El presente texto busca desarrollar una reflexión filosófica respecto de las posibles relaciones entre la noción de identidad y las formas de gobierno contemporáneas. A partir de un breve análisis sobre los principales desarrollos de la noción, se busca tensionar el campo de comprensión habitual y plantear un determinado modo en que esta puede pensarse como un engranaje epistemológico-ético respecto de los modos en que los individuos son llamados a nombrarse y reconocerse dentro de los límites impuestos por una cartografía (...) política. La tesis que sostiene este escrito dice relación con que la categoría de individuo moderno no es sostenible sin una adscripción a un orden de los nombres que tiende al autogobierno en base a la apelación de un ideal ético de correspondencia consigo mismo. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es indagar en la fundamentación schmittiana del individuo y de la reserva de conciencia. En la actualidad, buena parte de la recepción contemporánea considera al jurista renano como un antiliberal y, por lo tanto, como un antiindividualista. Sin embargo, nuestra hipótesis es que es posible encontrar en su obra no solo una crítica a la noción liberal de individuo, sino también una concepción propositiva a través de sus reflexiones sobre la crítica frente a la autoridad (...) y al poder público. Para demostrarla, se propone un abordaje hermenéutico-exegético de sus obras —principalmente, de las conferencias sobre El Leviatán en la teoría del Estado de Thomas Hobbes y del artículo "La visibilidad de la Iglesia. Una reflexión escolástica”— para indagar la acción humana como fundadora del orden político y las posibilidades del individuo de criticar a la autoridad. El artículo sostiene que Carl Schmitt formula una noción de individualidad de signo distinto a la liberal y que se vincula íntimamente con la idea de Derecho, el entramado institucional-estatal y el sustrato comunitario. (shrink)

El Ethos es el fenómeno de la moralidad en su sentido más amplio. El presente trabajo –de naturaleza programática– esboza la idea de una fenomenología integral del ethos capaz de pensar, evitando toda forma de reduccionismo, sus diversos niveles de sentido. Procedemos en cinco pasos: en primer lugar, sostenemos que las experiencias humanas fundamentales –en particular la experiencia ética– son del orden de la contingencia y que, en consecuencia, sus verdades no se dejan captu-rar por el análisis fenomenológico-transcendental. En segundo (...) término, presentamos la noción de experiencia ética, a la que describimos como la experiencia del contacto traumático de la Ley en su cuádruple carácter: singular, universal, verdadero, y contingente. En tercer lugar, vía la lectura del ensayo de Derrida Violencia y metafísica. Ensayo sobre el pensamiento de Emmanuel Levinas, ponemos en cuestión la tesis de la supuesta preeminencia de la fenomenología –en tanto que idealismo transcendental– respecto del discurso ético. En cuarto término, introducimos la noción de testimonio como la modalidad narrativa, “pre-filosófica”, capaz de expresar de la manera más fiel el sentido de la experiencia ética. Por último, distinguimos cinco niveles fundamentales del ethos y, sobre esta base, señalamos algunas de las tareas específicas de una fenomenología integral del ethos.The Ethos is the phenomenon of morality in its broadest sense. Our programmatic essay sketches the idea of a comprehen-sive phenomenology of the ethos capable of thinking –non-reductively– its different layers of meaning. We proceed in five steps: first, we claim that fundamental human experiences –in particular, ethical experience– are contingent in nature and that, as a consequence, their truths cannot be grasped by a phenomenologico-transcendental analysis. Second, we describe the notion of ethical experience as a traumatic experience of contact with the Law in its quadruple character: singular, universal, true, and contingent. Third, through a reading of Derrida’s Violence and Metaphysics. An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas, we question the alleged preeminence of phenomenology –as transcendental idealism– over ethical discourse and praxis. Fourth, we introduce the notion of testimony as the kind of “pre-philosophical” narrative able to convey most faithfully the meaning of ethical experience. Finally, we distinguish five fundamental layers of the ethos and, on the basis of these distinctions, we identify some of the specific tasks of a comprehensive phenomenology of the ethos. (shrink)

Se plantea la cuestión del papel de la armonía en la concepción de la racionalidad de Leibniz. Se sitúa esta noción en el marco de la metafísica de la individualidad sistémica, y aparece en dos lugares concretos. En primer lugar en el eje categorial uniformidad-diversi­dad, como principio de equilibrio entre ambos polos. Y en segundo lugar, aparece la noción de armonía en el nivel último de la racionalidad, concretamente en plano de la lógica de los principios. Este nivel se rige (...) por el principio general del orden, y precisamente este principio es explicado por Leibniz frecuentemente en relación con la armonía. (shrink)

El autor trata de justificarse en el orden de la composición de la Crítica del Juicio. Al analizar el estatuto del arte en Kant, muestra cómo la crítica del juicio estético prepara para el análisis del juicio teleológico sobre la “conspiración” del orden de la naturaleza al orden del espíritu.

Un agente está en un estado de akrasia epistémica moderada cuando cree que p y, simultáneamente, suspende el juicio sobre si su evidencia apoya p. En este artículo se argumenta que, dada cierta manera de entender la suspensión del juicio, un agente moderadamente acrático es doxásticamente irracional. En primer lugar, se introducen ciertos conceptos básicos para el argumento y se discute la dialéctica del debate. En segundo lugar, se elabora la conocida distinción entre racionalidad doxástica y racionalidad proposicional, y se (...) discuten algunos casos de fundación impropia desarrollados por Turri. En tercer lugar, se consideran dos posibles casos a partir de los cuales podría argumentarse que la akrasia epistémica moderada es doxásticamente racional y se argumenta que ninguno de ellos funciona. En cuarto lugar, se examinan varias objeciones a la propuesta. (shrink)

Nunca tal vez como ahora el hombre ha estado tan amenazado de una quiebra de los valores que sustentan su vida espiritual, su cultura y aun su misma coexistencia y subsistencia sobre la tierra. En el orden social internacional y nacional, en el mejor de los casos, pareciera que sólo existe un equilibrio de fuerzas, continuamente amenazado por quebrarse con el predominio de una de las partes, pero en modo alguno una paz interna lograda por un auténtico orden jurídico-moral. De (...) hecho tal equilibrio está roto en muchos casos; y en el plano internacional son muchos los pueblos sojuzgados por guerras o imposiciones injustas de otros Estados más fuertes, impedidos en el libre ejercicio de su soberanía —Hungría es un ejemplo—; y en el plano nacional son muchos los dictadores que con violencia imponen su régimen sobre los individuos, privados de sus derechos personales y sometidos a vejaciones y humillaciones de toda índole; y las clases sociales más fuertes que imponen una verdadera esclavitud sobre las más débiles —la explotación humana de los trabajadores o, lo que es peor, de pobres mujeres indefensas sometidas a las garras de un comercio infame—. Ha desaparecido el orden humano-moral, el orden intrínseco y jerárquico, que desde la conciencia y de un modo absoluto imponía a cada uno —al Estado, familia e individuos— sus obligaciones, con lo cual y correlativamente aseguraba también a cada uno sus derechos frente a los demás, organizando a los individuos en la familia e instituciones, a éstas en el Estado y a éste en la Comunidad internacional. Y este orden se ha perdido, porque los valores correlativos de justicia y de derecho con las consiguientes normas moral-jurídicas o son desconocidas o han perdido su carácter de vigencia absoluta y han sido substituidas por la fuerza, la austucia y los intereses y pasiones en general. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast (...) with standard scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about being (241c4–251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that Plato’s methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than what is often believed. (shrink)

An examination of the ways human movement can be represented as a formal language and how this language can be mediated technologically. In Motion and Representation, Nicolás Salazar Sutil considers the representation of human motion through languages of movement and technological mediation. He argues that technology transforms the representation of movement and that representation in turn transforms the way we move and what we understand to be movement. Humans communicate through movement, physically and mentally. To record and capture integrated movement (...) (both bodily and mental), by means of formal language and technological media, produces a material record and cultural expression of our evolving kinetic minds and identities. Salazar Sutil considers three forms of movement inscription: a written record (notation), a visual record (animation), and a computational record (motion capture). He focuses on what he calls kinetic formalism—formalized movement in such pursuits as dance, sports, live animation, and kinetic art, as well as abstract definitions of movement in mathematics and computer science. He explores the representation of kinetic space and spatiotemporality; the representation of mental plans of movement; movement notation, including stave notation (Labanotation) and such contemporary forms of notation as Choreographic Language Agent; and the impact of digital technology on contemporary representations of movement—in particular motion capture technology and Internet transfer protocols. Motion and Representation offers a unique cultural theory of movement and of the ever-changing ways of representing movement. (shrink)

With aims to both increase organ supply and better reflect individual donation preferences, many nations worldwide have shifted from ‘opt‐in’ to ‘opt‐out’ systems for post‐mortem organ donation (PMOD). In such countries, while a prospective donor's willingness to donate their organs/tissues for PMOD was previously ascertained—at least partially—by their having recorded positive donation preferences on an official register prior to death, this willingness is now presumed or inferred—at least partially—from their not having recorded an objection to PMOD—on an official organ donation (...) register. Using evidence regarding the presence and prevalence of selective donation preferences, and via exploration of how appeals to donation preferences are used to both motivate and legitimate shifts to opt‐out frameworks, this paper draws attention to a set of previously unexplored problems for opt‐out organ donation arising in contexts where: (a) individuals demonstrate selective post‐mortem organ/tissue donation preferences, (b) legislation provides prospective donors with the opportunity to selectively permit/refuse the donation of certain organs/tissues in line with these preferences. While selective preferences pose few problems for opt‐in systems where a selective occasion is built into the process of signing the donor register, this is not the case for opt‐out systems. The loss of this selective occasion can cause significant problems where appeals to preferences motivate/legitimate shifts to opt‐out but evidence regarding variable preferences does not feed into determinations regarding organ/tissue exclusions. The nature of these problems depends on how the authorization aspect of ‘opt‐out’ systems is framed (e.g. as presumed consent, deemed consent or, given the role of familial consent in many jurisdictions as consent in name only). (shrink)

Nicolas Weill propose une lecture stimulante de ces textes qui constituent une des découvertes philosophiques les plus importantes de ces dernières années. La publication des "Cahiers" redonne une actualité brûlante à la question qui divise épigones et détracteurs du penseur allemand : comment continuer à philosopher avec Heidegger sans tenir compte d'une éventuelle contamination de cette philosophie par l'idéologie nazie? Par une analyse sans concession des "Cahiers", en se concentrant sur les Réflexions (tenues par Heidegger de 1931 à 1941) (...) mais tout en cherchant à en dégager les éléments proprement philosophiques, cet ouvrage invite à une approche équilibrée, quitte à "penser avec Heidegger, contre Heidegger", comme le suggérait Jürgen Habermas dès le début des années 1950. Il montre notamment comment l'auteur d'Etre et temps, en inventant une nouvelle forme de philosopher, a poursuivi et prolongé dans ces carnets la critique de la modernité telle qu'elle a été formulée par la "révolution conservatrice" allemande et par Oswald Spengler, le théoricien du déclin de l'Occident. (shrink)

Johann Nikolaus Tetens s Philosophical inquiries into Human Nature and its Development (1777) is one of the most important philosophical works of the late Enlightenment. In 14 essays, Tetens attempts to resolve the fundamental problems of Enlightenment philosophy. This is the first complete and annotated edition of this major work of late Enlightenment empiricism since its initial publication.".

I propose a cautionary assessment of the recent debate concerning the impact of the dynamical approach on philosophical accounts of scientific explanation in the cognitive sciences and, particularly, the cognitive neurosciences. I criticize the dominant mechanistic philosophy of explanation, pointing out a number of its negative consequences: In particular, that it doesn’t do justice to the field’s diversity and stage of development, and that it fosters misguided interpretations of dynamical models’ contribution. In order to support these arguments, I analyze a (...) case study in computational neuroethology and show why it should not be understood through a mechanistic lens; I specially focus on Zednik’s mechanistic interpretation of the case study. In addition, I argue for a greater appreciation of the relation between explanation and other epistemic goals in the field, as well as an increased sensitivity towards the associated contextual factors. (shrink)

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list (...) of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules. (shrink)

The method of positron emission tomography illustrates the circular logic popular in subtractive neuroimaging and linear reductive cognitive psychology. Both require that strictly feed-forward, modular, cognitive components exist, before the fact, to justify the inference of particular components from images after the fact. Also, both require a "true" componential theory of cognition and laboratory tasks, before the fact, to guarantee reliable choices for subtractive contrasts. None of these possibilities are likely. Consequently, linear reductive analysis has failed to yield general, reliable, (...) componential accounts. (shrink)

In recent years much research has been undertaken regarding the feasibility of the human uterine transplant as a treatment for absolute uterine factor infertility. Should it reach clinical application this procedure would allow such individuals what is often a much-desired opportunity to become not only social mothers, or genetic and social mothers but mothers in a social, genetic and gestational sense. Like many experimental transplantation procedures such as face, hand, corneal and larynx transplants, UTx as a therapeutic option falls firmly (...) into the camp of the quality of life transplant, undertaken with the aim, not to save a life, but to enrich one. However, unlike most of these novel procedures – where one would be unlikely to find a willing living donor or an ethics committee that would sanction such a donation – the organs to be transplanted in UTx are potentially available from both living and deceased donors. In this article, in the light of the recent nine-case research trial in Sweden which used uteri obtained from living donors, and the assertions on the part of a number of other research teams currently preparing trials that they will only be using deceased donors, I explore the question of whether, in the case of UTx, there exist compelling moral reasons to prefer the use of deceased donors despite the benefits that may be associated with the use of organs obtained from the living. (shrink)

Has the time come to put to bed the concept of a harm threshold when discussing the ethics of reproductive decision making and the legal limits that should be placed upon it? In this commentary, we defend the claim that there exist good moral reasons, despite the conclusions of the non-identity problem, based on the interests of those we might create, to refrain from bringing to birth individuals whose lives are often described in the philosophical literature as ‘less than worth (...) living’. (shrink)

The method of positron emission tomography illustrates the circular logic popular in subtractive neuroimaging and linear reductive cognitive psychology. Both require that strictly feed-forward, modular, cognitive components exist, before the fact, to justify the inference of particular components from images after the fact. Also, both require a "true" componential theory of cognition and laboratory tasks, before the fact, to guarantee reliable choices for subtractive contrasts. None of these possibilities are likely. Consequently, linear reductive analysis has failed to yield general, reliable, (...) componential accounts. (shrink)

Muchos de los comentaristas de Gómez Dávila han notado que el carácter de su obra es intertextual, es decir, que no es un sistema cerrado: siempre está conectado implíci-tamente con otros libros y pensadores. El mismo Gómez Dávila nos indica en sus Escolios que Montaigne y Burckhardt tienen un rol central en esta intertextualidad. De tal manera, el siguiente artículo se propone interpretar la conexión entre los dos pen-sadores anteriores y la obra del colombiano. En el caso de Burckhardt, se (...) mostrará có-mo su pesimismo antropológico basado en una idea del pecado original, su escepti-cismo sobre la posibilidad humana de construir utopías, su negación de la idea de progreso y su concepción del tamaño y el papel del Estado aparecen y se desarrollan en el pensamiento del colombiano. En el caso de Montaigne, se mostrará su cercanía con Gómez Dávila a partir de sus similitudes biográficas, su alejamiento del espíritu académico de sus propios tiempos, su concepción de la filosofía, su escepticismo como arma para defender la fe y su fuerte conservatismo. Finalmente, se concluirá que esta intertextualidad que el autor mismo señala en su confesión sobre Montaigne y Bur-ckhardt nos ayuda a darle orden y sentido a sus posiciones políticas en los Escolios. En efecto, se intentará mostrar que Gómez Dávila articula las influencias de sus maestros para concluir en una visión de mundo reaccionaria. (shrink)

When attempting to determine which of our acts affect future generations and which affect the identities of those who make up such generations, accounts of personal identity that privilege psychological features and person affecting accounts of morality, whilst highly useful when discussing the rights and wrongs of acts relating to extant persons, seem to come up short. On such approaches it is often held that the intuition that future persons can be harmed by decisions made prior to their existence is (...) mistaken as identity is a most fragile thing with even the smallest differences in the conditions under which we procreate affecting not the interests of distinct future persons, but the identities of those who will come to exist in the future. Within this paper I reject this view, holding that a subscription to these two accounts need not result in the conclusion that virtually all acts relating to possible persons are permitted. Further, I argue that such accounts may in fact allow a great deal more scope for the determination of prenatal harms than accounts of personal identity that privilege physical features. Finally, by interpreting claims regarding causal identity such as Parfit’s Time Dependence Claim in terms of Counterpart Theory I suggest that a solution to the non-identity problem can be found in the acceptance of, as relevant in prenatal cases, three kinds of objective similarity relations: Biological, Environmental and Decisional counterpart relations. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense. The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives (...) ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally as good as.’. (shrink)

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list (...) of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules. (shrink)

Bd. 1-2. Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung.

In the present article, I introduce Husserl’s analyses of ‘natural causality’ and ‘volitional causality’, which are collected in the volume ‘Wille und Handlung’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins. My aim is to show that Husserl’s insight into these phenomena enables us to understand more clearly both the specificity of, and the relation between, the motivational nexus belonging to the sphere of the will in contrast with the causal laws of nature. In light of this understanding, in (...) the last part of the article I reflect on whether and to what extent there is, in fact, an ontological and epistemological compatibility between volitional causality and natural causality. (shrink)

The method of positron emission tomography (PET imaging) illustrates the circular logic popular in subtractive neuroimaging and linear reductive cognitive psychology. Both require that strictly feed-forward, modular, cognitive components exist, before the fact, to justify the inference of particular components from images (or other observables) after the fact. Also, both require a "true" componential theory of cognition and laboratory tasks, before the fact, to guarantee reliable choices for subtractive contrasts. None of these possibilities are likely. Consequently, linear reductive analysis has (...) failed to yield general, reliable, componential accounts. (shrink)

Most physics theories are deterministic, with the notable exception of quantum mechanics which, however, comes plagued by the so-called measurement problem. This state of affairs might well be due to the inability of standard mathematics to “speak” of indeterminism, its inability to present us a worldview in which new information is created as time passes. In such a case, scientific determinism would only be an illusion due to the timeless mathematical language scientists use. To investigate this possibility it is necessary (...) to develop an alternative mathematical language that is both powerful enough to allow scientists to compute predictions and compatible with indeterminism and the passage of time. We suggest that intuitionistic mathematics provides such a language and we illustrate it in simple terms. (shrink)

A new approach to sentencing Not Just Deserts inaugurates a radical shift in the research agenda of criminology. The authors attack currently fashionable retributivist theories of punishment, arguing that the criminal justice system is so integrated that sentencing policy has to be considered in the system-wide context. They offer a comprehensive theory of criminal justice which draws on a philosophical view of the good and the right, and which points the way to practical intervention in the real world of incremental (...) reform. They put the case for a criminal justice system which maximizes freedom in the old republican sense of the term, and which they call `dominion'. (shrink)

For the majority of scholars concerned with the ethics of living organ donation, inflicting moderate harms on competent volunteers in order to save the lives or increase the life chances of others is held to be justifiable provided certain conditions are met. These conditions tend to include one, or more commonly, some combination of the following: The living donor provides valid consent to donation. Living donation produces an overall positive balance of harm–benefit for donors and recipients which cannot be obtained (...) in a less harmful manner. Donation is not liable to cause significant and long-term morbidity to, or the death of, the donor. This paper critically examines the suggestion that these criteria are not sufficient to offer a general account of justified living organ donation in the context of competent volunteers and that key to justified living organ donation is that donors receive sufficient benefits from their donation that these outweigh the harms they suffer. However, although this view—termed here ‘The Donor Benefit Standard’—directs welcome attention to the many and complex motives which may underlie living organ donation, this paper ultimately concludes that given the threats this position poses to individual autonomy and the lives of those in need of organ transplants ‘The Donor Benefit Standard’ should ultimately be rejected. (shrink)

Within contemporary penal philosophy, the view that punishment can only be justified if the offender is a moral agent who is responsible and hence blameworthy for their offence is one of the few areas on which a consensus prevails. In recent literature, this precept is associated with the retributive tradition, in the modern form of ‘just deserts’. Turning its back on the rehabilitative ideal, this tradition forges a strong association between the justification of punishment, the attribution of responsible agency in (...) relation to the offence, and the appropriateness of blame. By contrast, effective clinical treatment of disorders of agency employs a conceptual framework in which ideas of responsibility and blameworthiness are clearly separated from what we call ‘affective blame’: the range of hostile, negative attitudes and emotions that are typical human responses to criminal or immoral conduct. We argue that taking this clinical model of ‘responsibility without blame’ into the legal realm offers new possibilities. Theoretically, it allows for the reconciliation of the idea of ‘just deserts’ with a rehabilitative ideal in penal philosophy. Punishment can be reconceived as consequences—typically negative but occasionally not, so long as they are serious and appropriate to the crime and the context—imposed in response to, by reason of, and in proportion to responsibility and blameworthiness, but without the hard treatment and stigma typical of affective blame. Practically, it suggests how sentencing and punishment can better avoid affective blame and instead further rehabilitative and related ends, while yet serving the demands of justice. (shrink)

In the biomedical context, policy makers face a large amount of potentially discordant evidence from different sources. This prompts the question of how this evidence should be aggregated in the interests of best-informed policy recommendations. The starting point of our discussion is Hunter and Williams’ recent work on an automated aggregation method for medical evidence. Our negative claim is that it is far from clear what the relevant criteria for evaluating an evidence aggregator of this sort are. What is the (...) appropriate balance between explicitly coded algorithms and implicit reasoning involved, for instance, in the packaging of input evidence? In short: What is the optimal degree of ‘automation’? On the positive side: We propose the ability to perform an adequate robustness analysis as the focal criterion, primarily because it directs efforts to what is most important, namely, the structure of the algorithm and the appropriate extent of automation. Moreover, where there are resource constraints on the aggregation process, one must also consider what balance between volume of evidence and accuracy in the treatment of individual evidence best facilitates inference. There is no prerogative to aggregate the total evidence available if this would in fact reduce overall accuracy. (shrink)