Our target article concerns the direction and growth of enactivism, a framework portrayed as a revolutionary shift in understanding cognition. While enactivism continues to be a lively position, it is unclear how its contributions relate to the cognitive sciences. Despite some empirical successes, enactivism remains somewhat insulated as a theoretical position and as a research program. There exists a discrepancy between enactivist aims and delivery. The basis of this problem, we argue, is that the overall objective of enactive theorising is (...) not clear, which has led to diverging strategies for implementation and integration with the cognitive sciences. We review contributions from different strains of enactivism – autopoietic, sensorimotor and radical – and their research goals, both tacit and explicit. We show that enactivism is productively understood as two projects we term utopian enactivism and scientific enactivism. Utopian enactivism aims to develop a philosophically defensible lens through which cognitive science is to be viewed. Scientific enactivism intervenes in scientific practice by contributing to the implementation of enactive ideas. Once disentangled, the utopian and scientific projects have important but independent tasks. Utopian enactivism is useful for building a coherent and defensible enactive philosophy of nature, while scientific enactivism is free to draw upon and contribute to non-enactive approaches in the cognitive sciences. We aim to motivate discussions that will enhance enactivism’s progress, and our reappraisal also offers a clear and explicit roadmap for renewing advances in enactivist philosophy and cognitive science. (shrink)

Meyer and Brancazio make an important distinction between two enactivist projects: “utopian” and “scientific.” I agree that contemporary enactivists would benefit from more clearly distinguishing these projects and their success conditions. However, I wonder whether there are times when letting these projects merge with each other might be helpful, or even necessary.

This Open Peer Commentary on “A Critical Cybernetics” by Klaus Krippendorff outlines that enacting alternative not-yet existing realities goes beyond discourse and can be considered design practice. A Critical Cybernetics for enacting alternative not-yet existing realities, such as Krippendorff proposed, would benefit from associating itself with the expertise in the technicity of society that has been central to cybernetics since its inception.

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I provide two reasons for thinking the conclusion drawn from the argument’s premises is too strong. Briefly, (a) the benefits of having consistent commitments between enactivism and developmental systems theory are only clear when treating both as philosophies of nature rather than empirical research programs, and (b) the target article demonstrates that enactivism is capable of explanatory pluralism.

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: A move to sympoiesis entails a conceptual overhaul of autopoiesis, a key facet of the enactive approach to cognition. In this commentary, I invite more systematic thinking about the concept of autopoiesis and enactivist commitments to it, given the inconsistencies regarding individuality raised in the target article.

Context: A central motivation behind various embodied, extended, and enactive (4E) approaches to cognition is to ground our understanding of minds and cognition within the biological structures that give rise to life. Because of this, their advocates often claim a natural kinship with dynamical and developmental systems theories. However, these accounts also explicitly or implicitly privilege individual organisms in ways that contrast with many of the insights of systems and developmental systems approaches to biology. Problem: The prioritization of individual organisms (...) within 4E approaches to cognition contrasts with the default entangled structure of biological systems associated with cognitive agency. We provide means for 4E cognitive science to move beyond an individual-centred view of cognitive agency. Method: We first identify and problematize individual-centredness within various predominant 4E approaches by comparison with biological research and developmental systems theory. Subsequently, we offer conceptual resources from the field of ecological research for understanding cognitive agency beyond the predominant focus on individual organisms. Results: Cognitive agency may be understood without privileging individual organisms by reading nonequilibrium maintenance in terms of a dynamic differentiation instead of individual organismic autonomy. This form of organizational structure corresponds to the notion of sympoiesis from ecological research. Implications: Approaching cognitive agency without privileging individual organisms should be invaluable to advocates of 4E cognition seeking to ground notions of cognition and mind within contemporary biological research. Constructivist content: We seek to expand upon existing constructivist perspectives on the organizing principles of cognitive agency, such as sensorimotor embodiment and autopoiesis, arguing that meta-organismic cognitive agents (including humans) embody distributed relations beyond the privileging of individual organisms. Key words: 4E cognition, autopoiesis, cognitive agency, developmental systems theory, enactivism, extended mind thesis, holobionts, sympoeisis. (shrink)

We delineate the distinctness of sympoiesis from adaptive notions of autopoiesis and explain why we see it as helpful to the exploration and explanation of agentive and adaptive cognitive systems.

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: Bin Liu’s model of the world, where screen creatures construct their experience and 3D environment but are not related to the world perceptually, makes a good case against objective realism assumptions and the passive world-view approach. However, from our point of view, it fails to account for the biological substrate of such worldmaking. We outline an alternative model of the world inhabited by embodied dialogic creatures.

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I examine the authors’ concept of relational cognition, showing that it has two possible readings, both more “cartesian” than the authors suppose. Whence the authors’ “anti-cartesianism,” then? I suggest it is due to an understanding of cognition that allows cognition to operate at very long timescales, and provide an argument to resist such an understanding.

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: Dengsø and Kirchhoff’s inspiring proposal to drop the individual-centeredness of autopoiesis in favor of a view based on sympoiesis and developmental systems theory (DST) has two problems: (a) It is not clear that the points they raise as arguments against individual-centered 4E cognition are incompatible with those views and many of them are already included in Ezequiel Di (...) Paolo’s account of enaction. (b) They give no clear account of how 4E cognition will account for agency as purposive behavior once it discards its current, individual-centered, accounts of it. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: I show that the observation of the objects of the observer-dependent world - that by virtue of which they are given - is not itself given as another object. The peculiarity of observation is that it is irreducible to either an object or an abstract concept. We see the content of the observation, but we do not see the observation itself, it is not an object (...) or an object for us. Therefore, we can apply the category of “virtuality” to the observation itself, as well as to the observer. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: I frame Liu’s “world of screen creatures” model (WSC) in terms of the idealism-realism opposition, by looking especially at the tradition of transcendental and phenomenological philosophy. I claim that the WSC model amounts to a form of subjective idealism and solipsism and that, for this reason, it is subject to what I call the “problem of alterity.”.

I present Weber’s German book Radikaler Lingualismus to those who are interested in non-dualism but cannot read German. In my review, I compare Weber’s book with Mitterer’s works, address non-dualism at key points, and elaborate on Weber’s deviations.

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: I examine the premise that Liu’s screen creatures duplicate the images of a first-person shooter. I raise questions about the first-person perspective of screen creatures and their use of language.

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: Liu proposes that in order to get rid of any representational perceptual relation we should interpret ourselves as screen creatures, i.e., as content that can be displayed on a screen from which we then construct our surroundings. I focus on two topics. The first topic is how exactly to understand the idea of “screen creatures” so that they can be interpreted as functioning human subjects. The (...) second topic is about the whole theoretical setup and how it can be reconciled with Ockham’s razor. (shrink)

I explain the world of screen creatures by virtue of our familiar environment and the notion of the experiential world. My explanation is meant to strengthen the argument for the view that the constructivist world model does not need the perceptual relation. I also demonstrate that the experiential world is complete, meaning that every type of phenomenon can be explained within this realm.

Context: Some scholars have put forward constructivist world models in which the purported external world is constructed from experience (i.e., there is a constructive relation between them. However, scholars disagree about whether experience is generated by the brain and results from the perception of the purported external world (i.e., whether there are generative relations and perceptual relations. Problem: Do we need to maintain perceptual relations or generative relations in a constructivist world model? Method: I propose a world model where our (...) world is composed of a large number of screen creatures, and this is compared with the world model in the irrealist virtual world theory. There is a constructive relation in both world models, but only the second world model contains generative and perceptual relations. I provide reasons to doubt that the world model in the irrealist virtual world theory can provide sufficient reasons for involving generative or perceptual relations. Results: We should accept the world model composed of screen creatures as the model of our world; we do not need to retain perceptual or generative relations in a constructivist world model. Implications: This article points out that perceptual relations stem from a misunderstanding of certain correlations between experiences. This will generate some new ideas when considering the mind-matter problem. Constructivist content: This article discusses how to deal with generative and perceptual relations using constructivist world models. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I raise the question of whether sympoietic systems, as construed in the target article, can be said to exhibit adaptivity. First, I give an overview of the role of adaptivity in the context of an enactivist conception of life-mind continuity. Subsequently, I reflect on a number of ways in which the notion of adaptivity may or may not (...) be applied to sympoietic systems. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: Bin Liu’s target article “The World of Screen Creatures” proposes a new constructivist understanding of our relationship to the (apparent) external world. While there is much that is interesting and innovative in Liu’s account, I suggest that there are some key points for clarification that would help readers to be better able to weigh the merits of his account against its rivals.

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I concur with Dengsø and Kirchhoff that if we are to ground cognition more deeply in contemporary biology, we need to focus on the organism-environment relationship as the unit of biological explanation most relevant to cognitive science. This entails questioning the individualistic bias that has pervaded 4E cognitive science. However, can we overcome that bias while retaining a (...) commitment to the importance of phenomenological descriptions for 4E cognitive science? Perhaps we can, but probably not if we continue to rely on classical Western phenomenology. Certain strands of Buddhist thought might be more compatible with sympoiesis. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: Bin Liu’s defense of phenomenalism via an elaborate and inventive thought experiment is contrasted with more traditional ways of defending that doctrine. A similar distinction in strategies can be drawn between different ways of arguing that we live in a virtual world. The comparison leads to a more general, metaphilosophical conclusion about how to argue for constructivist positions in metaphysics.

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: While sharing the authors’ interest in a biologically grounded approach to cognition that does not privilege individual organisms, I argue that autopoietic enactivism à la Maturana and Varela may be up to the task via its key relational notion of structural coupling. I also wonder about unicellular cognition from the viewpoint of sympoiesis and reflect on the ouroboric (...) nature of living beings as processes, which is rather implicit in the target article. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: Dengsø and Kirchhoff offer a revised dynamic conception of the individual in place of the bounded cognitive agent of classical cognitive science. However, this may not be sufficiently robust to ground the enquiries into individual and cultural differences that remain vital in the proposed “deterritorialized cognitive science.” It also needs to make contact with rich traditions of 4E (...) research on socially distributed cognition, which are neglected in Dengsø and Kirchhoff’s critique. It is just because individualization is a fragile process, and because boundaries are hard-won achievements, that anti-individualists who highlight the multiplicity, heterogeneity, and dynamism of cognitive ecologies must reconfigure rather than eliminate or efface the individual. (shrink)

Whereas I empathize with Penny’s grave concern over current modalist instructional technology - “modalist” in the sense of privileging one modality, predominantly vision, at the expense of all others - I do not quite share his bleak assessment of future offerings. Following some hopefully inspiring words from historical philosophers of education, I showcase the Quad, a haptic-tactile mechatronic device built by three US-based laboratories collaborating to create modally expansive learning tools for classrooms that are inclusive of sensorially diverse students. While (...) the Quad is “digital” in the familiar computational sense, it is at once “digital” in the corporeal sense of evoking the fingers - it reintroduces mutimodal engagement into mathematics learning. (shrink)

I clarify some epistemological aspects of what learning is, conceived from the perspective of the Santiago school of cognition. This process also serves to further examine the importance of the learning medium, or context, in shaping the learning experience of users/learners, and the type and nature of such learning experience. Finally, I introduce the “heart” and “mind” metaphors of autopoietic learning systems, as a way to define the different nature of design principles informing organizational and structural aspects of autopoietic TEL (...) systems considered as a learning tool, and considered as a leaning context. (shrink)

I address Theo Hug’s challenges by exploring relations between measurable and non-measurable dimensions of education from a systems-thinking, values-based educational technology design and Global South perspective.

Context: Challenges in designing digital learning come from the complexity and ever-changing nature of socio-technological systems. Following an autopoietic logic can assist the design of technology-enhanced learning (TEL) systems and their digital learning affordances in education. Problem: The lack of self-maintenance and adaptability considerations in educational technology design, to maintain the efficiency and engagement of TEL systems within ever-changing conditions over time. The concept of autopoiesis, and the 4E+ cognition framework can provide a guiding framework for a more adequate type (...) of the design of TEL systems in education. Method: I exlplore the philosophical and practical aspects of the concept of autopoiesis and 4E+ cognition in the design of digital learning affordances and TEL systems in education. This is motivated by the apparent potential of autopoiesis principles and ideas to inform the design of efficient and engaging digital learning affordances and TEL systems over time. The 4E+ cognition framework is applied to understand the learners’ experience, which in turn informs design principles. Results: Following an autopoiesis and 4E+ cognition framework to configure TEL systems and digital learning affordances has the potential, in theory, to increase the ongoing efficiency and learning engagement of TEL systems in education. An increased efficiency of TEL systems, in turn, can improve the learning process and outcomes for learners, by offering them enhanced digital learning affordances over time. Implications: Embedding autopoiesis, along with 4E+ cognition, in the design of educational technology can guide educational technologists, designers, researchers and practitioners to design more efficient, engaging and long-lasting TEL systems, while addressing the challenges found today in education. Constructivist content: The constructivist content is grounded in the epistemology of the Santiago school of cognition, coming from the work of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. (shrink)

In their target article Valdés-Zorrilla et al. postulate that the typical ways of teaching mathematics cause serious mental-health problems in a significant number of our students. They alert us that this would be “the most critical problem in mathematics education.” They propose a solution based on metaphorizing along with embodied and enactive strategies, and exemplify them in work on probability. I argue that the great challenge is how to get the educational system to adopt the proposed solution. This solution may (...) also help another critical mathematics education problem that is coming our way, i.e., trust. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Autopoiesis and 4E+ Cognition in the Design of Digital Learning Affordances” by Claudio Aguayo. Abstract: An autopoietic educational system may provide for immersive individualised learning experiences that cater to the unique interests of each student; however, universities generally require uniformity in education to enable group assessments and accreditation and thus do not readily accommodate individualised tuition. A further challenge is that for a system to be autopoietic, it should be able to create its own (...) rules; this may be at odds with the educator’s goals for their courses. (shrink)

Digital simulations and representations often make poor substitutes for direct engagement with the lived world. However, they also have the potential to enable new forms of engagement with our environment rather than replace those we already have.

Our commentary centres on our experiences of classrooms and lecture halls in different countries and what it might mean, from an enactivist perspective, to use the same idea across such boundaries.

I comment on Simon Penny’s main points about human cognition and his concerns about online education. I then provide an example and novice 4E assessment of my experience teaching mathematics remotely during the pandemic in the hope that it will encourage us to self-reflect on our own experiences, and determine whether frameworks such as 4E can shed light on our own observations and explanatory models during this most extraordinary period.

I focus on the concept of prolepsis, the representation or assumption of a future act or development as if presently existing or accomplished. It is suggested that prolepsis reveals the non-linear nature of semiotic mediation.

While sympathetic to much of what the authors of the target article write, I claim that there is a binary in their thinking, i.e., the one in the title of my commentary. I argue that such binaries obscure some groups and, in this case, one thing relatively hidden is the role of the teacher, in the lessons described. An alternative to positing an opposition between teaching approaches would be to apply the principles of “E-teaching” to working with teachers, as well (...) as students. (shrink)

While deeply sympathising with Shvarts and Abrahamson’s thoughtful attempt at theoretically explaining semiotic mediation from a radical embodied perspective, we suggest that their metaphor of an “ontological gap” to be bridged deserves pondering. We also discuss their illustrative “empirical finale” from our enactivist viewpoint.

I explore whether there are differences in kind between digital images that reproduce things from our lived world and digital images that enact conceptual relationships.

4E pedagogy is being promoted in the target article by Videla, Veloz, and Pino. In my commentary, the nature of teaching and whether or not 4E cognition is radical constructivist are discussed.

An adequate integration of 4E cognition and education must take into account classic themes in educational theory, such as the learning vs. Bildung debate. 4E cognition, however, offers a plausible alternative to go beyond this antinomy.

Open peer commentary on the article “Autopoiesis and 4E+ Cognition in the Design of Digital Learning Affordances” by Claudio Aguayo. Abstract: I agree with Aguayo that the design of technology-enhanced learning systems should be based on a living systems perspective, and that autopoiesis and 4E+ cognition have rich potential to develop this line of thinking. However, we need to examine some assumptions about “technology-enhanced learning” and consider how this term might be problematic for developing culturally inclusive learning systems. We also (...) need to consider the extent to which the autopoiesis and 4E+ cognition approach can improve the quality of learning. (shrink)

The authors of the target article provide insight into various ways creativity has been presented in the past 50 years or so. In my commentary, I identify some historical antecedents of key 4E ideas that can be found in the work of Dewey, Piaget and von Glasersfeld. I also allude to some crucial differences between radical constructivism and 4E cognition, and wonder whether implicit epistemologies may impact on the creative process.

Welcoming Hug’s critical analysis of educational and pedagogical applications of 4E cognition, I discuss the relevance of considering some enactive perspectives in dialogue with Freirean critical pedagogy in order to advance his proposal.

I claim that mathematics is constructed with the ambition of allowing for absolute agreement. Dealing with students’ thinking that deviates from the supposedly absolute agreement is a key problem for mathematics teaching. Some sources for such deviant thinking include the relationship between mathematics and modelled reality, and the “imaginary” nature of probability.

My response starts with some remarks on the fuzzy disciplinary boundaries of educational research. The aim is to elucidate the scope and the complexity of conceptual clarifications at the crossroads of learning, Bildung, 4E cognition and enactive education. The discussion of critical questions and issues of criticism results in cautiously optimistic perspectives and a vote for meta-critical and polylogical research in order to contribute to the development of fruitful and relevant indications for future-oriented forms of education.

Context: References to education in the 21st century often follow popular framings of education focusing on “skilling” and self-regulated learning without reflecting education as a key concept in educational research. Inter- and transdisciplinary efforts at the seams of 4E cognition and educational research can offer mutual benefits and enhanced perspectives for conceptualizing and designing educational arrangements open to the future. Problem: Education and educational research are contested fields. Depending on disciplinary backgrounds and entanglements of educational research and policy, different operative (...) fictions of, for example, optimization, emancipation, calculable output, or freedom of personality development play a role. I highlight some challenges and often neglected contexts at the crossroads of learning and education as Bildung. Method: I summarize some historical background regarding education, educationability (Bildsamkeit) and the relevance of educationalization formulas. Furthermore, I consider a number of issues related to learnification, literacification, datafication and the impact of the global education industry. A critical analysis shows that some challenges have been undervalued in the discourses at the crossroads of education and 4E cognition, so far. Results: As for the future of 4E cognition research, perspectives are not necessarily limited to quantitative measurement, calculability, formalization and computational models of cognition. Further clarification should include relations of measurable and non-measurable dimensions of education as well as humanist and post-humanist assumptions of learning subjects. Implications: Insights are beneficial for educational researchers and specialists from different disciplines who want to overcome reductionist or lopsided perspectives regarding the future of education. Constructivist content: 4E cognition considering extracranial processes is compatible with radical constructivism and relevant to educational research and pedagogical practice. However, considering the relevance of entanglements of micro-, meso - and macro-levels in education, the increasing impact of the global education industry and contemporary challenges of various critical ecologies, enhanced perspectives of constructivism that are informed by Siegfried J. Schmidt’s media-cultural constructivism and Kersten Reich’s interactive constructivism provide broader prospects for conceptualizing and designing education in the 21st century. (shrink)

My present reflections will center on a point the authors present as an afterthought, but that seems pivotal: mathematical knowledge is not comprised of perception-action loops alone. Instead, “guided coordination of sensorimotor and semiotic activity” is held to be essential. Shvarts and Abrahamson do not elaborate on how this happens. My aim is to sketch what an account giving equal weight to semiotic and embodied facets might look like, and to clarify why paying attention to the details of their interplay (...) is crucial for evaluating ontological claims such as the monist position defended by the authors. I will presently address four questions: (a) why failing to tackle the semiotic pole explicitly is a risky methodological choice, (b) what literature we can draw on to address the embodied-semiotic relationship, (c) what empirical criteria ontological claims might hinge on, and (d) why a dialectic (and non-dualist) approach offers a credible alternative to monism. (shrink)

While the target article articulates key concepts from enactivism and social perspectives very well, the framework the authors offer seems to obscure some epistemological tensions. One such tension concerns the goal of research and how the framework can contribute to education in the 21st century. The second is about the way in which the authors conceptualize the relationship between the theorizations they draw on. The third is in the adoption, at times, of a reifying perspective in contradiction with the “dynamical” (...) approach the authors first adopt. All three can be seen as opportunities to embrace and promote fuzziness and ambiguity for 21st-century (mathematics) education. (shrink)

Discussing the ideas of Bernstein, Shvarts, and Abrahamson, I suggest considering the more prominent role of Bernstein’s “repetition without repetition” principle in embodied learning. A vignette from an empirical study of co-construction activity illustrates the suggestion.

Understanding creativity in STEAM education from the 4E perspective is a virtuous idea. In my commentary, I focus on critically evaluating the author’s fish-catching metaphor to discuss interaction’s role in creativity further. Furthermore, I will raise the issue of constitutiveness regarding environmental factors used in the creative experience.

Context: During the Covid pandemic, teachers and academics at all levels were abruptly required to learn and deploy generic online educational tools that do not adequately substitute for many classroom or lab practices. In the rush to make education viable during the pandemic, there was little time for critical analysis of the qualities of “online delivery,” especially with regard to embodied dimensions of cognition. Conventional academic styles of pedagogy and testing were commonly emulated. In the attempt to simply “keep the (...) train on the rails,” there has been little time to assess what - cognitively or pedagogically - has been gained or lost. Problem: Computer and internet-based interactive applications have specific cognitive affordances and constraints that differ from the tangible embodied scenarios they sometimes purport to emulate. Traditional pedagogy in many disciplines entails a substantial component of “hands-on” learning, a complementary knowing how that enables practice, builds skills and provides metaphors and concepts. Existing software and interfaces do not cater well to training embodied skills, and perhaps cannot. In the absence of hands-on lab, studio and clinical experience that usually complements textbook-lecture-test styles of pedagogy, a knowing that (as opposed to knowing how) orientation was reinforced. The traditional recognition that embodied experience is an integral component of effective learning has been elided (similar elision occurs with respect to some online research practices. In emphasizing “problem-solving,” this instrumentalizing of a knowledge-that style of pedagogy usually elides the syncretic and creative cognitive corollary of problem framing. Method: I discuss online pedagogy and research from an enactive/embodied critical perspective and juxtapose case examples of embodied practices. Results: The conclusions drawn from this discussion are that important cognitive differences between face-to-face, hands-on pedagogy and research, and pedagogy and research conducted online are present and critical analysis of the situation is crucial for pedagogical and research effectiveness. Implications: Whether in pharmacology, mechanical engineering or social media, new technologies and technological systems often have unexpected effects when embedded in society. This is the case with online pedagogy. Critical assessment is overdue. Such will motivate new education research and human-computer design initiatives. Researchers in human-computer interaction, cognitive psychology, education design and other fields should take up the challenge. It remains a possibility that some embodied practices may simply not be compatible with online environments. It is incumbent upon institutions to take such issues seriously, or risk substantial impoverishment of the educational experience. Constructivist content: I analyze online pedagogy and research from an embodied and enactivist perspective, assessing the different qualities of sensorimotor engagement in screen-based activities as opposed to hands-on experiences. I argue that “knowing” is grounded in sensorimotorically multimodal embodied experiences, and recognize the limitations in the sensorimotor ecologies of online phenomena. (shrink)

I respond to a range of issues raised by commentators, concerning aspects of digital cultures, online interaction, and related matters of pedagogy.

From an enactivist perspective, I present some reflections on teachers’ and students’ body movements in mathematics learning.

We focus on the Herbartian notions of “Bildung” and “pedagogical tact” evoked by Theo Hug in his insightful discussion of the interplay and relations between education and 4E cognition. We raise the question of whether the development of pedagogical tact in mathematics teaching needs to be grounded on embodied, enactive and extended cognition in the teacher-learner interaction. In particular, we discuss the current “learnification” of teaching and education, as highlighted by the author.

I ponder what the rapid progress of AI means for education in the 21st century. Is it feasible to expect embodied autonomous tools that, through participatory sense-making, can construct knowledge ready to be taught to students?

I look at the implications of the 4E approach to understanding creativity. I argue that the focus on originality and ideation (even if both are understood as extended and distributed) reflects a lingering Cartesian dualism rather than a commitment to understanding creativity as it unfolds in the world.

In this commentary, I propose a more optimistic take to the role of virtual environments for pedagogical purposes than Simon Penny does in his target article. I consider how they already do involve our embodiment, and propose to rethink their objectives, from simulating our environments and substituting our practices, to enriching our repertoires and affording new actions.

I aim to strengthen the connection between Bernstein and Vygotsky, the key theoretical pillars in the target article on semiotic mediation during mathematics teaching/learning interactions. The concept of the field of promoted action (FPA) as understood through a constraints-led approach is crucial to foster such connection. FPA heavily relies on Bernstein’s characterization of (motor) problem solving in the learning process and relates to Vygotsky’s notion of the zone of proximal development. The use of FPA provides a more parsimonious account of (...) semiotic mediation. Instead of an active functional system comprising student-teacher intercorporeal interactions on the one hand and a passive functional system comprising body-artifacts interactions on the other, FPA comprises an integrated functional dynamic system. In this integrated system, agency is distributed across human and non-human elements, among which semiotic mediation takes place. (shrink)

In this commentary, I extend Videla, Veloz and Pino’s conceptual analysis of their design-engineering students’ flow of actions by drawing similarities to some of the recent developments in problem-posing and problem-solving research in mathematics education.

n our response, we provide theoretical clarifications on how the functional dynamic systems approach allows a monist theorization of offline cognition and imagination; highlight the importance, for ontogenetic cultural development, of the system’s sensorimotor dynamics as well as this dynamics’ reification; elaborate on the notions of “field of promoted action,” “zone of proximal development,” “scaffolding,” and “repetition without repetition” as well as purported relations among these notions. We stress the transformative potential both of culture’s proleptic anticipation and, conversely, individuals’ non-linear (...) rebellion against it. We also address questions regarding educational applicability, design, and classroom practices. Finally, we unpack the ethical and transformative role of our theoretical work in 21st-century educational science. (shrink)

Context: Radical embodied approaches to cognition propose a drastic alternative to representation-based models of the mind by way of theorizing and empirically demonstrating the constitutive roles of perception-action loops in human behavior. However, applying those approaches to higher-order processes - such as mathematical thinking and learning - remains one of the hottest debates within contemporary cognitive science. Problem: How might a radical embodied perspective theoretically explain semiotic mediation? For example, how can we theorize the understanding of trigonometric relations expressed through (...) the symbolic form of “sin 2a = sin a? Method: Revisiting the nature of semiotic mediation, we pursue a historically grounded theoretical analysis that integrates perspectives from Lev Vygotsky and Nikolai Bernstein; to make the theoretical proposal accessible, we illustrate it by empirical data from a dual-eye-tracking study on teaching/learning trigonometry. Results: We show how semiotic mediation of mathematical ideas is constituted as direct intercorporeal sensorimotor coordination between interlocutors. We treat semiotic actions as directly transforming an environment for the interlocutor, inviting new sensorimotor processes. New sensorimotor routines potentially lead to the emergence of pedagogically desired perception and action orientations, that is, new enactive capacity as the cognitive vehicle of mathematical reasoning. As such, Vygotskian cultural-historical ideas of semiotic mediation become a natural continuation of a radical embodied project developed by Bernstein, Kelso, Turvey, and others. Semiotic actions do not represent mind-independent reality as standalone tokens - rather, they present the environment itself, for the interlocutor, in a new way. Implications: The proposed perspective avoids ontologically problematic views of pedagogical discourse as the negotiation of minds, instead focusing educators’ attention on transformations of the students’ environment that foster desired perceptions and actions. Constructivist content: We develop an alternative to a social-constructivist reading of cultural-historical ideas, thus contributing to the understanding of higher-order cognition as direct extension of perception and action. (shrink)

Shvarts and Abrahamson bridge enactivism with Vygotsky’s sociocultural theory and Bernstein’s coordination dynamics, and ground the proposed ideas with a case study. I question the interpretation of enactivism for mathematics educators, and the applicability of the proposed ideas to explain offline mathematics cognition.

Open peer commentary on the article “Autopoiesis and 4E+ Cognition in the Design of Digital Learning Affordances” by Claudio Aguayo. Abstract: I first consider the question of whether the technology in any way contributes to technology-enhanced learning (TEL) systems’ being autopoietic. Secondly, if we think of TEL systems as autopoietic (and as relatively complex agents), it becomes unclear how we can guarantee that they remain efficient over time. Lastly, although technology in education can be very useful, it is not clear (...) why technology-enhanced learning systems (designed from the perspective of the 4E+ cognition framework), should necessarily, and prominently, lead to more engagement, meaning, and relevance compared to learning environments where the embodied and social nature of the human mind is emphasized instead of technology. (shrink)

We offer a response to the main themes arising from the commentators’ inquiries and critiques: Laying down a royal road in random walking, the causes of cognitive abuse, the binary good versus bad teaching, the role of the teacher, the limits of e-learning, the role of the body, mathematical modelling and AI exploration of problem-solving strategies.

Context: Millions of learners worldwide experience mathematics nowadays as an inescapable tool of cognitive abuse and punitive selection. Most traditional teaching thwarts natural human cognitive resources. Problem: We would like to contribute to alleviating the aforementioned cognitive abuse, sharing the insights afforded by our exploration of enactive and metaphorical approaches to learning and teaching, inspired by E (embodied, enactive, extended, embedded, ecological)-cognition. We aim at understanding mathematical thinking processes and practicing an experimental epistemology of mathematics, not just prescribing actions to (...) be undertaken in the classroom Method: Our theoretical scope is E-cognition. Our main research method is based on enactivism (enaction à la Varela) including metaphorical analysis, participant observation, and semi-structured interviews. Moreover, we discuss illustrative examples of learning activities related to random walks and STEAM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Art & Mathematics), particularly physics and art (dance and choreography. Results: Embodiment, enacting and metaphorising make a dramatic difference in mathematics learning processes. Learning activities related to random walks and deterministic dynamical systems enacted through dance and choreography can play a significant antidotal and remedial role against cognitive abuse in the teaching of mathematics. Beneficial insights are triggered, for students, teachers, and mathematics educators. Implications: We suggest new horizons for research and practice in mathematics education informed by E-cognition and metaphorisation, with an antidotal and therapeutic effect against cognitive abuse in teaching. Further research is commendable on the often-stressful transition process from an abusive and repressive education to a more open enactivist education, which could use micro-phenomenological interviews among other techniques. It could involve scaling up our experimentation, particularly with prospective and in-service teachers. Limitations are related to the small number of students and teachers hitherto involved. Constructivist content: Our research aims at developing a radically enactivist mathematics education inspired by Varela’s enaction. Erratum: In the last sentence of §111 "so fostering their metacognitive abilities" should have been deleted. (shrink)

We discuss the author’s suggestions of incorporating interdisciplinary arts methodologies and focusing on asking the “right questions,” or big questions, as well as embodied and enactive practices into education, besides raising a concern about how to foster the construction of “bottom-up” knowledge. We also touch on the importance of problem posing and transgressing disciplinary boundaries through metaphorising.

I discuss how random walks provide a metaphorical playground for mathematical conceptualization. In particular, I propose to extend the random-walk metaphor, by introducing structural changes that go beyond mere changes of state. Hence, the “steps” in the walk change not only the position the system is at, but also the way in which it walks. The latter invites learners to think in constructivist concepts in a mathematical way.

While we empathize with Theo Hug about the contributions of Bildung to the notion of education and its potential link with the 4E approach, we do not share the reductionist argument of STEAM in the light of education in the 21st century. Following some interdisciplinary influences from design and some references from pedagogues and philosophers of education, we present some reflections and discussions on the Bildung proposal. To embody our theoretical approaches, we present the “smart geodesic dome” STEAM project design (...) carried out by primary school students as a plant habitat. (shrink)

Context: The 4E approach proposes an alternative framework for understanding cognition and learning. However, its application to the study of education in the 21st century is incipient. Problem: What are the challenges of 21st-century education in the field of cognition and learning? How can the 4E approach be implemented in educational processes? Method: This introduction outlines the challenges of 21st-century education and the progress that the 4E approach has made in the different perspectives presented in the contributions of this special (...) issue. Results: Today, we find a limited but growing number of studies on the 4E approach applied to education. We argue that the 4E approach presents a propitious field for the challenges of education in the 21st century, especially for the understanding of teaching and learning in socio-material and technological environments, as well as new research tools that support theories of learning with empirical evidence. Implications: A better understanding of the constructivist perspectives on the application of 4E in education can guide future research in education as well as novel teaching methodologies. (shrink)

We address the following three questions that summarize the concerns of commentators: (a) Is the metaphor of creativity as catching the big fish useful? (b) What is the relationship between radical constructivism and the 4E approach? (c) What do we understand by teaching from the 4E approach?

Context: The 4E approach proposes an alternative framework to understanding cognition and learning. However, its application to the study of creativity from new educational approaches such as STEAM is incipient. Problem: How can the 4E approach that fosters creativity be implemented in STEAM education, through participation in technology-mediated learning ecosystems? Method: Through face-to-face ethnographic participant observation, we observe students engaging in creative activities suggested by our theoretical approach. We use these observations to illustrate our theoretical approach. Results: Our examples show (...) the many possibilities to encourage creativity by participating in STEAM educational environments that promote design and prototyping with technologies. We highlight collaborative work, disciplinary integration and learning by doing, characteristics of the STEAM approach, which favor the implementation of the 4E approach. Implications: The STEAM approach encourages creativity and learning that gives primacy to training processes over final products, so it is consistent with the 4E approach. Constructivist content: We adhere to the 4E approach to cognition: embodied, enacted, embedded and extended. (shrink)