativity of virtual wrongdoings into a distinctively conceptual question. Rather than asking whether some action is right or wrong, or whether some virtual phenomenon counts as a particular action at all, we argue that research into the normativity of virtual wrongdoings may be guided by reflecting on whether a concept that originated and developed within a non-virtual context should be exported into a foreign virtual domain. We consider this approach and several objections. (shrink)

Responsibility has become a central concept in AI ethics; however, little research has been conducted into practitioners’ personal understandings of responsibility in the context of AI, including how responsibility should be defined and who is responsible when something goes wrong. In this article, we present findings from a 2020–2021 data set of interviews with AI practitioners and tech workers at a single multinational technology company and interpret them through the lens of feminist political thought. We reimagine responsibility in the context (...) of AI development and deployment as the product of work cultures that enable tech workers to be responsive and answerable for their products over the long and short term. From our interviews, we identify three key pain points in understanding the distribution of responsibility between actors and developing responsible design and deployment practices: (1) unstable business ecosystems and AI lifecycles, which require an approach to responsibility that accounts for the dynamic nature of these systems; (2) the issue of incentivizing engineers to take responsibility for the mundane maintenance practices essential to the functioning of AI systems and (3) the need to overcome individual and structural barriers to taking ownership over AI products and their effects. From these findings, we make three recommendations based on feminist theory: (1) organisations should move from a static model of responsibility to a dynamic and ethically motivated response-ability; (2) companies need to revalue care and maintenance practices; and (3) firms must move away from individualistic ideas of responsibility towards fostering wider cultures of responsibility. (shrink)

Digital Democratic Innovations (DDIs) have largely been conceived of, by the academic community, as a possible solution to the crisis of representative democracy. DDIs can be defined as initiatives or institutions designed with the goal of deepening citizens’ participation and influence on political decisions through the use of digital tools and platforms. There is a hope that DDIs (as well as usual, non-digital DIs) could help nurture political trust in governing institutions. Yet the vast majority of research on trust and (...) DDIs/DIs focuses only on one side of political trust – the trust of citizens vis-à-vis government. What has largely been ignored, however, is the trust of decision-makers towards citizen participation and its outcomes. We contend that political trust should be seen as a two-sided relationship that implies reciprocity. Therefore, we claim that it is necessary to design DDIs in such a way that they generate political trust from both common citizens and decision-makers. Citizens must trust institutions and processes implemented by the ones in power, and decision-makers must trust the input of citizens’ participatory processes. We argue that transparency is crucial when it comes to fostering reciprocal trust, and we identify the necessary elements to achieve it via DDIs. (shrink)

In recent years, the European Union has advanced towards responsible and sustainable Artificial Intelligence (AI) research, development and innovation. While the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI released in 2019 and the AI Act in 2021 set the starting point for a European Ethical AI, there are still several challenges to translate such advances into the public debate, education and practical learning. This paper contributes towards closing this gap by reviewing the approaches that can be found in the existing literature and (...) by interviewing 11 experts across five countries to help define educational strategies, competencies and resources needed for the successful implementation of Trustworthy AI in Higher Education (HE) and to reach students from all disciplines. The findings are presented in the form of recommendations both for educators and policy incentives, translating the guidelines into HE teaching and practice, so that the next generation of young people can contribute to an ethical, safe and cutting-edge AI made in Europe. (shrink)

In this chapter, we turn our attention to the effects of the attention economy on our ability to act autonomously as a group. We begin by clarifying which sorts of groups we are concerned with, which are structured groups (groups sufficiently organized that it makes sense to attribute agency to the group itself). Drawing on recent work by Purves and Davis (2022), we describe the essential roles of trust (i.e., depending on groups to fulfill their commitments) and trustworthiness (i.e., the (...) property of a group that makes trusting them fitting) in autonomous group action, with particular emphasis on democratic institutions (which we view as group agents) and democratic legitimacy (which depends on trust and trustworthiness). We then explain how engagement maximization promotes polarization, which is detrimental to trust and trustworthiness and, in turn, democratic legitimacy and democratic institutions. We close by considering what groups might do to protect themselves from the threat posed to them by the attention economy. (shrink)

Through hypothetical scenarios, this paper analyses whether machine learning (ML) could resolve one of the main shortcomings present in Christopher Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of health (BST). In doing so, it foregrounds the boundaries and challenges of employing ML in formulating a naturalist (i.e., prima facie value-free) definition of health. The paper argues that a sweeping dataist approach cannot fully make the BST truly naturalistic, as prior theories and values persist. It also points out that supervised learning introduces circularity, rendering it (...) incompatible with a naturalistic perspective. Additionally, it underscores the need for pre-existing auxiliary theories to assess results from unsupervised learning. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the epistemological entanglements between data and data processing methods to manage expectations about what data patterns can predict. In conclusion, the paper argues against delegating the final authority for defining complex concepts like health to AI systems, as it necessitates ethical judgment and capacities for deliberation that AI currently lacks. It also warns against granting creators and deployers of AI systems the discretionary authority to determine these definitions outside the wider social discussion, advocating for ongoing public engagement on normative notions. Failure to do so risks limiting individuals and collectives’ ability to shape a just digital future and diminishes their fundamental epistemic agency. (shrink)

The rapid adoption of digital technologies has revolutionized business operations and introduced emerging concepts such as Digital Twin (DT) technology, which has the potential to predict system responses before they occur, making it an attractive option for smart and sustainable tourism. However, implementing DT software systems poses significant challenges, including compliance with regulations and effective communication among stakeholders, and concerns surrounding security, privacy, and trust with the use of big data. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a documentation framework (...) for architectural decisions (DFAD) that applies the concept of big data governance to the digital system. The framework aims to ensure accountability, transparency, and trustworthiness while adhering to rules and regulations. To demonstrate its applicability, a case study and three case scenarios on the potential use of Mobile Positioning Data (MPD) in Indonesia for DT technology in smart and sustainable tourism were examined. The paper highlights the benefits of DFAD in shaping stakeholder communication and human–machine interactions while leveraging the potential of MPD to measure tourism statistics by Statistics Indonesia since 2016. Not only the documentation framework promotes compliance with regulations, but it also facilitates effective communication among stakeholders and enhances trust and transparency in the use of big data in DT technology for smart and sustainable tourism. This paper emphasizes the importance of effective big data governance and its potential to promote sustainable tourism practices. The multidisciplinarity approach on political science, software engineering, tourism, and official statistics provides an opportunity for academic contribution and decision-making processes. (shrink)

The public health measures implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in a substantially increased shared reliance on private infrastructure and digital services in areas such as healthcare, education, retail, and the workplace. This development has (i) granted a number of private actors significant (informational) power, and (ii) given rise to a range of digital surveillance practices incidental to the pandemic itself. In this paper, we reflect on these secondary consequences of the pandemic and observe that, even though (...) collateral data disclosure and additional activity monitoring appears to have been generally socially accepted as inevitable consequences of the pandemic, part and parcel of a larger conglomeration of emergency compromises, these increased surveillance practices were not directly justified by appeals to solidarity and public health in the same way that the instigating public health measures were. Based on this observation, and given the increased reliance on private actors for maintaining the digital space, we argue that governments have a duty to (i) seek and ensure that there are justifications for collateral data disclosure and activity monitoring by private actors in the context of (future) public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, and (ii) regulate and provide accountability mechanisms for and oversight over these private surveillance practices on par with governmental essential services that engage in surveillance activities. (shrink)

Neurodevices that collect neural (or brain activity) data have been characterised as having the ability to register the inner workings of human mentality. There are concerns that the proliferation of such devices in the consumer-directed realm may result in the mass processing and commercialisation of neural data (as has been the case with social media data) and even threaten the mental privacy of individuals. To prevent this, some argue that all raw neural data should be conceptualised and regulated as “medical (...) data” even if it is collected from consumer-directed devices in obviously non-clinical settings. In this paper, we argue that without a clearer formulation of what does and does not count as medical data, this approach might also uncritically enlarge the scope for medical influence and an unwarranted medicalisation of everyday aspects of mental life. Indeed, if we were to accept the position that all neural data is medical data because it offers insights into personally sensitive information (such a person’s thoughts, emotions, or intentions) then this could even unnecessarily expand the boundaries of medical data to other forms of data that otherwise seem to be non-clinical. If all brain data (neural activity data) is considered to be medical data even when collected from consumer-directed devices then we might unintentionally reduce meaningful distinctions between what is and what is not rightfully in the purview of medicine. (shrink)

Technological developments increasingly enable monitoring and steering the behavior of individuals. Enforcement of the law by means of technology can be much more effective and pervasive than enforcement by humans, such as law enforcement officers. However, it can also bypass legislators and courts and minimize any room for civil disobedience. This significantly reduces the options to challenge legal rules. This, in turn, can impede the development of legal systems. In this paper, an analogy is made with evolutionary biology to illustrate (...) that the possibility to deviate from legal rules and existing norms is sometimes necessary for the further development of legal systems. Some room to break the law, for instance, through civil disobedience or imperfect enforcement of the law, will ensure sufficient variation. This allows for properly evolving legal systems that can continue to provide fair solutions, even when society and concepts of fairness further develop. (shrink)

It is estimated that one in three women experience intimate partner violence (IPV) across the course of their life. The popular uptake of “smart speakers” powered by sophisticated AI means that surveillance of the domestic environment is increasingly possible. Correspondingly, there are various proposals to use smart speakers to detect or report IPV. In this paper, we clarify what might be possible when it comes to combatting IPV using existing or near-term technology and also begin the project of evaluating this (...) project both ethically and politically. We argue that the ethical landscape looks different depending on whether one is considering the decision to develop the technology or the decision to use it once it has been developed. If activists and governments wish to avoid the privatisation of responses to IPV, ubiquitous surveillance of domestic spaces, increasing the risk posed to members of minority communities by police responses to IPV, and the danger that more powerful smart speakers will be co-opted by men to control and abuse women, then they should resist the development of this technology rather than wait until these systems are developed. If it is judged that the moral urgency of IPV justifies exploring what might be possible by developing this technology, even in the face of these risks, then it will be imperative that victim-survivors from a range of demographics, as well as government and non-government stakeholders, are engaged in shaping this technology and the legislation and policies needed to regulate it. (shrink)

In this paper we have looked at some of the fundamental issues in computer ethics and the characteristics and specific problems of its constitution as a discipline. One of the important issues we have analysed is the problem of access (methods) to a number of new phenomena that have emerged as a result of the wider application of computer technology. Among other things, we pointed out the need to respect the ethical heritage and approach – as a basis for a (...) better understanding of the many problems that this technology has created. In the second part of the paper, we looked at issues such as privacy protection, moral dignity, discrimination, hacking, property rights and the impact of computer technology on modern education. (shrink)

Nowadays, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is present in all sectors of the economy. Consequently, both data-the raw material used to build AI systems- and AI have an unprecedented impact on society and there is a need to ensure that they work for its benefit. For this reason, the European Union has put data and trustworthy AI at the center of recent legislative initiatives. An important element in these regulations is transparency, understood as the provision of information to relevant stakeholders to support (...) their understanding of AI systems and data throughout their lifecycle. In recent years, an increasing number of approaches for documenting AI and datasets have emerged, both within academia and the private sector. In this work, we identify the 36 most relevant ones from more than 2200 papers related to trustworthy AI. We assess their relevance from the angle of European regulatory objectives, their coverage of AI technologies and economic sectors, and their suitability to address the specific needs of multiple stakeholders. Finally, we discuss the main documentation gaps found, including the need to better address data innovation practices (e.g. data sharing, data reuse) and large-scale algorithmic systems (e.g. those used in online platforms), and to widen the focus from algorithms and data to AI systems as a whole. (shrink)

The new wave of ‘foundation models’—general-purpose generative AI models, for production of text (e.g., ChatGPT) or images (e.g., MidJourney)—represent a dramatic advance in the state of the art for AI. But their use also introduces a range of new risks, which has prompted an ongoing conversation about possible regulatory mechanisms. Here we propose a specific principle that should be incorporated into legislation: that any organization developing a foundation model intended for public use must demonstrate a reliable detection mechanism for the (...) content it generates, as a condition of its public release. The detection mechanism should be made publicly available in a tool that allows users to query, for an arbitrary item of content, whether the item was generated (wholly or partly) by the model. In this paper, we argue that this requirement is technically feasible and would play an important role in reducing certain risks from new AI models in many domains. We also outline a number of options for the tool’s design, and summarize a number of points where further input from policymakers and researchers would be required. (shrink)

Smart Cities consist of a multitude of interconnected devices and services to, among others, enhance efficiency, comfort, and safety. To achieve these aims, smart cities rely on an interplay of measures including the deployment of interventions targeted to foster certain human behaviors, such as saving energy, or collecting and exchanging sensor and user data. Both aspects have ethical implications, e.g., when it comes to intervention design or the handling of privacy-related data such as personal information, user preferences or geolocations. Resulting (...) concerns must be taken seriously, as they reduce user acceptance and can even lead to the abolition of otherwise promising Smart City projects. Established guidelines for ethical research and practice from the psychological sciences provide a useful framework for the kinds of ethical issues raised when designing human-centered interventions or dealing with user-generated data. This article thus reviews relevant psychological guidelines and discusses their applicability to the Smart City context. A special focus is on the guidelines’ implications and resulting challenges for certain Smart City applications. Additionally, potential gaps in current guidelines and the limits of applicability are reflected upon. (shrink)

Violent video games (VVGs) are a source of serious and continuing controversy. They are not unique in this respect, though. Other entertainment products have been criticized on moral grounds, from pornography to heavy metal, horror films, and Harry Potter books. Some of these controversies have fizzled out over time and have come to be viewed as cases of moral panic. Others, including moral objections to VVGs, have persisted. The aim of this paper is to determine which, if any, of the (...) concerns raised about VVGs are legitimate. We argue that common moral objections to VVGs are unsuccessful, but that a plausible critique can be developed that captures the insights of these objections while avoiding their pitfalls. Our view suggests that the moral badness of a game depends on how well its internal logic expresses or encourages the players’ objectionable attitudes. This allows us to recognize that some games are morally worse than others—and that it can be morally wrong to design and play some VVGs—but that the moral badness of these games is not necessarily dependent on how violent they are. (shrink)